1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 2 3 4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CRIMINAL NO. AMD-04-029 5 VS. WILLIE MITCHELL, et al. 6 7 DEFENDANTS 8 Baltimore, Maryland 9 April 26, 2007 10 11 The above-entitled case came on for a motions 12 hearing before the Honorable Andre M. Davis, United 13 States District Judge 14 15 16 APPEARANCES 17 For the Government: 18 Robert R. Harding, Esquire 19 Michael C. Hanlon, Esquire 20 For Defendant Mitchell: 21 Timothy J. Sullivan, Esquire 22 Laura Kelsey Rhodes, Esquire 23 24 2.5 Gail A. Simpkins, RPR Official Court Reporter

For Defendant Martin: Thomas L. Crowe, Esquire James G. Pyne, Esquire For Defendant Gardner: Barry Coburn, Esquire Adam H. Kurland, Esquire For Defendant Harris: Gerard P. Martin, Esquire Joshua R. Treem, Esquire Brendan A. Hurson, Esquire

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: We are on the record in United

States of America versus defendants, Case Number

AMD-04-0029. Counsel are present with their clients,
government represented by Mr. Harding and Mr. Hanlon.

This is the first in a series of motions hearings, status conferences that the Court has scheduled in the months leading up to the September trial. The government has helpfully provided a series of road maps on how we might best proceed through this series of proceedings.

It is my hope -- it seems to me the government's proposals make sense, as supplement by the defense. It is my hope that we can accomplish what we want to accomplish in this two-day period with a one-day session and not have to resume tomorrow. But if we resume tomorrow, it would be my hope that we can conclude with just a couple of hours of additional proceedings, so that you can all be excused before lunch tomorrow.

I understand, Mr. Harding, the government has two witnesses it would like to proceed with on one remaining Fourth Amendment issue?

MR. HARDING: Yes. Actually, I have two witnesses, but I told one of them he could go to a

meeting and come back at lunchtime. So I was in hopes the Court would permit me to put him on immediately following lunch this afternoon.

THE COURT: Sure.

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MR. HARDING: So I have Detective Donald Kramer here, Your Honor, and I will call him straightaway if the Court permits it.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from counsel on the other side to see if there are any concerns.

DEFENDANT MITCHELL: Mr. Davis, I would like to address the Court, with permission.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Mitchell, you may speak.

DEFENDANT MITCHELL: I, Willie Edward Mitchell,
III, sentient moral being, would like to rescind my
initial plea of not guilty. I would like to rescind
any controversy I caused, known, unknown. I would
like to rescind my signature for cause. I repented my
debt. I made a mistake. I reserve all rights with
explicit reservations and without prejudice.

I will also like the record to reflect I have accepted Mr. Attorney's, doing business as Tim Sullivan, offer to be my private lawyer for value and I have returned his offer to him for value for close and settlement of the account. As my private

attorney, I would like him to perform the following duties:

Do not argue the facts, request the Court to issue me an appearance bond and waive all public costs, request the Court to close the account and release the order of the Court to me immediately, request the Court to set off and adjust all public charges by the exemption and in accord with Uniform Commercial Code 3-419, House Joint Resolution 192, Public Law 73-10, request immediate discharge.

If this attorney is not able to perform his following duties, I will accept his dishonor.

THE COURT: Mr. Mitchell, the only part of what you just said that I understood is, one, you said you would like to rescind your plea of not guilty, and I am not even certain I understand what you mean by that.

The other part that you said that I thought I understood was you do not want your attorney to argue the facts. I didn't understand the rest of what you said.

Now let me ask Mr. Sullivan to address what you just said and see if he has a better understanding, and I am sure he does, than I do. Then I'll come back to you to see if you can better explain yourself.

Mr. Sullivan, good morning.

MR. SULLIVAN: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: By the way, I note that Ms. Rhodes is not present with us this morning. She will be arriving a little bit later.

MR. SULLIVAN: That's correct.

Your Honor, Mr. Mitchell, I met with Mr.

Mitchell last week, and he indicated to me that as

long as I requested and performed the five requests

that he just made to the Court, that I could continue

on as his attorney, he would not be disruptive or

cause problems in court. But in the event that I

could not perform the five requests that he made, I

would be dishonored.

I have done, and we have met as a collective group the defense and discussed these things because both Mr. Pyne and Mr. Crowe have also received from their client the same instructions.

I have researched Mr. Mitchell's requests and can't find any cognizable legal basis upon which to embark upon what he is requesting of counsel.

THE COURT: Can you, as best as you can, explain to the Court what the request is?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, I can do that, Your Honor, to the best of my ability.

The first request is that I not argue any facts whatsoever, that I not address the Court, that I not address any witnesses, that I not cross-examine any witnesses, that I not do a direct case on behalf of Mr. Mitchell, that I don't introduce any exhibits, that I absolutely do nothing during the guilt/innocence phase of the proceeding, and if he is convicted of the authorized count, do nothing in terms of mitigation or defending against the government's statutory, non-statutory aggravators in the penalty phase. So I don't do anything.

The basis for that is that if I do something, argue a fact, I will waive Mr. Mitchell's legal defense and ruin whatever he has created by this record. I told him that I wasn't inclined to do that, and we haven't really crossed that Rubicon yet.

So the first is I can't argue anything. I can't do anything, no opening, no jury selection. In fact, this morning Mr. Mitchell advised me that not discussing the facts began this morning.

The second is --

THE COURT: Now the obvious follow-up question, what is it that he wants or expects you to do if you are to do noting? Why does he want you in the case?

MR. SULLIVAN: I don't know, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SULLIVAN: It's a varying of the earlier quandary that counsel collectively found ourselves in, where we're basically left unfettered to defend our clients, even though they did not want us to represent them, but would not ask for us to be discharged by the Court. Now they have made a <u>Faretta</u> request and the Court hasn't done a <u>Faretta</u> inquiry on the right of self-representation.

I could tell the Court most candidly my position is that whatever Mr. Mitchell's request is, that I think I have an obligation ethically to make the tactical and strategic decision on behalf of my client, taking into consideration the scope of representation and how he wants to proceed. This is not one of the big three, whether to plea or not plea, whether to testify or not testify, and the like. I made it absolutely clear to Mr. Mitchell that I won't honor any of these requests in any penalty phase.

So I'm not quite sure, maybe the Court could ask
Mr. Mitchell, I am not quite sure what my role would
be, except for a potted plant. I don't know.

THE COURT: All right. So there are four other items on this list?

MR. SULLIVAN: There are four other items, Your

Honor. An appearance bond and waiving all public costs, again, I don't know the basis for that, despite inquiry.

Settling all accounts and releasing an order to Mr. Mitchell immediately, I don't know the legal basis for that as well, despite trying to figure out.

As to the setoff and adjustment of the public charges under the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 3-419, House Joint Resolution 192 and Public Law 73-10, I will tell Your Honor that I did research those three factors and they deal with the federal reserve, the gold standard and --

THE COURT: They have nothing to do with this case.

MR. SULLIVAN: In my opinion, that's correct, Your Honor.

Then a request that the Court release Mr. Mitchell was the fifth, the fifth request.

THE COURT: All right. Is there anything more you want to say, Mr. Mitchell, on this score?

DEFENDANT MITCHELL: Are you making me an offer?

THE COURT: No, I'm not making you an offer whatsoever.

DEFENDANT MITCHELL: Are you asking me to do something with force? Are you using threats, duress

and coercion or forcing me to do something for your benefit?

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THE COURT: No. I'm asking you is there any other elaboration or explanation, in light of what you just heard between the Court and Mr. Sullivan, that you can offer to explain what it is you are doing?

I'm here to accept offers and return offers for value.

DEFENDANT MITCHELL: I am not here to testify.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Mitchell, the Court is not going to bargain with you. Mr. Sullivan and Ms. Rhodes represent you. They will represent you as your attorneys, and that's the way it's going to be.

DEFENDANT MITCHELL: I accept your offer for value. I return your offer to you for value for close and settlement of the account. I request the following:

I do not argue the fact. I request the Court to issue me an appearance bond and waive all public costs, request the Court to close all accounts and release the order of the Court to me immediately.

I request the Court to set off and adjust all public charges by the exemption, in accord with the Uniform Commercial Code 3-419, House Joint Resolution 192, Public Law 73-10. I request immediate discharge.

THE COURT: All right.

DEFENDANT MARTIN: May I address the Court, Mr. Davis?

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Martin.

DEFENDANT MARTIN: Let the record reflect that

I, Shelley Wayne Martin, sentient moral being, rescind

my initial plea of not guilty. I rescind any and all

motions enter on my behalf. I rescind my signature

and cancel any consent for cause. I made a mistake.

I repented my debt. I reserve all my rights with

explicit reservation and without prejudice.

THE COURT: Mr. Martin, are you in effect joining in Mr. Mitchell's position? Is that what you are doing?

DEFENDANT MARTIN: I'm not here to testify. Are you making me an offer?

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Pyne, Mr. Crowe, can you shed any light beyond what Mr. Sullivan has already shared?

MR. CROWE: I may able to a degree, Your Honor.

As Mr. Sullivan indicated, both Mr. Pyne and I have received papers from our client, two sets of papers, and each of those instructs us to notify all parties, including the Judge, the U.S. Attorney, various court personnel, and the Department of Justice of his position. I think that being the case, I am at

a minimum free to share those papers with the Court, and I would like to do that at this time.

THE COURT: Well, before you do that, can just summarize your understanding of them?

MR. CROWE: Yes, Your Honor. The first request is not to argue the facts, and my understanding from the papers and from a brief conversation with my client today is that he wishes me to do absolutely nothing. I am not to argue the facts. I am not to argue the law, which in fact is a matter which he indicated in the strongest of terms begins today.

His second request is to request that the Judge issue me an appearance bond and waive all public costs. My assumption was that the appearance bond was a request that I ask to reopen his detention hearing and ask that the Court either release him on his personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond.

Indeed, we have prepared papers that we would be willing to file to that effect today, because that's certainly, if I am interpreting correctly, that's a proper request.

Requests three and four are those which Mr.

Sullivan has recited and it is to request that the

Court close and settle all accounts and release the

order to me immediately. The next request is to

request the Court to set off and adjust all public charges by the exemption, in accordance with the authorities which Mr. Sullivan mentioned.

I would say that the one that I think Mr. Sullivan didn't discuss was U.C.C. 3-419, which has to do with accommodation parties for negotiable instruments and has no possible, in my opinion, no possible relevance to this case.

Then the final matter was to request that the Court release me.

I guess, like Mr. Sullivan, I also feel that if
I have been appointed to represent my client, I simply
can't sit back and not argue the law and not argue the
facts.

The client certainly has the right to make the three decisions Mr. Sullivan mentioned. Both Mr. Pyne and I, of course, would consult very, very closely with the client on any other decisions, and I am generally guided, and I take their wishes even on tactical decisions very seriously. But it's not a situation where we can simply sit back and, as Mr. Sullivan indicated, sit here like potted plants in this case.

I think what the clients may be asking for is the right to represent themselves. It seems to me

that the only way that they can have a situation where their lawyers don't argue the law and their lawyers don't argue the facts is if they in fact represent themselves, either with or without standby counsel.

I am not certain that that is what the clients make, but I think that the request that we have received today, that Mr. Pyne and I have gotten in writing and that Mr. Sullivan at least has gotten orally, would require the Court to initiate a <u>Faretta</u> inquiry.

I know the Court did that to a degree I believe last November, but I think a full-fledged <u>Faretta</u> inquiry is appropriate at this time because it appears that that may be what the clients are asking for.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Crowe.

I should stand corrected. Defendant Harris is not present with us, and I will hear from counsel in just a moment.

Yes, Mr. Gardner.

DEFENDANT GARDNER: May I speak, sir?

THE COURT: Yes.

DEFENDANT GARDNER: Let the record reflect that I, Shawn-Earl Gardner, sentient moral being --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Mr. Crowe, could you move that microphone down, please?

DEFENDANT GARDNER: Let the record reflect that I, Shawn-Earl Gardner, sentient moral being, rescind my initial plea of not guilty, also any and all motions and entered on my behalf, my signature, and counsel, any consent for cause. I made a mistake. I repent of my debt. I reserve all rights with explicit reservation and without prejudice.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gardner.

Mr. Coburn, anything to add to what counsel have already stated for the record?

MR. COBURN: No. Thank you, Your Honor. I don't think we have anything to add to what has already been stated. I don't think we have any requests for the Court at this time either.

There is one scheduling issue relating to tomorrow, which at an opportune time I will raise with the Court. I know that Your Honor may have had a conversation with Judge Lambert, but that's nothing that needs to be addressed right now.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Coburn.

Mr. Treem, Mr. Martin, good morning.

MR. TREEM: Good morning, Your Honor.

MR. MARTIN: Good morning, Your Honor.

MR. TREEM: Your Honor, as you noted, Mr. Harris is not here. We were advised, Mr. Martin and I and

Mr. Hurson, this morning by the marshals that he had apparently this morning suffered another or had another epileptic seizure and we are uncertain as to what his health status is at the moment. We assume he is getting treated appropriately at Super Max, where he is being detained, and we have no further information about either his availability later today or tomorrow or what the prognosis might be.

So we are somewhat in a quandary as to how to proceed this morning. We are here. We have not had the opportunity to meet with Mr. Harris beforehand to discuss with him the proceedings today or what instructions he might want to give us in terms of how to proceed.

I think we can infer from prior proceedings that he would join in the statements made by the other defendants and the positions taken by them, and in light of that, we, I guess we suffer from somewhat the same dilemma as the other defense attorneys in terms of how we can proceed even today.

But we cannot tell the Court that we have that specific instruction, but I think it would be safe for us to infer and assume that that would be his instructions to us.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Treem.

Mr. Mitchell, do you wish to represent yourself in this case?

DEFENDANT MITCHELL: Are you making me an offer?

THE COURT: I am asking you whether you wish to represent yourself.

DEFENDANT MITCHELL: Are you giving me legal advice from the bench?

THE COURT: Do you wish to discharge your attorneys and represent yourself through the balance of these proceedings?

DEFENDANT MITCHELL: I accept your offer for value. I return your offer to you for value for close and settlement of the account. I request the following:

I do not argue the facts. I request the Court to issue an appearance bond, waive all public costs. I request the Court to close the account and release the order of Court to me immediately. I request the Court to set off and adjust all public charges by the exemption and in accord with the Uniform Commercial Code 3-419, House Joint Resolution 192, Public Law 73-10. I request immediate discharge.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. Martin, do you wish to represent yourself in this case?

DEFENDANT MARTIN: Are you using threats, duress coercion, force or fear to get me to accept something for your benefit?

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THE COURT: I am asking you if you wish to discharge your attorneys and represent yourself for the balance of these proceedings?

DEFENDANT MARTIN: I accept your offer for value, return your offer to you for value for settling and close the account. I do not wish to argue the facts.

I request the Judge to issue me an appearance bond and waive all public cost, request the Court to close all accounts and release the order of the Court to me immediately.

I request the Court to set off an adjust all public charges by exemption, in accord with the Uniform Commercial Code 3-419, House Joint Resolution 192, and Public Law 73-10, and I request immediate discharge.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Martin.

Mr. Gardner, do you wish to represent yourself in this case?

DEFENDANT GARDNER: Are you making me an offer, sir?

THE COURT: I'm asking you whether you wish to

1 discharge your counsel and represent yourself for the 2 balance of these proceedings. 3 DEFENDANT GARDNER: Are you offering me legal advice from the bench? 4 5 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gardner. You may be 6 seated. 7 Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Martin, Mr. Gardner, your 8 responses --9 DEFENDANT GARDNER: I wasn't finished. 10 THE COURT: -- to the Court are no, you do not 11 wish to represent yourself. 12 DEFENDANT GARDNER: You're not going to let me finish? 13 14 THE COURT: So, therefore, your attorneys will 15 continue to represent you under appointment of the 16 Court. The question that remains is do you wish to 17 remain here today through the balance of these 18 proceedings or do you wish to leave the courtroom? 19 Mr. Mitchell, what is your desire? 20 DEFENDANT MITCHELL: I accept your offer for

DEFENDANT MITCHELL: I accept your offer for value. I return your offer to you for value for close and settling of the account. I request the following:

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I do not argue the facts. I request the Court to release the order of the Court to me immediately.

I request the Court to issue me an appearance bond and

waive all public cost. I request the Court to close all accounts and release the order of the Court to me immediately. I request the Court to set off and adjust all public charges by the exemption and in accord with Uniform Commercial Code 3-419, House Joint Resolution 192, Public Law 73-10. I request immediate discharge.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Martin, do you wish to remain in the courtroom or do you wish to depart the courtroom?

DEFENDANT MARTIN: I accept your offer for value, return your offer to you for value for settling and close the account. I do not wish to argue the facts. I request the Court to issue an appearance bond and waive all public costs. I request the Court to close all accounts and release the order of the Court to me immediately. I request the Court to set off and adjust all public charges by exemption, in accord with the Uniform Commercial Code 3-419, House Joint Resolution 192, and Public Law 73-10, and I request immediate discharge.

THE COURT: Mr. Gardner, do you wish to remain in the courtroom or do you wish to depart the courtroom for the remainder of the proceedings?

DEFENDANT GARDNER: I accept your offer for

value and return your offer to you for value for closure, for full close and settlement of the account and request -- I do not wish to argue the facts. I request that you issue me an appearance bond and waive all public costs. I request that you close the account and release the order of the Court to me immediately.

I request you setoff and adjust all public charges by exemption, in accord with UCC 3-419, House Joint Resolution 192, and Public Law 73-10, and request discharge immediately, sir.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gardner.

All right. I treat the responses of the defendants as a yes. They wish to remain here, unless and until they demonstrate through their behavior that they wish not to be here.

Was it Mr. Kramer that you have available now, Mr. Harding?

MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. We will proceed with the suppression hearing with respect to Mr. Mitchell's arrest on April 1, 2002. You may call the witness.

MR. TREEM: Your Honor, before Mr. Harding does that, may I be heard for one moment?

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Treem.

MR. TREEM: Your Honor, as I said, we are somewhat at a loss as to what our role should be here today, and we would request that unless and until Mr. Harris has had the opportunity to respond to the Faretta inquiry that the Court has just engaged in with other defendants, that Mr. Harris and us, as his lawyers, not be, not participate in the remainder of these hearings and that Mr. Martin and Mr. Hurson and I be excused.

THE COURT: I certainly understand the request,
Mr. Treem, and don't find it unreasonable, but the
request is denied. As we all know, while a defendant
has the right to be present for all proceedings, the
right to be present for legal argument is more limited
than relevant factual development and factual
evidentiary-type hearings.

I don't intend to have an evidentiary hearing today with respect to Mr. Harris. You and Mr. Hurson and Mr. Martin are fully capable of presenting your legal arguments that we will focus on today on behalf of Mr. Harris.

I think that your earlier comments are well taken. The Court has every reason to believe that Mr. Harris's responses to the Court will echo those of the other defendants, and the Court's determination as to

Mr. Harris will be exactly the same as the Court's determination as to the remaining three defendants.

So, counsel, remain fully engaged in the case. Counsel will continue to advocate on behalf of your clients with the vigor that is customary in your professional lives, and we will proceed in that fashion.

MR. TREEM: Might I inquire, Your Honor, what would be the Court's intention in terms of conducting an appropriate Faretta inquiry with regard to Mr. Harris so at least we can advise him as to what the Court's intentions are?

THE COURT: As soon as he is available either tomorrow or perhaps later this afternoon, if he can be brought over, which I don't assume he will be, but perhaps he will. But as soon as he is next in court, the Court will certainly undertake a <u>Faretta</u> inquiry of Mr. Harris.

MR. TREEM: To the extent, therefore, Your

Honor, that on the chance that he does decide to

discharge us as counsel, that he not be prejudiced by

any arguments that we might make since his intention

would have been to discharge us today had he been

here.

THE COURT: I don't believe that would be his

intention, but I certainly don't perceive any possibility of prejudice to Mr. Harris from any arguments you might make on his behalf.

To the extent that Mr. Harris or any defendant truly wishes not to contest the facts of the case, your argument on his behalf on legal issues, such as severance, dismissal of the indictment and such, can't possibly prejudice his desire if it is his desire in effect to stand mute.

MR. TREEM: Well, Your Honor, in that regard, I suspect that there is a very real possibility, especially with regard to the severance issues, that there may be representations of what the factual development might be both in the guilt/innocence phase and in the sentencing phase, which would directly implicate Mr. Harris and his relationship to the other defendants, which he may not wish us to disclose.

THE COURT: Except at this point you represent him.

MR. TREEM: Very well, Your Honor. Therefore, my request at least that should he decide that he does wish to discharge us and had he been here today, he would have done so, that he not be bound by whatever representations we might make on his behalf in that regard.

THE COURT: I appreciate it, Mr. Treem. Even were he present and even were he to tell the Court that he wished to discharge counsel, as the government's memorandum quite accurately points out, there is no strong reason to believe that the Court would grant that request.

MR. TREEM: Well, I would like --

THE COURT: There is in fact very strong reason to believe that the Could would deny the request. I' not saying I will deny it. I'm not saying I'll grant it. I don't know what I'll do if the request is ever made.

But I'm satisfied that on the present record, under the present circumstances, it is entirely consistent with Mr. Harris's due process rights to a fair proceeding to have you and co-counsel continue to represent him.

MR. TREEM: Very well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. SULLIVAN: Before we call Mr. Kramer, can I just address one other thing?

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Sullivan.

MR. SULLIVAN: To complete the Court's inquiry on the interpretation issue, I understand the Court's ruling and certainly Ms. Rhodes and I, and probably

all counsel, will continue to zealously and effectively represent our clients. But there is an ethical issue here that I think the Court needs to give us some guidance on.

So the Court has defaulted to the constitutional issue that because there is an ambiguous or no response, that we are still their attorneys, that they have not invoked sufficiently their right to self-representation.

THE COURT: I'm sorry to interrupt. Let me be clear. It was not an ambiguous response.

MR. SULLIVAN: Okay.

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THE COURT: The response was no, I don't want self-representation.

MR. SULLIVAN: That's fine. It's the same thing.

Your Honor, that leaves us with Rule, Model Rule

1.2, for those lawyers who are licensed in Maryland,
which are incorporated by this Court's Local Rules.

That rule says that a lawyer shall abide by a client's
decision concerning the objectives of the
representation and, when appropriate, shall consult
with the client as of means by which they are to be
pursued.

Now what has happened now before today, they

didn't want us, but they didn't want us fired. So we were unfettered to continue our preparations, continue developing for the trial, both phases if we get there.

But now Mr. Mitchell has done this factor one, no arguments, no facts. It's going to come to a head as soon as Mr. Harding finishes his direct examination of the detective, and I'm with a quandary to recognize and abide by Mr. Mitchell's --

THE COURT: Excuse me. The record will reflect that Ms. Rhodes has arrived. Good morning, Ms. Rhodes.

MS. RHODES: Good morning.

THE COURT: Sorry, Mr. Sullivan. Go ahead.

MR. SULLIVAN: That's quite all right.

To abide by the scope of representation that Mr. Mitchell has instructed me. Your Honor, I fear that unless the Court directs us that your scope of Mr. Mitchell shall be unfettered, that, you know, at some point in time Mr. Hirshman will be asking me, you had a client who wanted to go down a specific path. He wanted his defense to be in a specific way and you ignored him essentially.

So I'm just looking for the Court --

THE COURT: Of course, Mr. Sullivan, I will take every phone call placed to you by Mr. Hirshman, and

that's true for each of the counsel here.

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you.

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THE COURT: I invite you to put call forwarding on your phone and any call any counsel in this case should receive from the Attorney Grievance Commission Office should come directly to my office.

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: But to be clear, and perhaps less whimsical, I am indeed directing counsel, as officers of the court, as appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice Act, to continue your representation vigorously and zealously on behalf of your respective clients and to continue to make the customary tactical and strategic decisions that tradition assigns to the role of counsel in a criminal case.

The Court obviously has an independent responsibility under the Sixth Amendment to insure that each defendant, no matter what his desire, receives a fair trial and a fair and impartial adjudication of the facts. So the Court has no hesitation whatsoever in its conclusion expressed to counsel that the proceedings will go forward in the customary way.

As I said, the defendant will either be present or not, at their election.

29 Mr. Harding, you may call your witness. 1 2 MR. HARDING: Thank you. 3 THE CLERK: Raise your right hand. 4 DONALD KRAMER 5 a witness called on behalf of the Government, having 6 been previously duly sworn, was examined and testified 7 as follows: THE CLERK: Be seated. 8 For the record, state your name and spell it for 9 10 the record, please. 11 THE WITNESS: Sergeant Donald Kramer. Last name 12 K R A M E R, Baltimore City Police Department. 13 DIRECT EXAMINATION 14 BY MR. HARDING: 15 Good morning, Sergeant Kramer. 16 Good morning. 17 Can you tell us, sir, what is your assignment 18 with the Baltimore City Police Department right now? 19 Narcotics division. Α 20 Q Okay. Is that in some particular precinct or --21 Northern district. 22 Can you tell us -- well, tell us how long you 23 have been a Baltimore City Police Department. 24 Α 18 years. 2.5 Can you tell us what your assignment was back in

April, the early part of April of 2002? 1 2 I was assigned to the Baltimore City Homicide 3 Division and I was working with the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Red Run Group. 4 5 So were you on a long-term detail to the Red Run 6 Group at DEA? 7 Yes, sir. I was there approximately three 8 years. Do you recall, were you involved in an arrest on 9 April 1, 2002? 10 11 Yes, sir. 12 Can you tell us the name of the person who you 13 arrested or participated in arresting? 14 Willie Mitchell. 15 Can you tell us, were you involved in the 16 investigation of Mr. Mitchell prior to that day or did 17 you simply become involved at the time of the arrest? 18 I became involved on that date for enforcement 19 purposes. 20 MR. SULLIVAN: I'm sorry. For what purposes? 21 THE WITNESS: Enforcement purposes, to place him 22 under arrest. 23 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you. 24 BY MR. HARDING: 25 Did you have an understanding with your fellow

officers, Sergeant Kramer, and the other agents in Red 1 Run about whether you would interview Mr. Mitchell? 2 3 We had an agreement that we would not. Can you tell us what you did agree to, what you 4 5 were intending to do? 6 Α Simply place him under arrest. 7 What were your arresting him for? Outstanding warrant, at least one outstanding 8 warrant of violence. 9 Okay. Were you the one that made the decision 10 11 that you and your fellow officers and agents were not 12 going to interview Mr. Mitchell that day? I did not make that decision. 13 Α 14 Okay. Do you remember who did or do you --There came a time I received that information 15 16 before arresting him, but I don't recall from whom. 17 Were you on foot or in a vehicle that day? 0 18 I was in a vehicle. Α 19 Was it an unmarked vehicle or a marked patrol 20 car? 21 It was an unmarked minivan. Α 22 Were you in plainclothes or in uniform that day? Q 23 Α I was in plainclothes. Can you tell us, were you alone in the vehicle 24

or were you with other people?

1 There were two others in my vehicle. I was 2 driving. Detective Keith Benson, who was my partner 3 at the time, was with me, and sometime before arresting Mr. Mitchell, there was a Baltimore County 4 5 detective placed in the van with me for communication 6 purposes. 7 Q I see. Were you positioned in Baltimore County at this time? 8 Yes, sir. There came a time when we received 9 10 information that he may be at his girlfriend's place 11 of work. 12 I see. Can you tell us where that was? That was in the vicinity of Owings Mills Mall 13 14 near Red Run Boulevard. 15 Do you recall the name of the Baltimore County 16 detective who was in your vehicle with you? I do not. 17 A 18 You said he was present in the vehicle for 19 communication purposes. Can you explain what you mean 20 by that?

A Being a Baltimore City detective at the time, I had communications with Baltimore City KGA or communications, but I, myself, or Keith Benson did not have communications with Baltimore County. So at some point in time, someone made the decision to place a

21

22

23

24

Baltimore County detective in the van with myself and 1 2 Detective Benson so we could communicate with 3 Baltimore County if in fact we had to, because we were in the county. We were not in the city. 4 5 Was your vehicle the only one deployed at Red 6 Run Boulevard near Owings Mills Mall? 7 I believe there were others, but I can't be sure who or where they were. 8 Well, were there other vehicles at other 9 locations? 10 11 Absolutely. 12 Were you within -- could you see other vehicles 13 from where you were? 14 I don't recall. 15 Did there come a time when you started to follow 16 a certain vehicle that afternoon? There came a time we received information that 17 18 Willie Mitchell was a passenger in a small dark color 19 sedan and that his girlfriend was driving the vehicle. 20 Do you recall the means by which you learned 21 that information? 22 Α No, I do not. 23 Q What did you do when you got that information? 24 Α We started following the vehicle. 25 Q Do you recall, was it by radio that you got this

information or was it by some --

- A I believe it was by radio communications, but I don't know who actually told us that.
 - Q Were you driving the vehicle that day or were you a passenger?
 - A I was driving.

- Q Did there come a time when someone in your vehicle made a radio transmission to other people in the police department?
 - A I remember telling Baltimore County -- myself or Detective Benson, I don't recall who, told the Baltimore County detective that we would need a marked patrol car to stop the vehicle, because we did not have emergency equipment on the minivan.
 - Q Could you see who was in the vehicle at the time from your van?
 - A I could see there were two occupants.
 - Q Okay. So what happened after this radio transmission was made about a marked patrol car? What happened?
 - We were on Reisterstown Road, headings towards

 Baltimore City -- we were still in Baltimore County -
 when a Baltimore County police cruiser pulled up

 behind the vehicle, the suspect vehicle, and in front

 of me.

That Baltimore County cruiser activated its emergency lights. The vehicle did pull over in front of an Exxon on Reisterstown Road.

At that time I placed -- I drove the minivan to the passenger side, basically taking up a tactical position in case Mr. Mitchell was to flee or try to do something else.

- Q Okay. What happened next?
- 9 A I exited my vehicle. He got out. He did not 10 give any resistance.
- 11 Q You're talking about Mr. Mitchell?
- 12 A Mr. Mitchell that is.
- 13 Q Okay.

1

2

3

4

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6

7

- 14 A He placed his hands in the air as I requested.
- I did a pat down of his person and found a loaded nine
 millimeter handgun in his ankle area, in his boot or
 sock.
- Q Did you notice anything unusual about Mr.
- 19 Mitchell that day?
- 20 A He was a bit jittery. I thought he was nervous.
- 21 He smelled strongly of alcohol, and there was a bottle
- of alcohol on the floor of the vehicle where he was
- 23 sitting.
- Q Okay. Did Mr. Mitchell say anything when you
- 25 arrested him?

- Q How much time passed before Mr. Mitchell was transported away from the scene on Reisterstown Road?
 - A Maybe a minute went by.

He did not.

5 MR. SULLIVAN: Objection to maybe.

THE COURT: Overruled. Go head, officer, or detective.

THE WITNESS: Approximately a minute went by and he was placed into a Baltimore County prisoner transport vehicle, a patrol car with a cage in the back.

BY MR. HARDING:

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- Q And what did you do during that minute or so before he was transported away?
- A I did a search of his vehicle for any more weapons. Basically I held onto him, and then I did a search of the vehicle after he was taken from me.
- Q Were there other officers on the scene by that time? I guess there were the uniformed officers, but were there any other officers?
- A One or two uniformed officers, myself, Detective Benson, and the Baltimore County detective at least.
- 23 Q Did you ever talk to Willie Mitchell that day?
- 24 A I did not.
- 25 Q Did you give him Miranda warnings?

The only thing I said to him was I gave him 1 2 orders to step out of the vehicle and place his hands 3 up. So you did or did not give him Miranda warnings? 4 I did not give him Miranda. 5 6 Did you see or hear anyone give him Miranda 7 warnings that day? 8 I did not. Α 9 What did you do after he was cuffed and put in this patrol car? 10 At that time, he wasn't my responsibility. He 11 12 was in the custody of the officer operating that vehicle. 13 14 What did you do? 15 I responded to Valdivia Court, I believe it 16 is -- I may be mistaken on the name -- to conduct the 17 search warrant at his girlfriend's apartment with 18 other detectives in the Red Run Group. 19 I see. Did you have any more contact with 20 Willie Mitchell that day? 21 Α I did not. 22 MR. HARDING: Thank you. I have no further 23 questions, Your Honor. 24 DEFENDANT MITCHELL: I fully accept the 25 government's offer for value. I return the offer to

him for value for close and settlement of the account. 1 2 I request the following: 3 I do not argue the facts, request the Court to issue me an appearance bond and waive all public cost. 4 I request the Court to close all accounts and 5 6 release the order of the Court to me immediately. I 7 request the Court to set off and adjust all public 8 charges by the exemption, in accord with Uniform 9 Commercial Code 3-419, House Joint Resolution 192, 10 Public Law 73-10. I request immediate discharge. 11 THE COURT: I am not going to permit repeated 12 disruptions, Mr. Mitchell. 13 You may proceed, Mr. Sullivan. 14 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 15 CROSS-EXAMINATION 16 BY MR. SULLIVAN: 17 Good morning, sergeant. 18 Good morning. Α 19 Did you bring any reports that you prepared 20 about this April 1, 2002 arrest of Mr. Mitchell, 21 because I don't see any up there? 22 Α Because I didn't bring any. 23 Okay. Just so I understand, there are no 24 reports by you of what you just testified to? 25 Α Correct.

```
1
              Are there reports about who you arrested on
        March 30th of 2002.
 2
 3
              I believe there is.
              Who did you arrest on March 30th of 2002?
 4
       Q
 5
       Α
              Willie Mitchell.
 6
              I thought he was April 1, 2002.
       Q
 7
              My mistake.
       Α
 8
              Well, when you arrested people -- let's pick a
 9
        date, any date.
10
              March 1, 2002, who did you arrest that day?
11
              I don't recall.
       Α
12
              That's why you keep reports, right?
13
       Α
              We keep reports to keep accurate dates on file.
14
              And also sergeant -- you have been a detective,
15
        what? You've been a police officer 18 years, right?
16
              That's correct?
17
              So you know, detective, do you not, that one of
18
        the reasons that you keep reports is when you are
19
        called to testify against a person that you arrested,
20
        you can refresh your recollection and remember what
21
        happened, right?
22
              I did not make any reports that day.
23
              I understand that. But the answer to my
24
        question is that's one of the reasons why you keep
25
        reports, correct?
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40 We do keep reports for those purposes. I did 1 2 not record that on that date. 3 Just so I understand, on this day you were 4 working Red Run with the DEA, right? 5 Yes, sir. Α 6 You know, of course, what a DEA-6 is, don't you? Q 7 Α Yes, sir. 8 What is that? Q 9 It's an administrative report. Α Or a report of investigation, right? Something 10 11 you had done that day, right? 12 Yes, sir. Α 13 In your official law enforcement capacity, 14 correct? 15 Yes, sir. Α 16 Are you telling me, just so I understand this, 17 that you are telling Judge Davis today there is not a 18 single report penned by you about what you just 19 testified to? 20 Α That's correct. 21 Now, on April 26, 2007, you are just testifying 22 from your recall of your April 1, not March 30th, your 23 April 1, 2002 arrest of Mr. Mitchell? 24 I am going from my memory recall and 25 administrative report that was authored by someone

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41
 1
        else.
 2
              What report was that?
              That was a report authored by Detective Giganti.
 3
       Α
              THE COURT: I'm sorry?
 4
              Detective who?
 5
 6
       Α
              Detective Giganti. I'm sorry.
 7
              Could you spell that?
       Q
 8
              G I G A N T I, I believe.
       Α
 9
              Who is this person?
       Q
10
              He is a detective with the City police
11
        department.
12
              Homicide or narcotics?
              He was in homicide at that time.
13
       Α
14
              And when did you look at this report?
       0
15
             About a month ago.
       Α
16
             Did it refresh your recollection?
             It did.
17
       Α
              Okay. Before you looked at it, did you have no
18
19
        recollection of this?
20
       Α
              I had -- yes, I did have some recollection, but
21
        it was five years ago.
22
              Do you have --
23
              MR. SULLIVAN: Let me ask the government.
24
        Court's indulgence.
25
              (Pause.)
```

Now help me out with something else, sergeant. 1 2 When a task force that you were a member of is going 3 to arrest somebody who had outstanding warrants, law enforcement does some kind of planning, right? 4 5 Yes. 6 You just don't go out into the neighborhood and 7 hope that you run into the person. You have a meeting 8 and you discuss an action plan or an execution plan or whatever you guys call it, right? 9 Not necessarily all of that or in that order. 10 No, sir. 11 12 Well, on April 1, 2002, could you tell us who was at the meeting to discuss the arrest of Mr. 13 14 Mitchell? 15 I don't recall a meeting per se. I do remember 16 receiving information, as I was working on other cases 17 myself, that there was an outstanding warrant for 18 Willie Mitchell. I don't know exactly where I was or 19 who gave me that information at that time, but I did 20 meet up with other investigators, both county and 21 city, to safely arrest him on at least one open 22 warrant. 23 Well, who is the person, detective or sergeant, 24 who told you don't question Mr. Mitchell?

I don't recall.

25

Α

```
43
 1
              Well, who was there?
 2
       Α
              Who was there, who was working with me that day?
 3
              Who --
       Q
              Who was part of the operation?
 4
       Α
 5
              That wasn't a good question. Let me ask it this
 6
        way.
 7
              Who told you not to ask Mr. Mitchell any
 8
        questions?
 9
              I don't recall.
       Α
10
              Well, who was involved with you in executing the
11
        arrest warrant on Mr. Mitchell?
12
       Α
              Several detectives, both city and county.
              And they have names?
13
       Q
14
              I can recall some of their names.
       Α
15
              Sure. That's what I would like.
16
              Sergeant James Hagin, Detective Chris Graul,
17
        Detective Keith Benson, Detective Giganti.
18
              Which one of these, sergeant, told you whatever
19
        you do, don't ask Mr. Mitchell any questions?
              I don't recall. I don't know if it was told to
20
21
        me like that.
22
              Well, how was it told to you?
       Q
23
       Α
              I don't recall.
24
       Q
              Well, didn't you just --
25
              You remember Mr. Harding asking you some
```

44 1 questions about ten minutes ago, right? 2 Yes, I do. 3 And didn't you answer to him, sergeant, that you were simply to arrest him and not ask him any 4 5 questions, do not interview him? I do remember that, yes. 6 Α 7 Who told you that? 0 I don't recall. 8 Α How many members of the arrest team were there? 9 Q 10 I don't know. 11 Just so I understand this, your actual contact 12 with Mr. Mitchell lasted approximately one minute, 13 right, your actual physical contact? 14 Approximately, yes, sir. 15 Right. If I understand your testimony, you 16 drove your minivan up to the passenger side once the 17 county cruiser effectuated the traffic stop, got Mr. 18 Mitchell out of his vehicle, patted him down, and then 19 turned him over to a county police officer, correct? 20 Α Yes, sir. 21 The only thing you said to Mr. Mitchell was I 22 quess put your hands up? 23 I asked him to get out of the car and place his 24 hands where I could see them in the air. 25 And your demeanor and tone was just like you're

45 testifying today? 1 2 Probably not. 3 And you probably had your service weapon drawn on him, correct? 4 5 Correct. And other officers probably had their service 6 7 weapons drawn too, correct? 8 I know that I did. I don't know what they were 9 doing. 10 0 Right. My focus was on Mr. Mitchell. 11 12 Right. So you drew your weapon, got Mr. 13 Mitchell out, told him to put his hands up, patted him 14 down, gave him to a county officer, and that ended 15 your involvement, correct? 16 That is correct. 17 Now would it be a fair statement, sergeant, that 18 you might have been a part of the Red Run Task Force, 19 but that this was not your case? 20 Α That's correct? 21 And while you were busy working other cases, 22 somebody called for your assistance on this occasion 23 in April of 2002, correct? 24 Α That's correct. 25 Who was that person who called for your

```
46
 1
        assistance?
 2
              I don't recall.
 3
              MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you.
              DEFENDANT MITCHELL: Your Honor, Your Honor.
 4
 5
              THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further, Mr.
 6
        Harding?
 7
              MR. HARDING: No, Your Honor.
 8
              DEFENDANT MITCHELL: Your Honor.
 9
              MR. COBURN: I have some questions, Your Honor,
10
        if I may?
              THE COURT: All right, Mr. Coburn.
11
12
              DEFENDANT MITCHELL: May I speak?
13
              THE COURT: No, Mr. Mitchell.
14
              DEFENDANT MITCHELL: I accept your offer. I
        reserve all rights with explicit reservation and
15
16
        without prejudice.
17
              THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Coburn.
18
              MR. COBURN: Thank you so much, Your Honor.
19
                           CROSS-EXAMINATION
20
        BY MR. COBURN:
21
              Good morning, Sergeant Kramer.
22
       Α
              Good morning, sir.
23
              You are an employee of the Baltimore City Police
24
        Department; is that correct?
25
       Α
              Yes, sir.
```

47 1 And you were so employed back in April of 2002; 2 is that correct? 3 I was. You were working as part of what you referred to 4 5 as the Red Run -- that's R E D R U N -- Task Force; is 6 that right? 7 Yes, sir. 8 But your assignment within the Baltimore City 9 Police Department was, did you say it was in the 10 Homicide Division? 11 Correct. 12 You testified I believe in response to some questions that I think were both from Mr. Harding and 13 14 from Mr. Sullivan that you were in an unmarked minivan 15 at the time the stop of Mr. Mitchell's vehicle was 16 effected; is that right? 17 That's correct. Α 18 The minivan was on Reisterstown Road; is that 19 correct? 20 Α As I remember, yes, sir. 21 Mr. Mitchell's vehicle was also on Reisterstown 22 Road; is that correct? 23 I don't know if it was actually his vehicle or 24 not. 25 No. I didn't mean his vehicle.

48 The vehicle he was in. 1 Α 2 I withdraw the question. 3 The vehicle in which he was a passenger was also 4 on Reisterstown Road at the time the stop was 5 effected; is that right? 6 Α Yes, sir. 7 Now this particular location on Reisterstown Road is in Baltimore County; is that right? 8 9 It is. Α It's not part of Baltimore City; is that right? 10 11 That's correct. Α 12 You testified, did you not, in response to one of Mr. Sullivan's questions, and again, I think also 13 14 in response to Mr. Harding, that it was you who, after 15 the vehicle was stopped, ordered Mr. Mitchell out; is 16 that correct? 17 Yes, sir. 18 I believe your words were you ordered him to get out of the vehicle and put his hands where you could 19 20 see them; is that right? 21 Correct. Α 22 And you indicated in response to Mr. Sullivan 23 that you had your service weapon drawn and pointed in 24 his direction at the time; is that right? 25 Α Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Mr. Coburn, where are we going?

MR. COBURN: I have no further questions, Your

THE COURT: Okay. Good.

Honor.

Anything else, Mr. Harding?

MR. HARDING: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Detective Kramer.

All right. We had a number of legal issues I think counsel may or may not want to be heard on. Let me start with this whole issue of mental health. Where do we stand on those issues, counsel? Mr. Harding?

MR. HARDING: Your Honor, the government submitted a proposed order for discovery on mental health issues many months ago. We request that the Court -- we also submitted modeled proposed orders that were issued in similar capital cases recently in this district.

So the government requests that the Court issue a discovery order on mental health issues. I guess the complication here is that we don't know how much mental health evidence there is going to be or exactly how to schedule when it appears that there isn't going

to be an opportunity to conduct, for example,

psychiatric or psychological examinations of these

defendants. But I think we have to proceed somehow

because we are getting within five months or so now, a

little over five months before the trial.

So the government requests that the Court enter a scheduling order on mental health issues.

THE COURT: Let me start with Mr. Sullivan or Ms. Rhodes if there is anything to be said on that.

MR. SULLIVAN: Only, Your Honor, that 12.2 sets forth the procedure for the Court and parties to consider. I think Mr. Harding is right, that it might be much ado about nothing because whether we have it done now or not done before Mr. Mitchell elected to proceed like he did, it's not ripe until such time as we make a declaration that we are going to do it.

Now if we did it, we have to give the government notice of that, but I wouldn't object to the Court placing an order into effect.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. Crowe, Mr. Pyne?

MR. CROWE: Your Honor, we are in a somewhat different position because the government is not seeking to execute our client. At this point we don't know of any likely mental health defense.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CROWE: But we certainly wouldn't object to the entry of an order.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Coburn.

MR. COBURN: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I think the inquiry that Mr. Harding just made was directed mainly at us.

There has been some pretty extensive briefing about this already that's in the file. The government filed a motion with respect to disclosure. We filed at least a couple of responses. I guess we have no objection to Your Honor resolving that on the papers after reviewing the motion and responses that have been propounded on this.

There is, I mean there is an issue about it or a couple of issues procedurally in terms of just sort of when this has to happen and, you know, when any sort of preclusive effect of non-disclosure might take effect, that sort of thing.

I should tell Your Honor that we've actually already made an initial Rule 12.2 disclosure in this case. In fact, I think we've made several of them.

But our suggestion to the Court is just that Your Honor review the paperwork and rule on the papers.

THE COURT: All right. I intend to enter the government's proposed order.

MR. COBURN: Your Honor knows, we do object to it.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. COBURN: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Treem.

DEFENDANT GARDNER: Can I speak, sir?

THE COURT: No, Mr. Gardner. Thank you.

DEFENDANT GARDNER: I would like to reserve my rights with explicit reservation and without prejudice.

THE COURT: It's reserved.

MR. TREEM: Your Honor, we, as the Court knows, we are just now getting the budget approved, and so Mr. Martin and I have not even had the opportunity to discuss the possibility of mental health issues with regard to Mr. Harris with any potential experts or otherwise discuss it even with him. So we are not in a position to put anyone on notice just yet.

But having said that, I think it is obvious from at least today's events and from other events that, other seizures that Mr. Harris has had which are known because they occurred while he was in custody, that there may well, very well be the likelihood of some

historical mental health evidence with respect to his conditions. Whether that amounts to a defense or not, we don't know at this point, but I think it would be -- it's certainly likely that there would be some historical testimony about all of this.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Treem.

Well, the Court certainly is going to be as accommodating as it possibly can be under the circumstances, with the efforts by counsel to produce what is required under the rules. But as I have said before on the record, it's not an open-ended pathway, and there is a risk that the defendants could forfeit their opportunities to adduce such evidence if good faith isn't shown. I will leave it at that.

All right. Why don't we move to issues of discovery, if there are any remaining. Mr. Sullivan.

MR. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, I don't believe we have any outstanding discovery-related pleadings.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Crowe.

MR. CROWE: Your Honor, on behalf of Mr. Martin,
I believe we have a number of discovery issues which
are open.

We have filed an initial motion for a Bill of Particulars, I believe sometime in 2005.

Subsequently, when the third superseding

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indictment came down last November, we asked for a more limited Bill of Particulars because we felt at that time it was going to be necessary to get a little additional information to understand the third superseding indictment and its extension of the conspiracy through August of 2006, and the other allegations that were in there as well.

Just to review for the Court, in terms of our initial motion, we asked for what I think is pretty standard stuff, the names and other identification information of co-conspirators and aiders and abetters, the roles which were played by any unnamed conspirator and aider and abetter.

THE COURT: Mr. Crowe, it would be helpful if you could just tell me what you don't presently have that you believe you are entitled to.

MR. CROWE: Your Honor, I don't think I have ever been in a case where I received so much paper and I really know so little.

I do not know -- although my client is charged with two murders, those being the murders of the two Wyche brothers, I don't know whether they are claiming that my client was an individual who was present at the scene, whether the government is claiming that he is the person who actually pulled the trigger and

fired a bullet, whether he was an aider and abettor in some other, whether he was an aider and abettor in some other situation.

In addition to that, the --

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THE COURT: Well, I'm sorry. What do you know?

MR. CROWE: I know very, very little. I know

that there is no physical evidence in terms of the

fingerprints or forensic evidence that connects him to

the crime.

I am informed that some individuals have apparently identified his voice on a tape which the government alleges was made shortly after the murder.

So just to bring it down to, I mean to particulars, the government asserts that after the murder was committed, individuals were riding in a car. One of the items they had with them was a cell phone, which was seized from one the of Wyche brothers. They began talking, and somebody apparently pushed a button which caused the conversation to be sent into the voice mail.

THE COURT: Right. Yeah, I understand all of that. But from what you are saying, it sounds like you are saying you received no reports, no autopsies, no, you haven't received anything on this, and that's --

MR. CROWE: No. We've certainly gotten that. I mean I understand that people died, that people were arrested. But in terms of what it is alleged that my client has done, I have no idea what that is about.

Perhaps equally important, we were told that there were apparently all of these co-conspirators and aiders and abetters and that in the RICO enterprise, there were people who weren't members, but they were associates and they were in some fashion involved, in some fashion involved in either the RICO conspiracy, the drug conspiracy or the RICO enterprise. We certainly don't know that.

We asked, for example, for the names of the individuals who physically committed each murder.

That doesn't seem to be anything which is particularly revolution-like, and we asked --

THE COURT: When you say physically committed each murder, you mean you want to know the identity of the trigger person?

MR. CROWE: Yes, and we also wanted to know the names of the individuals who aided and abetted the murder and the roles that they played. Those were for the two substantive counts for the murders of Darryl and Anthony Wyche.

As I said, it was really a very, very limited

Bill of Particulars that we asked for in that instance.

With respect to the third superseding indictment, and, as the Court knows, we have made a motion to dismiss certain allegations and to bar the government from putting on any evidence of activities after February 2004, which was the date which was supposedly the end date for all of these activities in the various counts, we just want to know who the members of the RICO enterprise were and to tell us who the people they thought were members after February 2004. We want the same information for associates, which is a term that the indictment uses, and what they did after 2004.

Then we asked for acts of racketeering activity, as that term is defined in the statutes, which were committed after February of 2004.

In our motion to dismiss we make the claim, and it's pretty, you know, I think fairly forcefully, that we don't think that the government really has any evidence that this RICO enterprise, and the conspiracy to violate RICO, subsisted beyond that time.

We are asking for what I think is really the most basic type of information, and in a case such as this, which is both complex and very serious, we think

that it's something which is warranted.

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Bills of particulars are funny things. I mean you can find authority for almost any proposition under the sun for a Bill of Particulars for either granting information or denying information.

The points which are clear under the <u>Will</u> case is that we don't have to show any cause for getting a Bill of Particulars. The Fourth Circuit decisions are quite clear that we are entitled to a Bill of Particulars and the Court has the discretion to grant a Bill of Particulars either where it furnishes necessary information about the crime that is charged or where it is necessary in order to prepare a defense.

We think that as far as that concerned, that it is just quite clear that what we have asked for, and again I would say that it is very, very limited, that we should be entitled to it.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from the government.

MR. HARDING: Well, Judge, the --

THE COURT: I guess the focus is the Wyche murders, Mr. Harding.

MR. HARDING: Yes. We have turned over everything that the government is required to turn

over under Rule 16 and in fact, because of the scheduling of the trial of Mr. Gardner a year ago, we turn over the <u>Jencks</u> material for that murder to Mr. Gardner's attorneys at that time. I assume that Mr. Gardner's attorneys have not shared that information with their fellow defense counsel, but I can assure the Court that nothing that has been withheld from Mr. Crowe and Mr. Pyne is material that they should have been receiving under Rule 16. It's <u>Jencks</u> material, or Grand Jury transcripts is basically what we are talking about here.

The evidence that we have addressing the issues that Mr. Martin, I mean, sorry, that Mr. Crowe spoke to come from Grand Jury transcripts of our cooperators.

THE COURT: When are you going to provide <u>Jencks</u> for the September 17 trial?

MR. HARDING: Well, we provided it to Mr. Gardner's attorneys approximately a month before the start of that trial.

THE COURT: Are you going to keep with that schedule?

MR. HARDING: Yes, I think so, Your Honor. I might add for the benefit of Mr. Crowe, he already knows one of the cooperators who identifies his client's role in this murder and it is quite clear on

the papers because he has filed another motion to preclude the government from using that evidence, claiming that there is a Bruton issue. The government's position is that it is a co-conspirator statement.

2.5

But Mr. Crowe is not completely unaware of what the evidence is going to be regarding his client's participation in that crime.

THE COURT: When are you going to disclose who the shooter was in all the murders, to the extent you haven't so far?

MR. HARDING: Your Honor, there are disputes over who the shooters were.

THE COURT: Okay. Understandable.

MR. HARDING: And that's certainly true as to Mr. Coburn and Mr. Kurland. Now that's true for the Tanya Jones-Spence murder.

THE COURT: Is it true about all the murders?

MR. HARDING: I would say so. Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. When you say disputes, do you mean disputes among and between the government witnesses, between --

MR. HARDING: To some extent, and also there is some evidence that points in one direction and some evidence that points in another direction.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HARDING: The government doesn't, of course, have to prove that some particular person was the shooter in order to convict someone of murder.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HARDING: So we don't consider this to be an essential issue in our case.

In other words, some of what Mr. Crowe is seeking, he is probably never going to get in the form he would like it.

THE COURT: Because it doesn't exist.

MR. HARDING: That's right.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm going to deny the motion for a Bill of Particulars.

DEFENDANT MARTIN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Mr. Crowe, you can expect to receive Jencks no later than August 17th. I'm going to hear from Mr. Coburn in a moment why I shouldn't order Mr. Coburn and Mr. Kurland to share with other counsel any discovery that they received that they haven't so far shared. If I need to hear that in camera, I will hear that in camera. But it seems to me --

It's hard for me to imagine a reason why I shouldn't do that, but I will hear from Mr. Coburn and Mr. Kurland in a moment.

Anybody else on --1 2 DEFENDANT MARTIN: I accept --3 THE COURT: Mr. Martin, I'm not going to permit repeated, I'm not going to permit repeated disruptions 4 5 of the proceedings, sir. DEFENDANT MARTIN: May I speak, Your Honor? 6 7 THE COURT: No, you may not. Please be seated. DEFENDANT MARTIN: I accept your offer for 8 9 value. 10 THE COURT: Thank you. 11 DEFENDANT MARTIN: I return your offer to you 12 for value to close and settlement of the account. 13 THE COURT: Anybody else want to be heard on 14 discovery issues? Mr. Martin? 15 MR. MARTIN: Your Honor, our motion was 16 identical to Mr. Crowe's. 17 THE COURT: Okay. MR. MARTIN: So since you denied the motion. 18 19 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Martin. 20 Mr. Coburn, can we take up that issue that I 21 identified just now? 22 MR. COBURN: Absolutely, Your Honor. Actually, 23 I haven't discussed this with Professor Kurland, but 24 I'm sure he will just come up and grab me if I say 2.5 anything that he disagrees with.

THE COURT: Well, you're pretty far away from him, so maybe he better come stand next to you.

MR. COBURN: Maybe I'll just talk fast before he can get here.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. COBURN: I mean from my own point of view, I don't see any reason why, you know, we are entitled to some sort of special access to this material based on the fortuity of our having had an earlier single trial date. I think it would be appropriate.

Frankly, I mean there isn't any legitimate security concern here with respect to this <u>Jencks</u> material. I mean, you know --

THE COURT: Well, why don't you share it? Have you not been requested or do you feel some obligation or what?

MR. COBURN: We just wanted to be sure we weren't going to violate 6(c). But if Your Honor tells us that it's okay for us to share it, we are more than, I think we are more than delighted to do that.

In fact, it would be a lot easier, quite frankly, Your Honor, if the government would just make copies and distribute them rather than our taking care of that task.

THE COURT: Is it anything other than Grand Jury, any 302's or sixes or --

MR. COBURN: I don't remember much of that, Your Honor. I think it is pretty much Grand Jury. There might be some additional material, but it is minimal.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Kurland.

MR. KURLAND: Yeah. We haven't shared it up to this point, absent a Court order. There is some -- most of it is Grand Jury material, not all of it. One aspect, which we'll talk about a little bit later to the extent we get to some of the severance and <u>Bruton</u> issues, none of it has been disclosed, at least directly.

There is one particular witness who in other discovery that has been given to all counsel, similar relevant statements were part of other discovery.

Again, if there is other additional material that the government eventually is going to give as Jencks material to everybody later on --

Like I'm not sure if what Mr. Harding gave us, the <u>Jencks</u> material a year ago, that was with respect to a truncated trial just for Mr. Gardner. There might well be other <u>Jencks</u> material that comes to everybody a month before.

But other than that, pursuant to a Court order,

if the Court wants us to do that or again, I echo Mr. Coburn's comment, it would be easier for the government to simply make additional copies of this stuff.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure if that's true or not. Let me ask Mr. Harding.

What makes the most sense, Mr. Harding? Are you able to just have it photocopied three more times?

MR. HARDING: Judge, the government objects to turning it over to the other attorneys.

THE COURT: What's the basis for the objection?

MR. HARDING: The basis is the whole reason why
the government withholds things like 6(e) information
until it absolutely has to turn it over in the first
place, which is that we have security concerns
regarding our witnesses. We have --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HARDING: Ongoing --

THE COURT: All right. Let me cut you off, because that's exactly what I was thinking why I should order Mr. Coburn and Mr. Kurland to turn it over. The government is going to object. I don't need to override the government's concerns.

Defense counsel have it. Defense counsel should have it. It's really to me a very simple proposition.

There's absolutely no reason whatsoever why the fortuity of the scheduling of the trials --

And I understand the government would have preferred that there not be severance in the case, but there was. It was postponed.

There's just no reason why these other six
lawyers shouldn't have what Mr. Kurland and Mr. Coburn
have, particularly in light of what Mr. Coburn has
described, from the defense perspective, at least
their perspective, it's not earth-shaking stuff.

But I'm not going to order the government to do it if the government really feels strongly that the government shouldn't have to do it. It's just a matter of who pays for it, who pays for the photocopying.

MR. HARDING: Judge, would Your Honor order defense counsel not to share the material with their clients? Maybe this is moot, given their clients' refusal to cooperate or communicate with their counsel anyway. But the government feels that as a security measure --

THE COURT: But that wasn't the condition that Mr. Kurland and Mr. Coburn received.

MR. HARDING: No, they benefited from the fact that the government believed it was within a month of

trial and, therefore, turned over the bulk of the Jencks material prematurely.

2.5

THE COURT: Okay. I'm not going to order counsel not to share it with their clients. I am very concerned, as always, about the security of participants in a criminal trial, not least certainly witnesses that the government intends to call. But I'm not going to order counsel not to share this information with their clients.

As you point out, that may be a moot point anyway since the defendants aren't talking to their lawyers about anything meaningful.

MR. HARDING: Could I ask Your Honor that -it's a standard part of our discovery agreements with
defense counsel that they not provide copies.

THE COURT: Absolutely, absolutely. Copies are not to be provided.

MR. HARDING: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Absolutely. But sharing the information is permitted.

Yes, Mr. Coburn.

MR. COBURN: Your Honor, may I just raise one logistical concern with the Court for which I apologize, which is when we got this packet of material --

1 THE COURT: You marked it all up? 2 MR. COBURN: I usually don't put markings on 3 it. But when it came in, it was very shortly before 4 we were going to try the case, and I'm just not sure 5 that I segregated it before integrating it into all of 6 my witness folders. 7 THE COURT: Was there a cover letter? MR. KURLAND: Yes. 8 THE COURT: I'm sure the government is very 9 10 careful. 11 All right. Copy what you need to, including the 12 cover letter, and counsel can review it and let you 13 know if there is something missing when they compare 14 what's in the cover letter from what they get from 15 you. Okay? 16 MR. COBURN: Very well. 17 THE COURT: If you need to black out your own 18 work product or something, of course, you can do that. 19 MR. COBURN: Okay. I appreciate it, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Of course, you will be reimbursed 21 for the photocopying cost, Mr. Coburn. 22 MR. COBURN: That wasn't the concern, Your 23 Honor. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. KURLAND: I just want to make it clear,

though, that we are specifically ordered to provide those copies and we are not going to be criminally prosecuted for violating 6(e).

THE COURT: Absolutely. I will enter an order to that effect, Mr. Kurland.

MR. KURLAND: Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Absolutely.

All right. Who wants to be heard on severance?

It's fully briefed I think.

MR. TREEM: Your Honor, just way of introduction, this is Brendan Hurson, who is an associate in our office. I will defer to his authorship and research on this.

THE COURT: Thank you. Welcome, Mr. Hurson.

MR. HURSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

We sort of piggybacked off somebody else. I think that the form of our motion to sever actually comes in a reply to the government's responses to someone else's. So to some extent, like you said, it has been well briefed.

I mean to be frank, Your Honor, at some point this trial is going to start pitting people against each other, whether it be at the guilt --

And again, renewing Mr. Treem's comments earlier, our client is not here.

THE COURT: Let me do us all a favor, if it is that. Let's not even consider bifurcation of the penalty phase yet. We don't have to cross that bridge for a long time.

I understand it would seem perhaps odd to suggest that we could have what could be I suppose a four-month trial on guilt or innocence and then have a series of three-or-four-day penalty trials with the same jury, one at a time, but I'm not ruling that out. I agree it's unlikely, but it could happen that way.

So my point is we don't need to talk about severance for purposes of penalty.

MR. HURSON: Your Honor, I would say that it has been made clear by the government, and the statute says it has to be the same jury.

THE COURT: Right. I'm saying the same jury, but one at a time.

MR. HURSON: Well, we would say that that makes
-- I mean that's exactly why we want the severance, to
have the same jury hearing all these same facts.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, maybe I'm not being clear. As I understand the argument, there is the argument that you need severance for guilt or innocence and you need a severance for the penalty phase.

Yes, under federal law, the same jury must hear the penalty phase that heard guilt or innocence. What I'm saying to you is I don't see anything in the law that says you can't have four defendants go to trial in front of one jury, fewer than all four are subject to capital penalty, and then at the penalty phase have defendant number one have a penalty trial, defendant number two have a penalty trial, and then defendant number three have a penalty trial.

There is no, in other words, there is no compelling reason, it seems to me, to muddle the issue of severance with respect to guilt or innocence because you can always, by considering penalty issues, because you can always sever penalty issues, even in front of the same jury. Do you see what I'm saying?

THE COURT: So I would like to limit the present consideration to the question of whether there should be a severance for purposes of guilt and innocence.

MR. HURSON: Well, I think I understand what you are saying, Your Honor, and I certainly understand that there can be a case where the jury hears separate penalty phases, but again, it's the same jury.

THE COURT: Right, right.

MR. HURSON: I do I think.

MR. HURSON: And I understand there may be some

precedent for that. But our position is that whether or not the jury sits and hears separate penalty phases, they still know what they did in a previous proceeding.

What our argument is as to guilt/innocence and as to the penalty phase is that this may be shaping up to be a situation where we have no choice but to go after other co-defendants, and to do so pits a situation where not only is it us against the United States, it's us against one another. I think I termed it in the reply that we become in essence de facto prosecutors, one after another.

In our situation, it's quite simple factually. We may have an argument where our client was somehow under the control of another co-defendant. If the jury hears that, then they are put in a situation where they decide not only as to the factual culpability, where we may have some sort of argument as to a lesser degree, for example, on a murder charge, but more than that --

THE COURT: You mean a duress defense to a RICO prosecution?

MR. HURSON: Well, I'm certainly no expert in all these fields. But again, and not to take it back to the penalty phase, we are still sifting through

volumes of documents and trying to figure out exactly what tack to take, and with no cooperation, it's obviously very difficult. So some of this is conjecture, but what is certainly clear --

THE COURT: Excuse me. Go ahead. I'm sorry.

MR. HURSON: What is certainly clear is that as it pertains to our client, who is facing the death penalty, mitigating factors, and I don't mean to draw it into the second part --

THE COURT: That's what you keep doing.

MR. HURSON: I know, because in some ways it's impossible because it's going to be --

THE COURT: No, it's not impossible. Talk to me about why Mr. Harris can't receive a fair trial if his guilt or innocence is determined in front of the same jury as these three defendants.

MR. HURSON: Well, like I said, it's very difficult for me to answer that in the sense that we don't necessarily have all the ducks in a row that I could stand up there and say this is going to be point A, B or C, nor would I. Given the obvious spirit of sharing information that has been presented to the Court, we are not about to stand up there and lay out exactly what it is we plan on saying.

In some sense, I quess you've made it clear you

MR. HURSON: -- we can't escape the issue of what happens in the sentencing phase. Whether it is presented separately, with only one defendant sitting at the table, or whether we are all here, it's still the same jury. To the extent that they make a decision as to defendant number one, they know why they've made that decision.

If defendant number two comes into the courtroom and begins to claim that the reason that he did something was because he was under a particular, did it for a particular reason, probably related to his control in our case by another defendant, they may have questions. They may have residual questions about why they made a decision in the first place.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I'm not following, I'm not following, I'm not following.

MR. HURSON: And I can completely understand why you are not, Your Honor, because it is a bit confusing. But let me put it this way, if we're all seated together in a sentencing phase, and that has --

THE COURT: We're not talking about the sentencing phase.

MR. HURSON: So here's what --

THE COURT: We're talking about the guilt/innocence phase.

MR. HURSON: Well, I can't speak to the guilt/
innocence phase clearly, except to say that it may
become apparent, and as Your Honor is well aware, that
there is no clear bright line in between the guilt/
innocence and the sentencing. Some arguments are made
at guilt/innocence that may in effect bleed into
sentencing. So to the extent that you can drop a wall
in between the two, I don't necessarily think you can
do that.

But obviously, as you stated, if we had separate penalty phases, as to the first person to go, some of my concerns may be obviated; but as to those who come later, probably not.

But I can't necessarily speak to, aside from what I've already said, if we choose to attack, I mean culpability, factual culpability in the first portion of the trial, we would certainly pit one another against each other.

That's our major overriding concern here, is that we don't want a situation where we're set up having to go against each other and have the same jury sit and listen to all of this and put in their head

the ultimate question, who deserves to live and who deserves to die, and that may well be a conclusion that they draw at whatever stage of the trial. It may be in guilt/innocence, it may be in penalty, but they are looking at these individuals or perhaps not even, if they are not present, and saying somebody has to die. If the case is not severed —

THE COURT: Well, if the jury said that, I would hope the law would address it appropriately. That wouldn't be appropriate under any circumstances, somebody has to die.

MR. HURSON: Nobody knows what goes on behind the closed doors, Your Honor. That's my point.

As to the government's arguments, they seem to be drawing on the resource argument, that it's a question of resources and time. Maybe it's because I'm just out of law school and too ideal, but I don't think questions of resource and time should ever come into play in a death penalty case. This is the ultimate penalty. Whether or not we can save money here on there, I don't think that should ever be a concern.

Plus there has been arguments about extending the length of trial and this and that. If we are all pitted against one another, I don't see how a trial

could, you know, the length of trial would change. In fact, I'd argue that separate individual trials would possibly be shorter than one long trial, where everyone is grouped together.

You know, again, this is the government's problem by seeking the ultimate penalty, and I don't see why our client should be, based on a resource issue, penalized.

THE COURT: Are you arguing that -- I guess my question is how would your argument be different, if at all, if this were not a capital case?

MR. HURSON: Well, it certainly would eliminate some of the concerns as to whether or not, because frankly, the real concern is what is a jury, faced with deciding the question of life or death, going to do when faced with three individuals who are facing the death penalty? I mean if --

THE COURT: All right. So if I'm following you, you're suggesting that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gardner, in order to avoid the death penalty, could possibly cast Mr. Harris as exercising influence over them and forced him to commit murders?

MR. HURSON: To me, it's almost the opposite.

THE COURT: Well, what's the opposite?

MR. HURSON: I guess I feel somewhat

uncomfortable without having the client here and with the express reservations of not arguing the facts, but I'll say this. We have a client, Mr. Harris, who did not, at any point is it alleged, begin the commission of any violent acts until he met Mr. Mitchell, and our argument may be that it is Mr. Mitchell's influence on our client that led him to act in the way that the government is alleging. It's almost the opposite of what you are saying. It's not that others --

THE COURT: And why wouldn't you rather do that in a case, in a trial with Mr. Mitchell?

MR. HURSON: Well, because obviously Mr.
Mitchell's counsel, and particularly knowing now, is
going to go after us and go after our claims that he
could be under any sort of influence.

THE COURT: I don't, I don't know that that's necessarily true.

MR. HURSON: Well, again --

THE COURT: It's not a situation of tit for tat.

MR. HURSON: Well, we don't know, and that's the point. Why err on the side of maybe, maybe not, when it's very simple to sever the trials and make sure that that concern is completely obviated?

THE COURT: Well, it's not simple to sever trials. The Court actually severed the trials and it

was the defendants' own acts that countermanded that order.

Look, I am going to deny your motion without prejudice. It's apparent that at some point perhaps, perhaps, in the next couple of months you may want to make an in camera proffer to somehow flesh out, shall we say, your argument. But right now I see no basis whatsoever for thinking, in the face of this third superseding indictment, that there is likely to be the kind of antagonistic defenses that the Fourth Circuit contemplates and the Supreme Court contemplates that justifies a severance.

Of course, a capital case is different, of course; but I just don't see how the Court can order a severance on the basis of this somewhat abstract argument. All right. Thank you.

MR. HURSON: I understand.

THE COURT: Anybody else want to be heard on severance?

MS. RHODES: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Rhodes.

MS. RHODES: Even in light of your decision, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, that's only Harris.

MS. RHODES: Right. On behalf of Mr. Mitchell,

we think, first of all, we would deserve a severance, whether or not it's for a capital case. I can assure you that there will be substantially antagonistic defenses if they are going to be arguing that Mr. Mitchell was controlling other people when we don't think there is going to be evidence that Mr. Mitchell was a shooter in these cases.

So that's going to be a critical part of the case. If he wasn't a shooter ever, then he may not have much responsibility here, and they are clearly --

THE COURT: That's not true as a matter of fact or as a matter of law, but I take your point.

MS. RHODES: Well, if he is not a shooter and he is not a leader, he may, he may simply be involved in a conspiracy, but that's going to be --

THE COURT: Well, it's called the Mitchell organization by the Grand Jury.

MS. RHODES: See, there are going to be three prosecutors. I mean we are going to have -- there are going to be substantially, I'm just saying not just antagonistic defenses, but like completely antagonistic defenses that are directly contradicted and finger pointing, and probably not just Harris to Mitchell, other ways as well.

So it's going to be, it's going to be, you know,

three or four prosecutors ganging up on each defendant, which, for one thing, may take longer.

But I think to answer the Court's inquiry of counsel who just spoke, that is going to be an issue. There are going to be antagonistic defenses. How can there not be? If somebody says that Mr. Mitchell was the leader of this organization and controlling things, how can we not, how do we refrain from attacking that? That's going to be the essential —that's going to be the essence of our defense then if that's the only way they can get to us.

THE COURT: But the government witnesses are going to say that.

MS. RHODES: Well, the government witnesses are going to say we don't know who the shooter was apparently.

THE COURT: The focus on who the shooter was, is that what you are talking about?

MS. RHODES: That's part of what it is. Mr. Harding has acknowledged that his witnesses are going to be going different ways on who the shooters are in these different offenses. Not just one killing, but all three of them there is conflicting information.

THE COURT: I'm not sure how important the specific identity of the shooter is in this context.

MS. RHODES: What I'm saying is the identity, it becomes important if people are saying it wasn't me, or if somebody says it was me, it was because Mr.

Mitchell told me to.

In other words, if nobody, it's particularly important to us if nobody is identifying Mr. Mitchell as a shooter in any of these incidents, then we think it makes it that much more important to us that we not be attacked by others and be claimed to have been directing things from afar.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MS. RHODES: Well, I think it's also, on top of the fact that this we believe would be severable under those circumstances, there is also the issue of the substantial <u>Bruton</u> problem we see with the lyrics that comes in under Mr. Harris's case.

THE COURT: I'm letting them in as co-conspirator statements. That's the basis on which I'm admitting, I'm admitting the lyrics.

MS. RHODES: I understand that. Our position is that they, we are objecting to that, and our position is they shouldn't come in and, therefore, create a Bruton problem.

The other issue where we believe there is a Bruton problem is an identification by Mr. Martin by a

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co-defendant of, allegedly of our client's voice on --
 1
 2
              THE COURT: Remind me of those facts.
 3
              MS. RHODES: On one of the --
 4
              THE COURT: I remember that there was a cell
        phone --
 5
 6
              MS. RHODES: Right.
 7
              THE COURT: -- taken from one of the Wyches.
 8
              MS. RHODES: Right.
 9
              THE COURT: There was a speed dial to the voice
10
        mail of the Wyches' mother --
11
              MS. RHODES: In-law.
12
              THE COURT: -- in-law.
13
              MS. RHODES: Yes. Her machine picked up.
14
              THE COURT: And the machine picked up, without
15
        knowledge of those persons in possession of the cell
16
        phone.
17
              MS. RHODES: Right.
18
              THE COURT: And the recording was preserved.
19
              MS. RHODES: Right.
20
              THE COURT: Okay. Pick it up from there.
21
              MS. RHODES: About 11 minutes or so.
22
              THE COURT: All right.
23
              MS. RHODES: Voices can be heard.
24
              THE COURT: All right.
25
              MS. RHODES: And different government witnesses
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have identified defendant people as the voices. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. MS. RHODES: And Mr. Martin has identified Mr. 3 Mitchell as one of the voices. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. So at best, perhaps -- I 6 don't know -- but at best, Mr. Martin's statement 7 would be cumulative because others are going to 8 identify Mr. Mitchell's voice? 9 MS. RHODES: There are conflicting -- the 10 government's witnesses we believe conflict. In other 11 words, there are many people who have been identified. 12 THE COURT: You mean whose voices have been identified? 13 14 MS. RHODES: Yes, yes, and it's not clear how 15 many people are in fact on the tape. 16 THE COURT: All right. Now --17 MS. RHODES: So there is some confusion. 18 THE COURT: Okay. So on what theory -- remind 19 me how Martin made this statement. Under what 20 circumstances? In other words, how does the statement 21 come in against --22 MS. RHODES: He was in custody I believe at the 23 time, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Right. 25 MS. RHODES: And --

THE COURT: And they played the tape for him? 1 2 MS. RHODES: Yes. 3 THE COURT: He waived his Miranda rights, answered questions, and identified voices on the tape? 4 5 MS. RHODES: I don't recall if he waived Miranda 6 on that. 7 MR. CROWE: Your Honor, I believe the Court --THE COURT: Okay. We don't need to get into 8 that. Yes, Mr. Harding. 9 10 MR. HARDING: I can simply this. I have 11 conceded several times in my pleadings that that is a 12 Bruton problem and we aren't going to use Mitchell's --13 THE COURT: Identification by Mr. Martin. 14 MR. HARDING: Martin's identification of 15 Mitchell's voice. 16 THE COURT: Right. That's where I was going. 17 There would be no basis to admit -- it wouldn't even 18 be admissible against Mr. Martin. Well, I mean it's 19 an admission that he knows Mr. Mitchell's voice, if 20 that were relevant. 21 But yeah, it wouldn't be admissible under any 22 circumstances in the trial of Mr. Mitchell, whether or 23 not he is tried with Mr. Martin, the voice 24 identification. 25 So that's not a problem, and the government says

it's clearly not a problem because they are not going to use it.

MS. RHODES: All right. Your Honor, the other aspect of this is getting to the concern that it is a capital case and our concern is that by trying them together at the guilt/innocence phase, you are essentially forcing the jury on mitigation to do a comparative analysis.

THE COURT: Okay. And that's going to be true in any capital case with two or more defendants.

MS. RHODES: Right, right.

THE COURT: And so?

MS. RHODES: Our request as a result of that is for severance from everybody.

THE COURT: If we were writing on a clean slate,

I would agree with the defense arguments that in a

capital case, every defendant should be tried by

himself or herself. That would be my position, but

that's not the law. That's not the law.

MS. RHODES: Well, the Court has discretion, though, to grant a severance.

THE COURT: But the Court doesn't have discretion to do it the way the Court thinks it ought to be done. The Court only has discretion to do it the way the law requires or compels or permits it to

be done.

MS. RHODES: Well, when there are other significant problems that present themselves, like this issue of the antagonistic defenses, which is going to involve multiple prosecutors, I think that's certainly an appropriate legal basis.

THE COURT: Okay. Again, it may be that at some point, I don't know, in June or July, you are able to make some kind of in camera proffer. But on the basis of -- and I don't mean to diminish this notion of antagonistic defenses, but it's just an abstraction at this point. It's an abstraction.

Again, as we know, it's not just antagonistic defenses. It's antagonistic defenses that cut to the core of the defendant's right to a fair and impartial consideration of the case against him. So it's not jut antagonistic defense.

Of course, in this case, what we are stuck with is the record after November 2005, the record of these proceedings. The Court has perceived no antagonism between and among these defendants whatsoever. Even today we see the defendants continuing to make these parroted speeches.

MS. RHODES: True. But as the Court's earlier ruling indicates, we're going to be proceeding,

counsel will be proceeding as counsel sees fit.

THE COURT: Oh, absolutely, sure, and I wanted

that, absolutely. But there is no perception on my

part of antagonistic defenses.

MS. RHODES: How is blaming somebody else for

MS. RHODES: How is blaming somebody else for being the shooter or you are going to be the shooter and somebody else denying that and positing a different, a contradictory theory --

THE COURT: I'm not even sure I would call that a defense. I mean I said to Mr. Hurson, do you mean duress, a duress defense to murder, a duress defense to a three or four or five or a six-year membership in a conspiracy?

Anybody else? Mr. Crowe?

MR. CROWE: Yes, Your Honor.

DEFENDANT MITCHELL: Your Honor, Your Honor, may I address the Court?

THE COURT: No, Mr. Mitchell.

DEFENDANT MITCHELL: I accept your offer. I reserve all rights, with explicit reservations and without prejudice.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Crowe.

MR. CROWE: Your Honor, we have two principal arguments for severance and I would like to address the two principal ones first.

Initially, when Mr. Martin is the only defendant against whom the government is not seeking the death penalty, I think it's a pretty fair assumption that Mr. Harding and Mr. Hanlon are going to seek a death-qualified petit juror. What I understand from my recent reading was that the people, under the Witherspoon decision, feel that the death penalty is morally permissible punishment and number two, and more importantly, that they are willing to impose it, and that they are going to challenge for cause, and the Court is going to grant challenges for cause, to people who do not meet the Witherspoon criteria. Intuitively, I think we all know that death-qualified jurors are more likely to convict.

Mr. Mitchell, fairly early on in this case, filed a motion to strike a supplemental notice of the intent to seek the death penalty, and he cited to some polls which had been taken in Maryland which indicated that, number one, people opposed to the death penalty are much less likely to come from Montgomery County and Baltimore City and Prince George's County. He also indicated that there was a statistical study which was published in the Law Review, which he cited, which indicated that the opposition to the death penalty was twice as high in African Americans as it

was with whites.

I'm fully aware of the Supreme Court's decision in <u>Buchanan versus Kentucky</u>. That was a case where a non-capital defendant did not ask for a severance, but what he asked for was --

He objected to the trial because he said he was going to be deprived of the right to an impartial jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community.

The Court in that case found, among other things, that there was not convincing, compelling statistical evidence that that was the situation.

The guy, the petitioner, Buchanan, however, didn't ask for a severance. We are asking for a severance.

I would point out that even if the Court would hold that the defendant has no constitutional right to a trial by a regular, non-death qualified jury, even a defendant who is not charged with a capital offense, by the same token, the government can't make any claim that it has a right to try Mr. Martin before a jury which is not death qualified.

So we have asked either for a severance, which seems to me is an easier solution, or that there in fact be two juries impaneled, one for Mr. Martin, who is not going to be subjected to the death penalty, and

that jury would not have to be death qualified, and the second for the other defendants.

We feel, quite honestly, that if Mr. Martin was tried before a death-qualified jury, that the chances of his being convicted go up, and they go up substantially, and I doubt if there is any person in this courtroom, and we have all had a substantial amount of experience prosecuting and defending federal cases, who would really argue with that proposition. In fact, I don't even know that Mr. Harding would be likely to argue about it.

THE COURT: What is the second ground, Mr. Crowe?

MR. CROWE: The second ground, Your Honor, is that the one cooperator that we do know about is a fellow by the name of William Montgomery. We have received discovery. In fact, I think the Court may have this itself.

There is an affidavit which Detective Giganti filed in an effort to obtain a search warrant I think for property associated with Mr. Harris. In that affidavit Mr. Giganti says that Mr. Montgomery, who he refers to as an individual with the name of CS-3, said that he had a conversation with Mr. Gardner when both of them were in jail, and that Mr. Gardner at that

point recited some of the facts concerning the Wyche murder. One of our papers actually sets that out in some detail.

We know that this conversation from other references included sometime between April 17th of 2002, which is the date that my client was in jail, and June 7th, which was the date of the arrest of Mr. Gardner. So this is pretty, pretty, pretty far back.

Montgomery says that he heard from Gardner all about the problems that Mitchell and Martin had with their murder charges, and then Gardner went on to explain about the accidentally transmitted voice mail messages. Gardner said that he didn't know who had pushed the button. He didn't know whether it was one of the Wyches or Mitchell who pushed the button on the phone.

Then he said Gardner explained, Gardner who is in custody with him, a co-defendant, explained that Martin was going to beat the charge because he had an alibi. He, that is Martin, had gone to a movie theater and bought two tickets, deliberately using a charge card to create a paper record for his alibi.

THE COURT: Why is that admissible?

MR. CROWE: I don't think it is admissible. The government has taken the position that it is

admissible under I think a fairly far-fetched theory that it is a statement in furtherance of the conspiracy. I don't think it's admissible for that purpose.

THE COURT: I tend to agree with you.

MR. CROWE: If the Court agrees with me, I probably will sit down right now.

THE COURT: I think I probably agree with you.

I mean I can't imagine admitting Montgomery's statement, if this is what you are suggesting,

Montgomery's statement that Gardner told him that

Martin did all of this, went to the movies, blah,

blah, blah, I don't see how that's in furtherance of any conspiracy.

MR. CROWE: We agree.

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THE COURT: Other parts of the conversation may be, but the specific business about Martin, that's not in furtherance of any conspiracy.

MR. CROWE: I couldn't agree more, Your Honor.

As to the points other people have made, I think we have an antagonistic defense issue also which may impact other defendants more than it does us. But the Court is probably correct. That's maybe a matter which should be brought up closer to the point, closer to the point of trial.

THE COURT: Okay. Before I hear from you Mr. Harding, I'll hear finally from Mr. Kurland.

DEFENDANT MARTIN: Can I speak?

THE COURT: No, Mr. Martin.

DEFENDANT MARTIN: I accept your offer for value, return it to you for value to settle and close the account. I do not wish to argue the facts. I request the Court to issue me an appearance bond and waive all public costs. I request the Court to close all accounts, to release the order of the Court to me immediately. I request the Court to set off and adjust all public charges by exemption, in accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code 3-419, House Joint Resolution 192 and Public Law 17-10, and request immediate discharge.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Kurland.

MR. KURLAND: Your Honor, subject to responding to whatever Mr. Harding might say with respect to that, we had filed a series of pleadings dealing with potential <u>Bruton</u> issues related to the statement that the Court has just indicated on. We also feel very strongly that that statement is not in furtherance of the conspiracy, and if that's the Court ruling, I have nothing else to say. I suspect, though, that I might want to --

THE COURT: Well, Gardner's statement, some of 1 2 Gardner's statements --3 MR. KURLAND: Gardner's statement, Gardner's alleged statement might well be admissible, subject to 4 5 redaction, as an admission against Gardner. THE COURT: Exactly. 6 7 MR. KURLAND: But as a statement in furtherance of the conspiracy, which carries with it Bruton 8 9 problems, but also ancillary evidentiary issues as 10 well, as long as it comes in redacted as an admission, 11 we can deal with that. 12 THE COURT: All right. 13 MR. KURLAND: We strenuously say that the 14 evidence -- well, I'll see what Mr. Harding has to 15 say. 16 THE COURT: Now, is Mr. Montgomery a member of 17 the conspiracy? 18 MR. KURLAND: Well, our position is no. I 19 suspect --20 THE COURT: I mean was he at the time? 21 MR. KURLAND: He is not named in the indictment. 22 THE COURT: Well, we don't need to name him in the indictment for him to be a member of the 23 24 conspiracy. 25 MR. KURLAND: You have to ask the government

1 that. 2 THE COURT: That's what I'm going to do. 3 MR. KURLAND: I will say this, though, that the government has already in another federal court 4 5 pleading indicated that he was a member of another 6 conspiracy at the time. 7 THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from Mr. Harding. MR. KURLAND: Subject to being able to respond 8 9 to whatever Mr. Harding says. 10 THE COURT: Please sit down, Mr. Gardner. 11 Please sit down. Yes, Mr. Harding. 12 DEFENDANT GARDNER: I would like to reserve all 13 rights with explicit reservations and without 14 prejudice, sir. 15 THE COURT: Thank you. 16 Mr. Harding. 17 MR. HARDING: Yes. Judge, first of all --18 THE COURT: First, is there anything generally 19 on severance before you focus on any particular 20 argument? 21 MR. HARDING: Well, Your Honor, let me just 22 briefly say, since Your Honor doesn't want to deal 23 with the sentencing phase at this point --24 THE COURT: Right, yeah. I mean I understand 25 that's not a panacea. It just occurs to me that I

don't need to focus on that right now.

MR. HARDING: The issue of severance in capital cases has been directly addressed by the Supreme Court in <u>Richardson versus Marsh</u>, <u>Buchanan versus Kentucky</u>, and by the Fourth Circuit in the <u>Tipton</u> decision.

Those decisions are quoted at great length in my pleading.

They argue that joint trials of capital defendants and joint trials with non-capital defendants is very appropriate, and one of the reasons it's appropriate is because it allows the jurors to compare culpability. This is something that the Supreme Court expects jurors to be able to do. So that's one of the concerns.

The <u>Richardson</u> decision speaks of the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts that would result from severed trials in capital cases. The <u>Buchanan</u> decision speaks of the heightened reliability that results from a joint trial of capital defendants and non-capital defendants as well in a joint proceeding. These are the values that the government and the Supreme Court's case law are most interested in.

You know, Mr. Hurson also alludes to the resources issue and the interests of our victims and

the interests of our witnesses, and those are important values also. The <u>Tipton</u> decision treats those as important values that must be considered in the context of a severance motion in a capital case.

However, that is not the prime issue. The prime issue is the one that the Supreme Court stressed having to do with the fairness and equity of the decision-making process, and the government believes that those are the things that the government should — that the Court should focus on most of all.

Your Honor, Mr. Crowe just raised the issue of the unfairness of having his client tried by a death-qualified jury, and he alluded to <u>Buchanan</u> <u>versus Kentucky</u>. He pointed out that the Court there was not faced with a motion to sever, but the defendant there claimed that he should be entitled to a non-death qualified jury. The other defendants could have a death-qualified jury and he should have a non-death-qualified jury.

The reason why Mr. Crowe hasn't cited any cases in support of this request is that there aren't any.

It has been decided by the Supreme Court, and there are string cites of subsequent decisions. I'll simply read to you, if I may, very briefly the decision by another district court in this circuit, the Eastern

District of Virginia, in 316 F.Supp.2d 330, United States versus Lee, a 2004 decision, where the Court held, and I'm quoting from page 339 here, "The noncapital defendants' first argument has been squarely addressed and rejected by the Supreme Court in Buchanan versus Kentucky. There, the Supreme Court held that use of a death-qualified jury for a joint trial in which the death penalty is sought against only one defendant does not violate the noncapital defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. In so holding, the Supreme Court relied on its decision in the Lockhart versus McCree (expressly approving the practice of using the same jury in both the guilt and penalty phases of a capital murder trial).

In <u>McCree</u>, the Supreme Court made clear that the Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case.

Given this presupposition, and the government's significant 'interests in having a joint trial,' the

Supreme Court in <u>Buchanan</u> found no infringement of the petitioner's right to an impartial jury. In short, binding Supreme Court precedent makes clear that a death-qualified jury --"

THE COURT: Slow down.

MR. HARDING: -- binding Supreme Court precedent makes clear that a non-qualified jury, I'm sorry, that a death-qualified jury poses no constitutional problem with respect to noncapital defendants in a joint trial. As a result, defendants' argument for severance in this respect is without merit.

I should add, Your Honor, that in the <u>Lockhart</u> case, the Supreme Court was confronted with a lot of statistical and social science evidence about the supposed predisposition of death-qualified jurors to be more likely to convict, and the Supreme Court ruled that it was unconvincing and rejected the evidence.

Your Honor, I would like to respond, if I may, to the second argument that Mr. Crowe just made, and it is also one, as Mr. Kurland says, that he has dealt with in pleadings.

THE COURT: Yes. How does Montgomery's statement to Gardner -- how does Gardner's statement to Montgomery about what Mr. Martin did come in?

MR. HARDING: Okay. This is, of course, not a

constitutional issue, so I haven't actually dealt with 1 2 it in writing, and I would appreciate the Court giving 3 me an opportunity to do so. THE COURT: Of course, of course. 4 5 MR. HARDING: I will briefly summarize my answer, however. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MR. HARDING: Montgomery is, first of all, 9 clearly a member of the conspiracy, as Mr. Kurland and 10 Mr. Coburn well know, because they have his Grand Jury 11 testimony. 12 THE COURT: And other than his assertion that he 13 was a member of the conspiracy, I assume you have 14 evidence aliunde that he is a member of the --15 MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Is he a member of the Mitchell 17 organization? 18 MR. HARDING: He wouldn't know what -- none of 19 these defendants would say they were members of the 20 Mitchell organization I suppose, Your Honor, because 21 that's just the phrase we used in our indictment. 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. HARDING: He was a member of this crew on 24 numerous criminal ventures, going back to 1997. Mr. 25 Montgomery grew up --

THE COURT: Give me a sample of the kind of 1 2 things he did. 3 MR. HARDING: He went to New York with these defendants to buy --4 THE COURT: Any criminal things he did. 5 MR. HARDING: With these defendants? 6 7 THE COURT: Yes, or of which they have 8 knowledge. 9 MR. HARDING: He got guns from these defendants 10 on several occasions. 11 THE COURT: From them? 12 MR. HARDING: Yes, from them. THE COURT: To dispose of or something? 13 14 MR. HARDING: No, no, to use. 15 THE COURT: To use. 16 MR. HARDING: Yes. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Did he ever use --18 MR. HARDING: Including the murder weapon and 19 the other gun used in the Tanya Jones-Spence murder. 20 THE COURT: What did he do with the weapons, if 21 you can say? 22 MR. HARDING: He hid them until they were used 23 in the murder. He and Gardner concealed them in 24 Gardner's girlfriend's house. Then they were used in 2.5 the murder.

THE COURT: I see.

MR. HARDING: But one of them was a .40 caliber gun and he -- it's a kind of complicated story, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Oh, no, I'm getting it. I'm getting it.

So I mean when I said to Mr. Kurland that it wasn't a co-conspirator statement, obviously I responded to Mr. Kurland and added that element, which I anticipated might be the one thing that you were going to point out to me.

MR. HARDING: Yes, and I should point out too that Mr. Kurland and Mr. Coburn in their pleading based their argument that this was a <u>Bruton</u> problem on the claim that Mr. Montgomery was not a conspirator, and they cite the fact that in another federal indictment, specifically the Tyree Stewart indictment, there was a reference to the person who was hired to kill a man named Terry Cheeks as a co-conspirator with Tyree Stewart.

Well, this person, although he is not named in the indictment, was in fact Will Montgomery, and Will Montgomery was indeed hired, did a hit for Tyree Stewart.

That does not mean that he is not a member of

this crew. Murder for profit is one of the named purposes of the Mitchell organization in the indictment. It is perfectly possible to be a member of two different criminal agreements. In fact, Mr. Montgomery's involvement with the Tyree Stewart organization was limited, limited to that one incident, where he participated in a hit with Mr., on behalf of Mr. Stewart and got paid for it.

I'm not intending to introduce any evidence of
that, of course, but the point is --

THE COURT: I know.

MR. HARDING: -- since 1997, Mr. Montgomery has been involved in home invasion robberies, street robberies, drug trafficking on a continuing basis with these defendants, traveling to New York with them to get drugs.

He has gotten firearms from them. He has been involved in shootings with them, not murders so far as we know, until the Tanya Jones-Spence murder, but other kinds of shooting incidents he was involved in with these defendants.

THE COURT: So in effect, this encounter is, what, at the Baltimore City Detention Center?

MR. HARDING: No. This is not a statement that was made in the detention statement.

THE COURT: Mr. Crowe said it was while they 1 2 were both locked up together. 3 MR. HARDING: No. Mr. Crowe, I don't recall him 4 saying that. 5 THE COURT: I thought that was what he said. 6 MR. HARDING: I'm sure he would agree with me 7 that that was not the case. It was made while they 8 were planning to do an act in furtherance of this 9 conspiracy; namely, to rob Darius Spence, and also 10 they had a plan involving the robbery of a drug dealer 11 by the name of Goose. Mr. Martin was involved in 12 this. THE COURT: Wait a minute. I thought this was a 13 14 discussion after the Spence murders. 15 MR. HARDING: No, no. 16 THE COURT: Isn't that where the --17 MR. HARDING: No. 18 THE COURT: -- cell phone thing happened? 19 MR. HARDING: That was the Wyche brothers' 20 murders. 21 THE COURT: I'm sorry. I'm sorry. So it was 22 after the Wyche brothers --23 MR. HARDING: After. THE COURT: -- which was before the Spence 24 25 murder.

MR. HARDING: Yes. Mr. Martin and Mr. Gardner and Mr. Montgomery and possible other co-conspirators were discussing who they were going to rob.

THE COURT: Like who they were going to rob next.

MR. HARDING: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. HARDING: Mr. Martin is then abruptly arrested for the Wyche brothers' murders on April 17th.

Mr. Gardner also actually was arrested coincidentally on a violation of parole around the same time, but he only stayed in jail a very short time and he got out.

He discussed how this was going to affect their plans with Mr. Montgomery by pointing out that, first of all, Gardner was not a risk. He was not a danger because his voice was not on the tape. So that's the first thing he had to do to inform Montgomery of. He was going to be available.

Martin got picked up, according to Gardner, because his voice was on the tape and they mentioned the name Wayne actually on this taped conversation that was inadvertently intercepted on the Wyche brothers' mother's cell phone, on the voice mail.

Mr. Gardner also has to explain to Mr.

Montgomery that they need money to pay for Martin's attorney. They need money quickly, and that in fact is the reason why they transformed their immediate target from the drug dealer named Goose to Darius Spence. They figured they could get the Spence murder or robbery done more quickly, and they proceeded along those lines.

They needed to get money for Martin's attorney and Goo, Mr. Gardner, explained that Martin also was going to be out of jail soon because he had this alibi. He would be able to rejoin them. He would be on the street with them pretty soon because his alibiwas so good.

Martin was so clever, that he had gone to a movie theater prior to the Wyche brothers' murder and bought a ticket using his credit card and he had the receipt and it would show that he was watching a movie at the time of the murder.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm with you. I see.

MR. HARDING: So the government's position is going to be when we submit something in writing, Your Honor, that this clearly was a statement made by a co-conspirator -- Gardner is a co-conspirator. He's a declarant. He is the one who has to be member of the

conspiracy, but Montgomery is a member of the conspiracy too -- and it was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. There is copious case law on this.

THE COURT: No, no. I hear you, Mr. Harding. I was assuming that Mr. Montgomery was just somebody who happened to be at the detention center who, for whatever reason, became a government witness.

MR. HARDING: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I understand exactly what you are saying. Clearly, a conversation between two members of a conspiracy about plans, about needing lawyers, about getting money, about the next crime, all of that would be in furtherance of the conspiracy. I agree with you.

MR. HARDING: Thank you. I'll be happy to put all this on paper so defense counsel will have a full opportunity to respond.

But I would note that Mr. Kurland and Mr. Coburn didn't even raise the in furtherance of the conspiracy argument in their motion. They argued simply that Montgomery was not a member of the conspiracy, and I suggest to Court that they have read the case law well enough to know that these statements were quite clearly in furtherance of the conspiracy. That's why they confine it to a footnote. Actually, they do

1 preserve that issue in a footnote. 2 THE COURT: Okay. Let me give Mr. Crowe a 3 chance because I think I seriously misunderstood Mr. Crowe, and I want to give him a chance before we break 4 5 for lunch to respond if he wants. 6 I'm sorry, Mr. Crowe. I misunderstood. 7 MR. CROWE: Your Honor, I believe that I did make a mistake when I said they were both in custody 8 9 at that point. 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MR. CROWE: I don't believe that that is the 12 situation. 13 THE COURT: The picture that emerged from my 14 mind was simply, you know, Mr. Gardner got arrested 15 for something, Mr. Montgomery happened to get arrested 16 for something, they were together at the detention 17 center, and they were having chitchat. MR. CROWE: I would ask the Court to understand 18 19 that 90 percent of what I just heard from Mr. 20 Harding --21 THE COURT: You're learning for the first time. 22 MR. CROWE: -- I'm hearing for the first time. 23 I expect --24 THE COURT: Because they have the Montgomery 25 Jencks and you don't.

MR. CROWE: That's correct. I, of course, knew that Montgomery was, I think he was the person driving the car at the time of the Tanya Jones-Spence murder.

But it had always been my understanding that although a claim would be made that he was a member of the conspiracy, that certainly Gardner's attorneys were going to be arguing very vociferously that he was not. I knew that they were going to do that on the basis of the transcript in other proceedings in Baltimore County in the Tanya Jones-Spence murder, which I had read, and also that they mentioned in a footnote that they had had some Grand Jury testimony. In their response, they noted in a footnote that they had Grand Jury testimony from Montgomery, which I understood was supportive.

Be that as it may, and whatever the evidence is going to show, I think the Court would be hard pressed, even on the basis of what is at this point a proffer from the government, to say that simply Gardner's statement that my client had an alibi, perhaps a false alibi, was in any fashion in furtherance of a conspiracy.

But I'm really going to have to wait until I see what Mr. Harding says, and perhaps more importantly, until we have a chance to read the additional

discovery, which we are going to be getting I guess sort of third hand from Mr. Coburn and Professor Kurland.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Crowe.

Briefly, Mr. Kurland.

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DEFENDANT MARTIN: Your Honor, I accept my attorney's offer for value and return it to him for value to settle and close the account. I do not wish to argue the facts. I request the Court to issue me an appearance bond, waive all public costs. I request the Court to close all accounts and issue an order of the Court immediately. I request the Court to set off and adjust all public charges by exemption, in accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code 3-419, House Joint Resolution 192, and Public Law 73-10, and request immediate discharge.

THE COURT: I want to remind the defendants what I said before. Everything you say in this courtroom potentially becomes evidence against you. I can't make it more clear than that, everything you say.

Yes, Mr. Kurland.

MR. KURLAND: Judge, I just want to make sure that even though we had filed some preliminary motions with respect to this, that when the government files its more detailed issue with respect to the

co-conspirator statements, that we have an opportunity to respond specifically to what the government has filed.

I want to correct one misimpression, and without hopefully violating 6(e). May I read one line out of Mr. Montgomery's Grand Jury testimony?

THE COURT: Why don't you just paraphrase whatever it is. Just paraphrase.

MR. KURLAND: Well, in his testimony he basically says, when asked specifically about selling drugs together, the question, do you guys sell drugs together or separately or what; answer, no. They sold their drugs and I sold mine.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KURLAND: But the point is --

THE COURT: That doesn't exclude --

MR. KURLAND: Your Honor, I understand that.

But with respect to this critical issue as to whether or not Mr. Montgomery is both a member of the conspiracy and separately whether or not the statement is in furtherance of the conspiracy, at the time the Court evaluates what is now going to be a pretrial proffer, which is fine with us, the Court has to make a finding that the government has established by a preponderance of the evidence. I submit to you, Your

Honor, that with respect to the voluminous information we have, not just the Grand Jury testimony, but the tons of under oath evidence that Mr. Montgomery has provided in other proceedings, that at best it's going to be about 48, 52 --

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Gross says he was the driver at the Spence murder.

MR. KURLAND: That's irrelevant to whether or not --

THE COURT: It's not irrelevant.

MR. KURLAND: Your Honor, it's irrelevant. I submit, Your Honor, that it's irrelevant whether or not that murder was part of the Mitchell organization that's charged in the indictment. That's still an open issue.

THE COURT: It's not an open issue for the Grand Jury.

MR. KURLAND: But the Grand Jury --

Your Honor, again, rather than fight this out here -- I mean this is significant for a variety of issues.

Simply because Mr. Montgomery may or may not have been involved in the Spence murder doesn't automatically mean that the Spence murder is part of the larger conspiracy, despite what is alleged in the

indictment.

THE COURT: I understand that. I understand that. I was only saying that if the Spence murder, as alleged, is part and parcel of the conspiracy, and if he was the wheelman, that pretty much clenches it.

Then he is a part of the conspiracy. If only for one night, if only for a half an hour, he is a member of the conspiracy.

MR. KURLAND: Your Honor, in every trial that I have been in, the Court gives an instruction to the jury that the indictment is jut a piece of paper. So the allegations --

THE COURT: No, no, no. The Court doesn't say it's just a piece of paper.

MR. KURLAND: Yes, it does.

THE COURT: No. The Court says it's an accusation. It's not evidence. It's much more than just a piece of paper.

MR. KURLAND: In light of that, again, the government is still going to have to prove, after we get to present our case, responding to what evidence they proffer on the significant hurdle with respect to the evidentiary issue as to whether something is done in furtherance of the conspiracy. It's not just automatic simply because it's in the indictment.

1 But I am sure the Court will keep an open mind 2 on that. 3 THE COURT: Of course. MR. KURLAND: I will welcome the opportunity to 4 5 respond to whatever the government files. 6 THE COURT: Of course. 7 We are going to break for lunch and we will 8 return at two p.m. I think we will have the one 9 witness. We will have argument on the motion to 10 dismiss, and I think that should conclude what we need 11 to do I hope for this week. But if we have to come 12 back tomorrow morning, we will. If the defendants continue to be disruptive, I 13 14 am going to exclude the defendants. I hope that Mr. 15 Harris can join us this afternoon; but if not, we will 16 proceed as we have. 17 Yes, Mr. Martin. 18 MR. MARTIN: Your Honor, with your permission, I 19 would like to be excused this afternoon. I had 20 surgery recently and I have to go back to the doctor 21 this afternoon. 22 THE COURT: Certainly, Mr. Martin. We are in 23 recess till 2 o'clock.

(A luncheon recess was taken.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

24

1 THE COURT: Good afternoon. Ready to proceed, 2 Mr. Harding. 3 MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor. MR. TREEM: Your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Treem. 6 MR. TREEM: I ran up to the Marshal's Office 7 just to get an update. Mr. Harris is not going to be 8 allowed to travel out of the institution today. So he 9 won't be here at least today. 10 THE COURT: All right. 11 MR. TREEM: We will advise the Court as we get 12 more information. 13 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Treem. 14 MR. HARDING: Your Honor, the United States 15 calls Sergeant Richard Willard. 16 RICHARD WILLARD 17 a witness called on behalf of the Government, having 18 been previously duly sworn, was examined and testified 19 as follows: 20 THE CLERK: Please be seated. 21 Please speak directly toward it and state your 22 name and spell it for the record. 23 THE WITNESS: I'm Sergeant Richard Willard, 24 common Richard, last name Willard, W I L L A R D. 25 DIRECT EXAMINATION

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- 21 Q Let me call your attention to an arrest at about 22 1:30 p.m. on June 18, 1999. Did you participate in an 23 arrest at about 1:30 in the afternoon that day?
- 24 Α Yes, sir, I did.
- 25 Was that arrest initiated by informant

information?

- A We received information into the office of a person carrying guns and selling drugs in the area of the 300 block of South Pulaski Street.
- Q Well, what kind of person was this informant, to the best of your recollection?
- A It has been eight years, sir. I mean we used to get a lot of informants and people calling into the station and giving information.
- Q Okay. People from the neighborhood?
- 11 A Yes, sir.
 - Q So is it fair to say you can't remember the name of the informant at this point?
 - A No. I mean a lot of times we went out on the street, and as the Flex Unit, we would get calls into the station and we would get information from informants, and we were expected to go on the street and try to track down the leads and information on that.
 - Q What did this informant tell you?
 - A He told us that there would be a person that drives a gold station wagon, a Ford Taurus, that drops off cocaine in the area of the 300 block of South Pulaski Street, that when he came into the area to drop off drugs, he always carried a handgun in his

1 car.

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Q Was that in your district, the 300 block of South Pulaski Street?

A Yes, sir.

Q So what did you do after you got this

6 information?

- A We got the information. We went up to area. A group of us set up. While we were there, we observed a car pulling into the neighborhood. When we observed him come around and turn the corner of the 300 block of South Pulaski Street -- I belive that's Ashton Street, westbound -- he was smoking a hand-rolled cigar, like a rerolled cigar, commonly used, commonly called a blunt to smoke marijuana out of.
- 15 Q Was there anybody in the vehicle with him?
- 16 A To the best of my knowledge, I don't believe
 17 there was. I didn't put it in my report, so I
 18 wouldn't assume there was anyone else.
 - Q So you did prepare a report on this event; is that correct?
- 21 A Yes, sir.
- 22 | Q And a Statement of Probable Cause?
- 23 A Yes, sir.
- Q Now you said, you just said that a vehicle came into the neighborhood. What was the description of

the vehicle?

- A It was a gold Ford Taurus station wagon.
- Q So did that match the description that you had been given by this informant who called into your unit?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q Okay. So what did you decide to do after you saw this guy smoking a rerolled blunt pull into the area?
- A We stopped the vehicle. We caught up with the vehicle and stopped it in the 200 block of South Smallwood Street. I approached the driver's side of the vehicle.

As we were approaching, we observed him making motions down towards the floorboard area of the vehicle. We asked him to step from the vehicle. We could smell the marijuana. It was very strong.

Down at the floorboard, there was burnt marijuana laying down near the right side of the console, like under where his leg would be, and the butt of a handgun sticking out from underneath the car -- underneath the seat, on the driver's side.

- Q Was the driver's side window open or closed, do you recall?
- A To the best of my recollection, it was open. I

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- Q Okay. Did you put in your report anything about when you first smelled the marijuana?
 - A As we walked up to the vehicle.
- 5 Q Is that to the best of your recollection now?
- 6 A Yes, sir.
 - Q Okay. What happened then after you got up to the vehicle?
 - A Well, once we got up to the vehicle, we smelled the marijuana. Based on the information from the source of information, and based on the other observations of him smoking the rerolled cigar and possible marijuana, we asked him to exit. We removed him from the vehicle and observed the marijuana sticking on the floorboard, laying on the floorboard right under his seat where he made the gestures. We recovered that and located the handgun underneath the seat.
 - Q When did you first notice the handgun?
 - A As we going down for the cigar, where it was laying, you could see the handgun sticking right up under the seat, the butt of it.
- Q So did you at that point arrest the occupant of the car?
- 25 A Yes, he was.

What was his name? 1 2 Shelley Wayne Martin. 3 MR. HARDING: I have no further questions at this time. I have one more piece of evidence in this 4 5 case, Your Honor, but I will wait until cross-examination is over with. 6 7 THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Crowe. DEFENDANT MARTIN: Your Honor, I accept the 8 9 government's offer for value, return it to the 10 government for value, request settlement and close the 11 account. I do not wish to argue the facts. I request 12 the Court to issue me an appearance bond, waive all 13 public costs. I request the Court to close all 14 accounts, release the order of the Court to me 15 immediately. 16 I request the Court to offset, setoff and adjust 17 all public charges by exemption, in accord with 18 Uniform Commercial Code 3-419, House Joint Resolution 19 192, and Public Law 73-10. I request immediate 20 discharge. 21 THE COURT: You may proceed, Mr. Crowe. 22 CROSS-EXAMINATION 23 BY MR. CROWE: Good afternoon, sergeant. Are you in fact a 24 2.5 detective.

- 1 I'm a detective sergeant right now, yes, sir. 2 Are you aware that this case involves the 3 murders of individuals by the name of Darryl and Anthony Wyche? 4 5 I have no knowledge of the case past Mr. Martin. I have been involved in other cases. 6 7 Now you, at the time this occurred, you were in the southwest district; is that correct? 8 Yes, sir. 9 А Is the 800 block of Vine Street in the southwest 10 11 district? 12 I believe that's the western district. 13 The time that we are talking about, what other 14 officer or officers were with you? 15 I remember Kevin O'Gavin was there and possibly 16 Cliff McWhite. I'm not sure of everyone else, but I 17 remember Kevin Roberts was with me at the car.
- 18 Do you know an Officer Hollingsworth? 0
- Christopher Hollingsworth? 19 Α
 - Yes. Do you know if he was with you?
- 21 He was in the unit. I'm not sure if he was 22 there.
- 23 This arrest, as I understand it, occurred about 24 1:30 in the afternoon; is that correct?
- 25 A Yes, sir.

- Q When did you speak with the informant?
- 2 A I don't recall the exact time I spoke with him.
- 3 It was prior to the arrest.
- 4 Q Was it minutes before, hours before?
- 5 A It could have been both. It could have been
- 6 days.

- 7 O You have no idea?
- 8 A Sir, this was eight years ago.
- 9 Q Now you told Mr. Harding that you don't recall
- 10 the name of the informant. Was the informant a man or
- 11 a woman?
- 12 A Our unit used to get calls every day, sir. We
- got the information of what I wrote in the report at
- 14 the time.
- 15 Q As you sit here today, how do you know that you
- 16 talked to an informant?
- 17 A Because that's what I wrote in my report, sir.
- 18 Q So you are testifying on the basis of the
- 19 information in your report, not on the basis of any
- independent recollection whatsoever; is that correct?
- 21 A I remember the car and I remember Mr. Martin. I
- 22 remember walking up to the car. I don't remember how
- we got the information and when the call came in. We
- got calls every day.
- 25 Q But you have no independent recollection, no

recollection independent of your report that you in 1 2 fact talked with an informant; is that correct? 3 No, sir. Α The report didn't even refresh your recollection 4 5 that you had talked to an informant, did it? It leads me to believe that I did talk to an 6 7 informant because that's what I wrote in the report, sir. 8 The informant in question, was this a concerned 9 citizen who made a call out of the blue to say that he 10 11 disliked drugs and that there is this person you 12 should know about? It could have been. 13 Α 14 Could it have been a person who was arrested? 15 It could have been. 16 But you have no recollection whatsoever; is that correct? 17 18 Like I said, sir, it was eight years ago. I don't remember. 19 20 Now did the individual who is the informant, did 21 that individual have anything to do with what you 22 claim is my client's appearance on that street in the 23 described vehicle? I don't understand your question, sir. 24 A 25 Did the informant in fact say that my client was 0

coming there to meet him?

- A I don't remember the informant or the source. I couldn't tell you that. I don't remember any case where, while I was in the Flex Unit, that we did an operation like that.
- Can you tell me whether or not the informant in fact made the phone call to have the individual come there?
- A I seriously doubt that. At that level of Flex, we didn't do those types of operations. When I went to HIDTA, we did operations like that, but never in Flex, because the Flex Unit was a lower level than a drug unit. We were more focused on street violence and street crimes. We didn't work operations where people were set up in general, back eight years ago.

MR. CROWE: Just a moment, Your Honor.

I would like to have marked as Defendant Martin Motion Exhibit 1 a report which we received from the government with their Bates Number 421D.

THE COURT: All right. It will be marked. You hold onto it for now.

DEFENDANT MARTIN: Your Honor, can I review that? I'm not aware of that. May I read that?

MR. CROWE: Certainly.

THE COURT: I'm glad to see you participating,

```
Mr. Martin. You can't write on it, sir.
 1
 2
              MR. CROWE: The judge said you can't write on
 3
        it.
              THE COURT: Thank you, marshal.
 4
 5
              MR. CROWE: Actually, Your Honor, I have another
 6
        copy. We will have the other copy marked.
 7
              (Defendant Martin's Motion Exhibit Number 1 was
        received.)
 8
 9
        BY MR. CROWE:
10
              Do you recognize that document?
              No, sir, I don't. I know what the document is,
11
12
        but that specific one, no.
              You indicated that Detective, that Officer
13
14
        Hollingsworth was an individual at that time?
15
              Yes.
       Α
16
              I will tell you that we received this document
17
        in a series of documents which we were told related to
18
        the arrest of my client on that day. Is it your
19
        reading of that document that at approximately 10:30
20
        on June 18th of 1999, that there was seized from 836
21
        Vine Street four razor blades with white powder
22
        residue, and the defendant's name was Charles Staton?
23
              That's what is written on here, yes, sir.
24
             Was Charles Staton in fact the informant in that
25
        case, if you know?
```

A I have no idea, sir.

- 2 Q You have no idea whether the -- okay.
- You have no idea whether the individual who gave

 you the information was or was not somebody in trouble
- 5 with the criminal law; is that correct?
- A He could have been, sir, but I don't know. I don't recall.
- Q In fact, for all we know, that individual could
 be sitting in the courtroom today and you wouldn't
 know him or her; is that right?
- 11 A You are actually right, sir.
- 12 Q And you wouldn't even know whether it was a him
 13 or a her?
- 14 A You are absolutely right.
- 15 Q Now you testified about smelling the odor of 16 marijuana as you approached the car; is that right?
- 17 A Yes, sir.
- 18 Q At the time that you approached the car, had it
 19 already been ordered to stop?
- 20 A Yes, we ordered it to stop.
- Q Was this an investigative stop or was this for purposes of making an arrest?
- 23 A At that point?
- 24 Q Yes.
- 25 A Purposes for making an arrest.

- Q Why were you making an arrest?
- 2 A Because at that point in my career, I had been
- 3 involved in well over a thousand arrests. I've seen
- 4 rerolled cigars, and when we stopped the car, we
- 5 believed at that point he was smoking marijuana, which
- 6 is still a violation of Maryland law.
- 7 | Q But the stop was made before you smelled the
- 8 odor again?

- 9 A It was when we observed him smoking the
- 10 marijuana.
- 11 Q How far away from him were you when you
- 12 initially observed him?
- 13 A He passed our car driving by. He made the
- 14 left-hand turn onto Ashton Street.
- 15 Q What was the distance between you and him at the
- 16 time the observation was made?
- 17 A At the closest point, five feet. At the
- 18 furthest point, maybe 25 feet or 50.
- 19 Q Where were you located?
- 20 A In the driver's side of the vehicle, in the 300
- 21 block of South Pulaski Street.
- 22 Q He was in the driver's side of the vehicle on
- the other side of South Pulaski Street?
- 24 A He was driving north. We were facing south.
- 25 Q You observed the cigar; is that correct?

1 Α Correct. 2 What was it that you saw about the cigar which 3 caused you, yourself, to determine that it was, that it was a rerolled cigar? 4 5 Like I said, we've made numerous marijuana 6 arrests, numerous arrests. I've seen rerolled cigars 7 thousands of times. What was it that you saw on this occasion which 8 caused you to believe that it was a rerolled cigar, if 9 10 you can recall? 11 Α The way it was rolled. 12 Do you recall what you saw at the time? 13 Α A rerolled cigar. 14 As you sit here today, can you actually, I mean 15 do you actually have a picture in your mind of this 16 cigar, or are you going by your report? 17 I'm going by my report basically, a lot of it, 18 but that's what I wrote at the time. That's what I 19 observed at the time that day. 20 In fact, the truth is that you are going on your 21 report for virtually everything that you said; is that 22 correct? 23 A No, sir. 24 MR. CROWE: Can I have marked as Defendant's Exhibit 2, and we will submit this in a moment, Your 25

```
Honor, a copy of the officer's report which shows the
 1
 2
        government's Bates Numbers 409 and 410?
 3
              THE COURT: They are admitted.
              (Defendant Martin's Motion Exhibit Number 2 was
 4
 5
        received.)
 6
        BY MR. CROWE:
 7
              Is that in fact the report that you wrote?
              Yes, sir.
 8
       Α
              Would you turn to the second page of that
 9
10
        report? Does that indicate, "Upon stopping vehicle,
11
        we observed 30-1," which was the defendant, "smoking
12
        number one. 30-1 then placed number one on the floor,
        then placed number one on the floor between his legs."
13
14
             Yes.
       Α
15
              Does that indicate that you didn't, that the
16
        first time that you observed the individual stopping,
17
        smoking what you described was a rerolled cigar was
18
        after you had stopped him?
19
              It wasn't after. We stopped him -- we saw him
20
        smoking it before we stopped.
21
              Does the report say upon stopping vehicle, we
22
       observed 30-1 smoking?
              It's a very brief report. A more detailed
23
24
        report is in the statement of charges.
25
              Again, does this report, which you relied on for
```

everything else, say that upon stopping vehicle, you 1 2 observed the defendant smoking? 3 I relied on the statement of charges, sir. Pardon? Well, you have been testifying about 4 5 your report. Again, can you just give me a yes or no 6 answer? 7 Does your report say that it was upon stopping 8 the vehicle that you observed the man smoking what you 9 described as a rerolled cigar? 10 It does say that. It doesn't mention prior to 11 stopping the vehicle either. 12 MR. CROWE: Nothing further, Your Honor. 13 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 14 BY MR. HARDING: 15 Sergeant --0 16 DEFENDANT MARTIN: Your Honor. 17 MR. HARDING: Oh, I'm sorry. 18 DEFENDANT MARTIN: I accept the attorney's offer 19 for value, return it to him for value, request him to 20 settle and close the accounts. I request -- I do not 21 argue the facts. I request the judge to issue me an 22 appearance bond, waive all public costs. I request you to settle and close all accounts, release the 23 24 order to me immediately. 2.5 I request him, request the Court to set off and

adjust all public charges by exemption, in accord with 1 Uniform Commercial Code 34-301, House Joint Resolution 2 3 192, and Public Law 73-10. I request immediate discharge. I accept his offer for value and I return 4 5 his offer to you for value. THE COURT: Marshals, Mr. Martin is excused. 6 7 (Pause.) 8 Let the record reflect that Mr. Martin has 9 indicated by his repeated disruptions that he wish not 10 to be present. The Court could only anticipate that 11 when Mr. Crowe rose to argue the motion, that there 12 would be further disruptions by Mr. Martin, and his behavior here indicates that he has chosen not to 13 14 participate through the balance of this hearing 15 You may proceed, Mr. Harding. 16 MR. HARDING: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 BY MR. HARDING: 18 Your Honor, did I show you --19 I'm sorry. Sergeant Willard, did I show you 20 that chemist report previously, the one that Mr. Crowe 21 just showed you and which is marked as defense 22 exhibit, and bears Bates Stamp 421D? 23 Yes, sir. 24 What did you conclude after seeing that 25 document?

```
1
              In those days, when we had the Flex Unit, we
 2
        were averaging well over 1500 arrests a year.
 3
        Typically, in a day we would arrest ten people. One
        person was designated as the submitting person. They
 4
 5
        would write all the submissions and submit things.
 6
              But this doesn't look like anything that was
 7
        even recovered from the report. It was common and
 8
        typically happened that people wrote numbers down
 9
        wrong when they did the submissions.
10
              MR. HARDING: Let me also offer an exhibit.
11
        This is the Statement of Probable Cause and bears
12
        Bates Stamp Number 413 and 414.
              THE COURT: It's admitted.
13
14
              (Government's Motion Exhibit Number 2 was
15
        received.)
16
        BY MR. HARDING:
17
              Taking a look at this, Sergeant Willard, is this
18
        the Statement of Probable Cause that you swore out
19
        that day?
20
       Α
              Yes, sir, it is.
21
              Let me call your attention to the sentence that
22
        begins your officer, with this information, and I just
23
        want you to read the next several sentences.
24
       Α
              Yes, sir.
              MR. CROWE: Your Honor, would the Court note my
25
```

objection? This is an inadmissible prior consistent statement.

THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

THE WITNESS: Your officer, with this

information --

THE COURT: Slowly, please, sergeant.

THE WITNESS: Your officer, with this information, went to the 300 block of South Pulaski Street and set up covert surveillance. While there, we observed a gold Ford Taurus station wagon drive into the area. This vehicle had Delaware temp tag of XY1257. Your officer also observed Mr. Martin was smoking what looked to be a rerolled cigar. Your officer knows that it is common -- that a common use for rerolled cigars is to smoke marijuana. Your officer, with this information and observation, stopped the vehicle as it turned onto the 200 block of South Smallwood Street.

BY MR. HARDING:

- Q Why don't you just keep reading a couple lines.
- A During the stop, as your officers approached the driver's side door of the vehicle, as your officers approached, we observed Mr. Martin placing an object between his legs on the floorboard of the vehicle. We could smell a strong odor of burnt marijuana. Your

officer asked Mr. Martin to step from the vehicle. 1 2 Your officer then recovered a half burnt rerolled 3 cigar containing a green leafy substance, suspected marijuana. 4 5 Your officer also located, sticking from under 6 the driver's seat of the vehicle, the butt of what was 7 found to be a Hi-Point nine millimeter handgun, Serial 8 Number P040255. 9 MR. HARDING: Thank you. That's good enough. 10 I believe that's all the questions I have for 11 Sergeant Willard. As I say, I have one more exhibit. 12 THE COURT: Thank you, Sergeant Willard. I assume there are no further questions from counsel? 13 14 MR. CROWE: Just a couple, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Crowe. 16 RECROSS EXAMINATION 17 BY MR. CROWE: 18 Officer, as I understand it, you were in the 300 19 block of South Pulaski Street; is that correct? 20 Α When this started, yes, sir. 21 And when you saw the gold Taurus? 0 22 Α Yes, sir. 23 How many lanes are there in that block of South 24 Pulaski Street? 25 One lane in each direction.

137 You were facing in which direction? 1 2 Α I was facing southbound. 3 And the car was driving --0 Northbound. 4 Α 5 -- northbound? 6 MR. CROWE: Thank you. That's all that I have, 7 Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you very much, Sergeant 8 9 Willard. You are excused. 10 Will you hand those documents to the clerk, 11 please? 12 Do you have an exhibit, Mr. Harding? MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor. This is RW-1. 13 14 It is a copy of Mr. Martin's plea agreement in the 15 federal case that resulted from this arrest, dated 16 November 16, 1999. It is signed by Mr. Martin and his 17 attorney, James Wyda, from the Federal Public Defender's Office. 18 19 Actually, the dates next to his signature on the 20 last page are November 24, 1999. The November 16th 21 date is on the front of the document. 22 I would ask the Court's permission to -- well, I 23 offer into evidence, and I ask the Court's permission 24 to permit me to read aloud the first paragraph of the 25 factual stipulation.

THE COURT: It's admitted. You may.

(Government's Motion Exhibit RW-1 was received.)

MR. HARDING: On June 18, 1999, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Baltimore City police officers responded to the 300 block of Pulaski Street, Baltimore, Maryland, in response to informant information that the driver of a particular vehicle may be in possession of a firearm.

During the surveillance of the defendant, Mr.

Martin was observed in the area driving the described vehicle, a gold Ford Taurus. The officers stopped the car. At which time, Mr. Martin was asked to step out of the vehicle. At which time, the butt of a handgun found to be one Hi-Point nine millimeter semiautomatic handgun, Serial Number P040255 was observed under the driver's seat. The firearm was recovered and Mr.

Martin was arrested.

There are a series of factual stipulations that follow in the document having to do with the serial number of the gun, the definition of firearm, the fact that it was in interstate commerce, and that he had a prior conviction. That's all, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Harding. It's the government's burden, but I will hear you first, Mr. Crowe. I think I understand the government's theory.

MR. CROWE: Thank you, Your Honor.

I was, quite frankly, surprised at Detective Willard's recollection. It was not sparse, but probably non-existent. He had no -- he appeared to have absolutely no recollection of the facts concerning this case and was testifying, as I understood it, if not entirely, then virtually entirely from the basis of statements which he had made, which he had made at a previous time.

My recollection of the Rules of Evidence is that they are quite clear the police report is not a business report, and for that reason, we do not think that the search can be supported on the basis of, on the basis of the report itself.

In addition to that, there was not the standard examination that one would expect, which would be necessary to get this in as past recollection recorded.

THE COURT: You know, it occurred to me when I got Mr. Harding's letter, and particularly now that Mr. Harding has read into the record the stipulated facts, I'm not even sure we have to have a hearing.

MR. CROWE: Well, that's the second part.

THE COURT: I don't understand the law to be that in case one, a defendant can waive his rights to

2.5

challenge under the Fourth Amendment the admissibility of evidence, and then come along in case two, when that issue becomes important again, to have the defendant's right to challenge under the Fourth Amendment and apply the suppression remedy to be reinvigorated.

I mean it's an unusual kind of situation, and I haven't done any legal research, but I am not sure the stipulated facts wouldn't get the government exactly where it needs to get to.

MR. CROWE: I also, Your Honor, have not done any research on that point. It is my understanding that essentially a waiver of rights in one proceeding does not necessarily carry over to another proceeding.

THE COURT: That would be a peculiar application of the suppression remedy under the Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence.

Anyway, go ahead. I understand the point.

MR. CROWE: I mean the only discovery we had gotten in this case was the officer's or the various reports from the officer, many of which have been referred to here. With simply those and his testimony, we don't believe this evidence comes in.

It's a warrantless arrest. It's the government's burden of proof in this matter, and we

don't believe that they have carried it.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Crowe.

I don't need to hear from you, Mr. Harding.

The facts and the law are quite self-evident.

Even assuming, from the point of view of Mr. Martin,

that the Court had some doubt, which I don't, but even

assuming that, as Mr. Crowe's questioning suggested,

that the officer is mistaken, the detective is

mistaken, that he didn't actually observed the

rerolled cigar when Mr. Martin drove past him, I think

there would still be adequate grounds, given the

description of the vehicle, to make a traffic stop.

But I don't need to go to that point because I do credit the testimony of the detective that he observed the hand-rolled, rerolled cigar and reasonably concluded that there was a possibility, certainly sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, that Mr. Martin was in possession of contraband and, therefore, the traffic stop was permissible.

Once the traffic stop was effected, and as he approached the vehicle, he could smell the odor of burning marijuana and, therefore, he had probable cause therefrom to effect an arrest of Mr. Martin and/or to search the vehicle, which Mr. Martin was the

operator.

2.5

The Court credits the witness's testimony that when Mr. Mitchell (sic.) came out of the vehicle and the officer properly went into the vehicle to search for what he believed to be a hand-rolled or a rerolled cigar containing contraband, he observed in plain view the butt of a weapon. Clearly, therefore, there was probable cause to believe that Mr. Martin was in violation of state law by transporting a handgun in a vehicle.

So for all these reasons, the stop and search of the vehicle comported with Fourth Amendment requirements, and the arrest of Mr. Martin was permissible.

But the Court also concludes, for what it's worth, that the stipulation in the federal prosecution of Mr. Martin did indeed effect a once-and-for-all waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights in respect to this particular stop, search and seizure.

Therefore, as an alternative basis of decision, the Court finds that Mr. Martin has knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to invoke a suppression remedy in respect to the seizure of the handgun.

Anything further, Mr. Harding, on this?

MR. HARDING: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. I believe the final issue is the issue of the motions to dismiss. Am I right? I think so. So I am happy to hear from counsel in any particular order you choose, unless you want to submit on the papers.

MR. COBURN: I'm ready to go if no one else is.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Coburn. I'll hear

from you.

MR. COBURN: Thank you, Your Honor.

The motion that I was hoping to argue, and, of course, I'll be brief, is the motion related to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COBURN: The government has filed a fairly comprehensive response to this motion. The issues that I think continue to exist and that really, from my point of view at least, don't appear to be substantively addressed are as follows:

The government admits, generally speaking, how the IAD works. You know, of course, what we are focused on here is what is called the anti-shuttling provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, particularly Article IV of the IAD.

The government's position seems to be that after

the federal case, that is to say this case, started, that all that happened was that Mr. Gardner was kind of repeatedly transported to various county facilities typically for proceedings relating to the state proceeding that's focused on the Spence murder.

I don't think that the record is consistent with that proposition, at least as far as I can tell. I mean the government gives, provides kind of an interesting summary, and I think it's just a partial summary actually, of the number of the various transfers that occurred.

For example, the government says that on August 4th --

THE COURT: Just a moment, please. Let me pull up the government's memorandum.

MR. COBURN: Absolutely, Your Honor. I know I have Mr. Hanlon's --

MR. HANLON: I have another copy of it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- master work. Yeah, here it is.

Go ahead, Mr. Coburn.

MR. COBURN: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

Directing your attention -- I can pretty much just calibrate my argument to what's written there in their memorandum.

I mean on page three of the memorandum, the government concedes that on August 4th --

Actually, I should start at the little bullet point above that.

From February 20, 2004 until August 4, 2004, the government concedes or says the defendant was held as a federal prisoner at the Maryland Correctional and Adjustment Center, MCAC.

Now the distinction that they are drawing in this submission, if I understand it, the notion that they are urging is that Mr. Gardner was never sent back to a Maryland Department of Corrections facility, and the cases that they are relying upon are cases in which typically, you know, a defendant is held in state custody, serving a sentence at a particular prison facility.

Then this defendant is sent to federal custody or is sent to federal detention to face a federal charge on a federal detainer, and when is sent back to state custody in a completely unrelated, like a third case, to the same state, that is to say, the sending state that the defendant originally came from, and typically held in like sort of a temporary jail, a temporary detention facility other than a facility that's a correctional facility or a prison facility,

at least not the same prison facility that the defendant came from originally.

So the government relies on a couple of cases. There is a recent 2007 case suggesting that that doesn't violate the IAD.

But here, the facts that we have here, at least as I see them, are materially different because here, the government concedes right in the first bullet point that the defendant is held from -- after this case, the case we are in right now commences.

From February 20, 2004 until August 4, 2004, they say he is held as a federal prisoner at the Maryland Correctional and Adjustment Center.

Now actually, I was just trying to do -- and I hope Your Honor will forgive me. I'm in trial, as Your Honor knows, down in D.C. So I just wasn't able to kind of scrutinize this issue as closely as I should have before this hearing. But I'm pretty sure that the MCAC is part of the Maryland Department of Corrections.

That's different from the cases that the government is relying on. In other words, he is not being sent, you know, to like the Frederick County

Jail in order to face a new robbery charge in

Frederick County or something like that. He is being

sent from whence he came.

In other words, he is initially serving a sentence in a Maryland Department of Corrections facility. He comes here and then he is sent back, at least as I think, if I'm figuring this out correctly, he is sent back to another Maryland Department of Corrections facility. I'm pretty sure MCAC is part of the Department of Corrections. I was actually just looking him up.

THE COURT: Of course, it is, but I'm not -- we don't have a federal detention facility.

MR. COBURN: And I know that's a subject of a lot of controversy in this district.

THE COURT: Actually, there's no controversy. We need one. We've got to have one.

MR. COBURN: I don't mean to disagree with that at all. I strongly agree with you.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. COBURN: But I mean as a result then of just sort of the fortuity, the chance that there isn't one, he then comes back, not to a county jail, but he comes back to a Maryland State Department of Corrections facility.

THE COURT: But he is in federal custody.

MR. COBURN: Now I hear that. That's certainly

the government's position with respect to that particular, that particular moment.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. COBURN: But A, if I understand correctly, there's a contract between the federal government and --

THE COURT: The State of Maryland.

MR. COBURN: -- the State of Maryland. It may be State of Maryland or, according to --

Actually, there is a Wikipedia write-up on the MCAC, believe it or not, Your Honor, and it says the contract is with the MCAC specifically.

THE COURT: Which is an agency, department of the State of Maryland.

MR. COBURN: Now the government, you know, they haven't proffered a copy of this contract. I haven't seen it. I mean I sort of take their word, I suppose, that the contract exists.

But I don't think that takes, with respect to even that particular transfer, I don't think it takes that out of the IAD. In other words, he is not being transferred to sort of some other facility. He is not being transferred, let's say, to, you know, a state facility in a third state that has this contract. He is being transferred, at least as I see it, directly

in violation of the IAD, back to the Maryland

Department of Corrections, and I don't think the

existence of that contract changes that situation at
all. I don't think it does.

Now they are citing some cases relating to transfers to other places, not relating to transfer back to the sending jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, you know, for this proposition that he sort of remains in federal custody because of the existence of these contracts.

A, you know, I'm not at all sure those cases, to the extent they exist, are correct because I mean --

THE COURT: Okay. But -- all right.

MR. COBURN: I mean you have to -- I'm sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm just trying to understand your position, and maybe I should hear from Mr. Hanlon first. Would that be helpful to you?

MR. COBURN: It would be perfectly fine with me if it's helpful to the Court, but I mean from my point of view, you know, this is a direct and unambiguous violation of the IAD because he is being sent back to the same agency within the sending state. You know, contract or no contract, that's where he is going.

THE COURT: Let's hear from Mr. Hanlon and then

you respond to the government's argument.

MR. COBURN: I appreciate that, Your Honor.

DEFENDANT GARDNER: Excuse me, sir. I accept everything for value that the attorney said, return it for full value. I do not wish to argue the facts. I request the judge to issue me an appearance bond, and waive all public costs. I request the judge to close the accounts and release the order of the Court to me immediately. I request the judge to set off and adjust all public charges by exemption, in accord with U.C.C. 3-419, House Joint Resolution 192, and Public Law 73-10, and I request discharge.

THE COURT: You are discharged, Mr. Gardner.

Mr. Gardner is excused. Thank you, marshal.

(Pause.)

Okay, Mr. Hanlon.

MR. HANLON: Thank you.

THE COURT: Walk us through it.

MR. HANLON: Certainly. What I did, in attempting to brief this issue, I had to begin by sort of reconstructing what the defendant's sort of custodial status had been. The defendant's motion had attached various documentation dealing with the fact that he was shifted here and there. It basically said this is in violation of the IAD, and that was about

it. Then we had Mr. Gardner's own written submission.

So I relied on that and then I obtained documentation from the marshals and essentially put together the chronology that we have and that I put in the memorandum.

I looked at it in terms of sort of two categories of transfers, and the categories were based on whether or not it was a situation where the defendant is being housed in a state facility as a federal prisoner or a situation where the defendant was being placed in a state facility as a state prisoner. So it was the Baltimore County situation on the one hand and then sort of all the other situations on the other.

They were different situations, and it is true, he was always being held in a state facility, because that's how we do things here in the federal courts in Maryland because we have no facility.

A number of decisions, including the <u>Hunnewell</u> decision which I cite in my brief, have essentially stated that it is clear under the IAD, and this appears to be uniform -- I found no Fourth Circuit law, but it appears to be uniform -- that the formality of treating a prisoner as a federal prisoner, whether he is being housed in a state

facility or not, simply takes it out of the IAD. That prisoner has not been transferred back to the original place of imprisonment or even the sending state in a way that would violate the IAD.

Frankly, that was the easier problem. The Baltimore County issue was I thought a bit more complicated because there you actually have a transfer to the sending state.

But focusing first on the issues that I think
Mr. Coburn focused on a moment ago, during the time
that Mr. Gardner was held as a federal prisoner at the
state facilities, all of the case law makes clear, it
doesn't matter where you go. It doesn't matter what
facility you are at. If you are treated as a federal
prisoner, if you are credited federal time, then you
are in federal custody. There has been no transfer
back to the sending state.

It appears the way the cases have dealt with it, including the First Circuit in <u>Hunnewell</u>, is that the term sending state means you are within the sovereign custody of the state. In this case, it would be the State of Maryland.

That wasn't the case here, with the exception of the Baltimore County transfers. Mr. Gardner was a federal prisoner. He was getting credit accounted to

him by the marshals. The marshals are counting his days as federal time, as indicated in that prisoner transfer log. He was brought to court if he needed to be brought to court on the basis of a come-up, not on the basis of a federal writ issued to a state judge.

THE COURT: There has never been a federal writ issued for Mr. Gardner, has there?

MR. HANLON: Not to the best of my knowledge, with the exception I think with the original one that brought him to court in the first place where he invoked his IAD rights. Then subsequently, he did waive his IAD rights later on. I don't know what his history has been after that because I don't really think that's in controversy here.

But during the issues that we are dealing with, no, there were no federal writs. He was brought in and then he remained a federal prisoner, with the exception of the times when he was held in Baltimore County custody on the basis of a state writ.

So the government's answer to this first point dealing with his housing in state facilities is there is no IAD violation because he was never sent back to the sending state. If he were, I guess we are violating the IAD with all of our prisoners who invoke the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Of course,

that's now how all of the federal courts that have looked at this have addressed the issue.

Now that's the first category. The other category are the Baltimore County situations and again, that seems to be squarely addressed again in the Hunnewell decision and also in, I believe it's the Pursley decision, which arose out of Colorado I believe.

Again, both of those cases are dealing with exactly the same situation we have here, both of them reaching the same result that the government urges here. A state prisoner, a state prisoner in sentence is transferred to federal court on a new charge. He is then picked up on a state writ or a state transfer order to another state jurisdiction for a new state charge, and that is simply not a violation of the IAD because he is not being returned to his original place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V.

Those are the two prongs that have to be shown if there is a violation of the anti-shuttling provision. There needs to be a return to the original place of imprisonment and that return has to be done pursuant to Article V of the IAD, which contemplates a return of a prisoner to serve his state sentence and return to rehabilitation after the conclusion or

during, if it's a violation of the ongoing current case.

The fact is that at no time during Mr. Gardner's federal incarceration, from the day of his initial appearance until the day that he made his reserved waiver of rights under the AID, was he ever returned to a DOC facility in a way that he resumed his state sentence and entered back into rehabilitation.

Therefore, there has been no violation of the IAD.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Hanlon.

MR. HANLON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I hope that was helpful, Mr. Coburn.

MR. COBURN: Absolutely, Your Honor. I think it helped to sharpen the issues and, you know, I will try to address them directly, to the extent that I can.

First of all, he spoke of a waiver, and I hope it's clear from the paperwork, and I am sure the prosecutor didn't mean to suggest anything to the contrary, that the waiver is only prospective.

THE COURT: Right, April 14, 2005.

MR. COBURN: Exactly. So we are only talking about -- you know, there is no waiver with respect to prior to that date, and there is a federal detainer prior to that date. So the IAD is squarely set up

here, at least as I understand it.

So with respect to that first -- again, I'm not going to detain Your Honor long on this.

But with respect to that first bullet point in terms of the MCAC custody, what you typically have, at least as I understand it with respect to the cases on which the government relies, is a situation in which let's say, you know, there is a county facility somewhere that has like a block set aside for federal prisoners. And the argument is made, and I don't know how, you know, carefully it has ever been vetted, frankly, but the argument typically is made to the effect that those prisoners in the federal block in the county facility are, for IAD purposes or other purposes, they are still in "federal custody."

But here, Your Honor, you have a situation in which my client is sitting for several months at the MCAC.

THE COURT: In a federal cell.

MR. COBURN: But he is not in federal custody.

There may be a contract, you know, which is a piece of paper. That's fine. You know, I'm sure it regulates where the funding comes from and so on, but he is supervised by state people.

THE COURT: What dates are you saying he was not

in federal custody? 1 2 MR. COBURN: At least as I understand it, Your 3 Honor, he is not in federal custody from February 20, 2004 until August 4, 2004. It says that he is held --4 5 this is just a conclusory allegation by the 6 government. It says he is held as a "federal 7 prisoner" at the Maryland Correctional and Adjustment 8 Center. 9 Now that's what they -- you know, that's just 10 putting a label on it. 11 THE COURT: Well, what kind of label do you put 12 on it? MR. COBURN: The label I put on it, Your Honor, 13 14 is that he is being held at a state facility. 15 THE COURT: Slow down. That's not disputed. He 16 is in a state-owned facility. 17 MR. COBURN: He is being supervised, regulated, 18 controlled by state personnel in a state facility. 19 THE COURT: Who are acting for those purposes as 20 agents of the United States Marshal Service. 21 MR. COBURN: I don't know that, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Well, I'm telling you that. 23 MR. COBURN: I mean --24 THE COURT: That's what they do. 25 MR. COBURN: Well, I don't know that --

THE COURT: They don't have federal employees over there doing feedup at Supermax. They are state employees.

MR. COBURN: That's exactly my point.

THE COURT: But the United States government pays for those meals.

MR. COBURN: That's true. The United States government pays for the meals and the United States government I suspect, pursuant to the contract that I am sure exists between the U.S. government and the Maryland Department of Corrections, you know, pays some sort of proportionate share of the salary and the other overhead expenses that the institution incurs.

THE COURT: Actually, I think it's a per diem.

MR. COBURN: That would be easier, I mean a per diem, but it's still being done by state people in a state facility that is part of the Maryland Department of Corrections.

I don't think, if you look at the language of the IAD and you look at the particular cases that they cite, I don't think that that takes this out of the ambit of the IAD, not for one minute. I don't think it does.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll take another look at it.

I don't think you are going to persuade me. I'll take

another look at it. 1 2 MR. COBURN: That's the feeling I am getting 3 also, Your Honor. There is one other thing which I should bring to 4 Your Honor's attention. 5 6 THE COURT: What's that? 7 MR. COBURN: You know, there is some very careful phraseology in this submission. I mean he is 8 9 taken to the Northern Neck Regional Jail in Virginia. 10 That is not an IAD violation, I concede, because 11 that's not the sending jurisdiction. 12 But right after that, they point out, they say -- this is on page five of their submission --13 14 between March 24, 2005 and April 11, 2005 -- and this is, like I say, this is carefully written -- the 15 16 Defendant was housed for 18 days --17 And I know, Your Honor, this sounds just 18 hypertechnical. 19 THE COURT: It is hypertechnical. That's what 20 we all get paid to do. 21 MR. COBURN: It's a bizarre piece of 22 legislation, I concede to you, Your Honor. 23

When I was an Assistant U.S. Attorney in D.C., we had a serial rape case that was dismissed with prejudice because of a one-day violation of the

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        Interstate Agreement on Detainers. I think it was
 2
        probably the hardest thing that judge ever did.
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              THE COURT: Did he get reversed?
 4
              MR. COBURN: No, he didn't.
 5
              THE COURT: Did the government appeal?
 6
              MR. COBURN: The defendant was discharged.
 7
              THE COURT: Did the government appeal?
              MR. COBURN: I don't believe they did. It was a
 8
        serial rapist.
 9
10
              THE COURT: Well, an alleged serial rapist.
              MR. COBURN: And he will always remain alleged.
11
12
              THE COURT: All right.
13
              MR. COBURN: But here we have on page five --
14
              THE COURT: It's the same argument, Mr. Coburn.
15
        Whether it's the Maryland Adjustment and Training
16
        Center or the Allegany, what difference does it make?
17
              MR. COBURN: Here's the difference.
18
              THE COURT: What's the difference?
19
              MR. COBURN: Because according to the
20
        phraseology here, do you see the way they say --
21
              I have to say, Your Honor, I haven't scrutinized
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        the internal paperwork of the Allegany County
23
        Detention Center, but it says again, the USMS
24
        considered him a federal prisoner during that time.
25
              I would wager --
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THE COURT: He is a federal detainee. 1 2 MR. COBURN: I would wager that there is no 3 contract with respect to that institution. THE COURT: You're going to lose a lot of money. 4 5 We've got takers over here. 6 MR. SULLIVAN: I'll take him. 7 THE COURT: We'll all take that bet. 8 MR. COBURN: Really? 9 THE COURT: You think that Allegany County, out 10 of the goodness of its heart, says U.S. marshals, 11 bring us your downtrodden, your --12 MR. COBURN: There may be some other 13 methodology, Your Honor. There may have been a 14 contract later or something, but I don't think they would have said considered him. 15 16 The fact that the U.S. Marshal Service considers 17 somebody a federal prisoner is meaningless. It means 18 nothing from the point of view of the IAD. 19 THE COURT: On that, I can agree with you. Mr. 20 Hanlon, I'm sure, probably would draft that a little 21 differently. 22 But you're right. It's not what the U.S. 23 marshals consider him to be. It is what he is in law 24 and in fact, and he is being held by the United States 25 Marshal under Judge Grimm's order, plain and simple.

They can ship him to California. They can ship him to Oklahoma, state or federal. They can leave him here overnight. It doesn't make any difference, it seems to me. That's the only common sense interpretation.

But I'll take another look at it, Mr. Coburn.

But I'll take another look at it, Mr. Coburn.

They may be, there may be something there.

MR. COBURN: I guess the main point from my point of view, I think in terms of if it is viewed through the prism of common sense, the statute really makes very little sense.

But I don't think it is a common sense proposition. I think it is a technical, a highly technical proposition. From our point of view, it seems to me it has just been violated.

THE COURT: Okay. You understand, of course, there wouldn't be a dismissal with prejudice in this case under any circumstance.

MR. COBURN: You know, Your Honor could exercise your discretion and dismiss this case with prejudice for the following reason.

THE COURT: I'm going to stop you. Now you are really --

MR. COBURN: Have gone too far.

THE COURT: -- going too far, yes.

While you are up there, did you want to argue on

the third superseding indictment? Do you have any issues on that?

MR. COBURN: I don't think we do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Does anybody? You can submit on the papers if you want or I'll be glad to hear some brief argument.

Good afternoon again.

MR. HURSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

The papers have laid it out, and I think it has been tossed around as -- the government has labeled it a proof issue. What's at issue here is the amendment to the -- it's really just a small amendment, but large in the sense that it extends the date of this alleged RICO conspiracy two years.

It doesn't add any new racketeering acts, but it does change the purpose of the so-called Mitchell organization to preventing and obstructing arrests and prosecution through witness intimidation and disruption.

THE COURT: The part that I liked was your suggestion that maybe I need to recuse.

MR. HURSON: Well, Your Honor, I guess we jump right into the proof part.

THE COURT: I don't think the governments needs me as a witness.

MR. HURSON: Well, Your Honor, it is sort of

unchartered waters, I think it has been described as.

It's in-court behavior. Now it has been labeled as disruption; but frankly, as a former middle school teacher, I have seen disruption, and it's relatively tame, if you ask me.

THE COURT: I'm afraid I don't have the option of a time-out.

MR. HURSON: None of my students cared either; hence, I'm here. But either way, the Fourth Circuit just a few weeks ago had a case before it, <u>U.S. v.</u>

<u>Banks</u>, where the same flesh and blood argument was presented.

THE COURT: There have been a couple, yes.

MR. HURSON: Actually, I think the Fourth
Circuit, to my knowledge, went as far as ever in
describing it in this particular case. They called it
an ill-advised self-defeating legal strategy, which
perhaps is correct.

But the point is that this third superseding indictments seems to criminalize what it is albeit a strange, bizarre, what have you, but a legal argument. And to do that, we have entered into a really strange world, which I think is what you are alluding to, where we all become in some sense co-conspirators to criminal acts every time we come into the courtroom.

THE COURT: Well, no, not co-conspirators. You certainly become witnesses of disruptive behavior which the government contends, and the Grand Jury agreed, was evidence of an ongoing conspiratorial understanding.

MR. HURSON: Well, that certainly raises another issue that I think --

What was presented to the Grand Jury? What witnesses came forward? How was this even proven? The point of all this --

THE COURT: It would haven't taken much beyond reading the transcripts of the proceedings.

MR. HURSON: Perhaps, but at trial --

The point I guess, Your Honor, is to say at what point can we just narrow this down, cut the fat, and get to what this case is really about? It can't extend the life of a conspiracy for two years.

I mean in some sense it is a proof discussion.

But you have defendants who are cooperative at a point and then, you know, cease cooperating. To reindict that and claim that it somehow stretches into the future, are we to expect I guess a fourth superseding indictment after today's proceedings? This goes on and on and on.

So you can call it a proof issue, you can call

it a pleading issue, but the point is the Court should step in and say enough is enough, limit this to what is really the issue here, and that is the supposed drug organization, and cut the flesh and blood out of it. That's what in essence we are asking the Court to do.

To the point that you made, whether or not you would be a witness, I mean it was in there, some argument over this, but as I read it, it was your suggestion, albeit maybe not -- you didn't expect it to be carried out, I don't know, but it was in the transcript where you said you know, I can actually envision a third superseding indictment.

THE COURT: And I think every one of us could.

MR. HURSON: Well, certainly now.

THE COURT: I mean it was as clear as the nose on our faces.

MR. HURSON: Well, I wasn't here at the time, of course. I would think that the behavior that was being exhibited here is an ill-advised legal strategy, and to turn that into evidence or a component of a criminal charge is a very dangerous direction. When we are talking about --

THE COURT: See, I don't think, I don't think it is any more a legal strategy than murder is a legal

strategy. I say that most respectfully. The Fourth Circuit was being, I was going to say uncharacteristically generous, but I won't say that.

The Fourth Circuit called it a "legal strategy," right? It's not a legal strategy. It's not a legal strategy other than it's just the most expansive colloquial sense of that term one can imagine.

MR. HURSON: Certainly, perhaps not to us, but I do know that we may be hearing more about it as we are learning more about what it is and its genesis, and this and that, and I don't want to give it any more respect than it deserves.

But my point is it is a strategy, and if these gentlemen presenting it together somehow turns it into part of a criminalism, then four co-defendants saying not guilty can just as easily be turned into some sort of collected behavior designed to thwart the ends of the justice system.

So by that, I would say that is generally our issue. If anything, this is a separate, just one final point, a separate conspiracy, if you even want to go that far, whereby it would be perhaps a cover-up or some sort of disruptive -- but it can't be part of the initial drug organization. That's really our issue.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hurson.

MR. HURSON: Thank you.

THE COURT: I will certainly anticipate various motions in limine from the defense as we go forward, and I will give those motions careful consideration, to be sure, but I don't have within the Court's power to start amending indictments and making pretrial rulings on the scope of a conspiracy. We are just going to have to see how this plays out.

Yes, Mr. Crowe. I didn't mean to shortcut your argument on your motion to dismiss.

MR. CROWE: I will make it extraordinarily brief. I believe Mr. Hurson has certainly covered the high points and I think we have briefed it as well as we can in our second set of motions. I would just like to point out a couple of important dates for this.

June 7, 2002 we think is probably the critical date. That is the date of the last murder, the Tanya Jones-Spence murder. Mr. Harris was arrested for that murder that day.

My client and Mr. Mitchell had been in jail since April of 2002. So by that time, we had three of the four people who were named as members of the RICO enterprise and three of the four people who were part

of, who were named as members of the conspiracy in jail.

As Mr. Hurson has pointed out, that is also the date, even through the third superseding indictment, of the last racketeering act, and we only have a couple of crimes past that point. One is -- excuse me.

The arrest of Mr. Harris, he was actually in 2004. He had a gun on him. Then there was the assault up in the Marshal's Office.

None of those were pled to be part of the conspiracy. None of those were pled to be part of the RICO enterprise.

Clients were in jail for months under the state indictment. They were in jail for about a year and a half under the federal indictment.

This Court made the formal finding itself that at all times they conducted themselves properly and they acted in a completely decorous manner while they were in court until the activity, the outburst, whatever you want to call it, in November of 2005.

The law is quite clear that for there to be a RICO enterprise, it has to be something that is continuing and ongoing. It can't be something which is punctuated by a lapse of -- actually, years is what

we are talking about here.

We don't think it's an ongoing activity. Under the cases we cited, we don't think that it is an ongoing activity in terms of being a RICO enterprise or in terms of being a garden variety conspiracy.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Crowe.

Mr. Harding.

MR. HARDING: Thank you, Your Honor.

Judge, in my response to this motion about when the conspiracy or the racketeering enterprise ends, I talked mostly about RICO cases, the Shores case and the Stokes case and other similar cases.

There's another line of authority which I think can be applied to this, and has been by the Fourth Circuit, and that's the case law dealing with withdrawal from a conspiracy.

I agree with Mr. Martin that the issue of when an enterprise ends is largely the same as the question of when a conspiracy ends. Of course, that's especially the case when what we have charged is a RICO conspiracy.

There is a section -- Section 170 of the Fourth Circuit Criminal Handbook summarizes the case law on withdrawal from a conspiracy. It talks about the rule in this circuit. I'll give you the Leavis case, 853

F.2d at 218-219. The rule applies in this circuit that a conspiracy continues until there is affirmative evidence of its abandonment or defeat of its purpose.

For withdrawal from a conspiracy, a particular member has to take affirmative steps to defeat the conspiracy, and it is his burden to show that he has done that.

There is a particularly good case that I pulled up in this line of cases about withdrawal from a conspiracy. It's the <u>West</u> case, and it is good because it deals with being incarcerated or getting locked up as an argument for withdrawing from a conspiracy.

This case, <u>United States versus West</u>, which is at 877 F.2d 281, dealt with a situation where a guy named Thomas was locked up in January of, I'm sorry, in May of 1986, and about seven or eight months later, in January of 1987, two of his co-conspirators were caught doing a marijuana transaction in Bermuda. Mr. Thomas claimed that he wasn't a member of the conspiracy, that evidence shouldn't be admissible against him.

The Fourth Circuit says in the <u>West</u> case, Thomas argues instead that his arrest constituted evidence of his withdrawal from the conspiracy and, therefore, the

post-arrest evidence should not have been admissible, absent an affirmative showing that Thomas somehow continued in his role as a conspirator from jail. We disagree. A defendant's membership in a conspiracy is presumed to continue until he withdraws from the conspiracy by affirmative action. Withdrawal must be shown by evidence that the defendant acted to defeat or disavow the purposes of the conspiracy.

It goes on to say that the District Court determined that the post-arrest evidence was relevant on the basis of the government's uncontested representation that two of the participants in the January 1987 marijuana transaction were co-conspirators with Thomas prior to his arrest. Given this presumption that Thomas's membership in the conspiracy, if proven, continued after his arrest, evidence of that transaction was relevant to proving the scope of the conspiracy's activities. We, therefore, find that the evidence was properly admitted.

There are similar provisions in a number of Fourth Circuit cases that deal with this issue.

I would also like to speak, and I'll rely on my written submission that I provided to the Court for the argument as it relates to a RICO enterprise, which

is very similar case law actually.

I want to say one thing about the courtroom disruption activity of these defendants, Your Honor. It is not charged in the RICO count. It is, however, racketeering activity because Section 1503 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code is listed as racketeering activity in Section 1961. Section 1503 is a sort of federal contempt and obstruction of justice statute. It contains a sort of catchall provision.

There is a case, a United States Supreme Court case called <u>U.S. v. Aguilar</u>, 515 U.S. 593. At page 598 it talks about this omnibus clause in 1503, and says that it serves as a catchall, prohibiting persons from endeavoring to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice. The latter clause, it can be seen, is far more general in scope than the earlier clauses of the statute.

The clause basically makes it a crime to corruptly influence, obstruct or impede or endeavor to influence, obstruct or impede the administration of justice, corruptly, which is a word, I believe it was Mr. Martin's motion, talks about.

There is an abundance of case law that simply says this is a specific intent requirement. It requires that the defendant specifically intend to

disrupt the administration of justice.

versus Alwan from the Fifth Circuit, a 2004 case, 388

F. 3d 507, where its talks about a witness's failure to testify, his refusal to testify after being subpoenaed to court, which would be a classic example of contempt of court. It holds that that kind of activity is cognizable under the catchall provision of 1503.

There is a string of case citations in the U.S. Code Annotated that speaks of this as a contempt provision.

So even though it's not charged, the courtroom disruption activity is racketeering activity under the law and would be admissible to show the pattern of racketeering activity in this case.

I had proposed to address that issue in writing, Your Honor, and I will do so, but I want to give you the government's position on that now.

The key point of that is the government doesn't say anything about live flesh and blood or the defendants' defenses, legal defenses in its third superseding indictment. It simply cites courtroom disruption, along with witness intimidation, as two of the purposes of the Mitchell organization, and witness

intimidation has in fact always been there in the indictment. It is one of the ongoing permanent features of this organization, and Your Honor got a flavor of it in the rap song that was played in court here one day.

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But there are other instances. It's not just

Mr. Harris who has attempted to assault or intimidate

government witnesses. The Court will hear evidence of

other such occasions that have punctuated the

post-arrest history of this case. It's not jut Mr.

Harris. It's other defendants as well, and it is an

ongoing permanent feature of the organization.

So the government's position is that the new language that was inserted into the third superseding indictment is perfectly appropriate, proper language in the indictment and doesn't compromise any rights that the defendants have. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Harding.

Well, I am not persuaded to dismiss the indictment on account of the changes effected in the third superseding indictment. So the motions to dismiss or to strike certain language from the indictment is denied.

I will take another look at this IAD issue.

It's kind of interesting actually, but I don't expect

to grant any relief to Mr. Gardner on account of that motion.

I think that -- yes, Mr. Hurson.

MR. HURSON: Not to interrupt, we have a separate motion to dismiss as well.

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

MR. HURSON: Not simply this one.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HURSON: I can briefly summarize. This will, actually will be brief I think.

The papers pretty much lay it all out. It's the motion to dismiss. It was Count 1 of the second superseding indictment. I guess I would orally amend to make it the third superseding indictment. It's the whole issue of the separation between the person and the enterprise under 1962(c).

Again, the papers sum it up pretty well. I just wanted to draw attention to a couple interesting things.

One was Mr. Harding's representation in the courtroom today about how the fact that no one would have ever even called this an organization, the Mitchell organization. I thought that probative of the issue because our point all along is that there is no separation here between the individuals and what is

now being called a RICO organization. As the papers make clear, the Fourth Circuit has been very specific on the requirement that this be separate.

I was trying to think of an example that may sum it up, and something that came to mind was like a baseball team. The 1941 New York Yankees -- some might call them a criminal organization of sorts -- would be different if they didn't have Joe Dimaggio on the team, but they would still be an organization. They would still continue on.

So in that sense, there is separation between the individual, albeit a key individual, but an organization.

Here, we have an organization, but if you take any one of the defendants out of it, it simply falls apart. It is not what the government claims that it is, a long-standing organized enterprise.

The case law is laid out clear in the briefs, but I just wanted to draw attention to that.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I'll take another look at that. I'm aware that that is an issue that has been raised by Mr. Harris and I believe joined in at least by Mr. Gardner and perhaps by the other defendants as well.

All right. I appreciate counsel's efficient

presentation of your arguments today. We don't need 1 2 to be in session tomorrow. We are next scheduled for 3 May 10 and 11, and I believe that's when you wish to do the identification. 4 5 MR. KURLAND: Yes. I have a couple of 6 procedural housekeeping matters that I would like to 7 address with the Court. 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 DEFENDANT MITCHELL: Excuse me, Your Honor. 10 Without being dishonorable, I wanted to know can I 11 address the Court when you finish? 12 When we are done, yes, Mr. Mitchell. THE COURT: 13 DEFENDANT MITCHELL: Thank you. 14 MR. KURLAND: Your Honor, at the lunch break I 15 was talking to the government with respect to some of 16 the potential witnesses. I indicated to the 17 government that we wanted Mr. Montgomery present, and 18 the government politely, but certainly refused. I was 19 wondering if the Court could order --20 THE COURT: Why do you need Mr. Montgomery? 21 MR. KURLAND: Well, without going into too much 22 of displaying what our, part of our defense is --THE COURT: I'm sorry. This is on the 23

MR. KURLAND: The array of issues with respect

eyewitness identification.

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to the Andrea Smith identification.

From the moving papers that we filed years ago, it's clear that Ms. Smith has made several contemporaneous statements concerning the identity of the perpetrators right after the initial shooting. Of critical import, she describes a tall person, much taller than Mr. Gardner, wearing a red hat as the shooter. This has been testified to under oath by some of the police officers.

Mr. Montgomery, we have reason to believe that Mr. Montgomery has under oath to the government said that Mr. Holly was wearing a red hat. That is critical with respect to --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, Mr. Kurland. I'm not following this. We are talking about Mr. Gardner's motion to suppress photographic identification, correct?

MR. KURLAND: No.

THE COURT: No. Okay. What are we talking about?

MR. KURLAND: Andrea Smith made several statements to officers with respect to what happened at the scene. She also allegedly made a show-up identification.

THE COURT: Right. The show-up identification

of Mr. Gardner. 1 2 MR. KURLAND: Well, it's unclear as to what 3 exactly. The government's positions is going to be that she identified Mr. Gardner in the show-up as the 4 5 shooter. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Just stop there 6 7 for a moment. So the government's contention, 8 proffer, expected evidence is that she identified Mr. 9 Gardner at the Spence murder --10 MR. KURLAND: Yes. 11 THE COURT: -- as the shooter. 12 MR. KURLAND: Yes. 13 THE COURT: She has testified already in the 14 state court proceeding. 15 MR. KURLAND: No. She never did testify. 16 THE COURT: She didn't testify. 17 MR. KURLAND: But she made a statement to a 18 police officer who did testify under oath at both a 19 preliminary hearing and at the state court trial that 20 the shooter was a tall guy wearing a red hat. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MR. KURLAND: Which is not --23 THE COURT: She knew it was a tall guy wearing a 24 red hat. 25 MR. KURLAND: Which is not Mr. Gardner.

THE COURT: What does that have to do with the identification evidence in this case?

MR. KURLAND: Well, because, because that isn't

MR. KURLAND: Well, because, because that isn't Mr. Gardner and --

THE COURT: Okay. So she might be a defense witness, but I'm trying to focus on what we need to do in the way of Mr. Gardner's motion to suppress identification evidence.

MR. KURLAND: If part of putting on that evidence --

THE COURT: Part of putting on what evidence?

MR. KURLAND: If part of putting on the evidence concerning the constitutional unreliability of the show-up procedures with respect to how Andrea Smith allegedly made an identification of Mr. Gardner, we have proffered evidence, and it's in the file from years ago, that Andrea Smith also made a statement at the scene where she described what happened and described the shooter as a taller guy, six foot three, six foot three, wearing a red hat.

THE COURT: Okay. So that will go to the reliability and thus, the admissibility of her out-of-court identification.

MR. KURLAND: Yes. In addition to that -THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. KURLAND: -- we had earlier heard today in graphic and flowing things that Mr. Montgomery has been self-described, or not self-described, as the wheelman with respect to that shooting.

The government's argument is, and it is their contention that Mr. Montgomery was present during, or at or around the time of that. Mr. Montgomery has testified that on that day --

THE COURT: In the state court proceeding?

MR. KURLAND: Well, in the Grand Jury.

THE COURT: In the Grand Jury. All right.

MR. KURLAND: That Mr. Holly that day, who is about six foot three, wore a red hat.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KURLAND: Again, without going all into what our defense is going to be with respect to that, that's critical evidence for the Court in evaluating the accuracy and the reliability, and all of the factors concerning the accuracy and the reliability of her alleged show-up identification.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm not going to order the government to produce Mr. Montgomery. I don't see the connection. In fact, you just told me that he testified in the Grand Jury that Mr. Holly was wearing a red hat.

MR. KURLAND: Oh, I'm sorry. I forgot one 1 2 critical factor. Ms. Smith says at the scene that the 3 guy wearing the red hat is the shooter. I'm sorry. THE COURT: Okay. So she will be cross-examined 4 5 on that and the Court will make a reliability 6 determination. 7 MR. KURLAND: Well, the government has also told 8 me that if I try to admit into evidence Mr. 9 Montgomery's statement in the Grand Jury, they are 10 going to object on hearsay grounds. How can they object on hearsay grounds if they are not going to 11 12 present him? THE COURT: Well, it's --13 14 MR. KURLAND: Well, you have to make the ruling. 15 THE COURT: I can consider that on a motion to 16 suppress identification. I mean we are not concerned 17 about a jury at the hearing. So we don't need Mr. 18 Montgomery is what I'm saying. 19 MR. KURLAND: Well, as long as that testimony 20 with respect to Holly wearing the red hat is --21 THE COURT: Well, I'll decide whether I'm going 22 to consider it at the time of the hearing. 23 understand that, but we don't need him here to repeat

MR. KURLAND: All right. That's the first

that if you've got the Grand Jury testimony.

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1 thing. The second thing --2 THE COURT: Let me just hear briefly from Mr. 3 Harding, please, again. I know you have been over this. 4 Mr. Harding, are you going to introduce the 5 6 evidence of the show-up? 7 MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: And through what witness? 9 MR. HARDING: I'm going to let Mr. Hanlon --10 THE COURT: Mr. Hanlon, do you have a detective 11 who is going to testify to that? 12 MR. HANLON: There were two. I believe they were uniformed officers. 13 14 THE COURT: Uniformed officers. 15 MR. HANLON: Then they will be prepared to 16 testify about the procedure that was followed. One of 17 the things Mr. Kurland and I spoke about this 18 afternoon is Mr. Kurland has a couple of officers he 19 is expecting to see at the hearing. I told him to 20 give me a list. I want to make sure they are 21 available and so forth. 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. HANLON: That's essentially how the 24 government anticipates setting forth this procedure. 25 THE COURT: All right. Okay.

All right. Go ahead, Mr. Kurland.

MR. KURLAND: Two other things, Your Honor. One is that, Mr. Harding and I had talked about this over the phone, the earlier transcripts of several of the proceedings --

THE COURT: Right. I saw that in the papers. Have you been in touch with Ms. Cook?

MR. KURLAND: I personally have not, but we need the full, I think all counsel need the full transcript, not just simply the testimonial part.

THE COURT: I agree. I am sure if you are in touch with Ms. Cook, she will do whatever she needs to do to get them produced.

MR. HARDING: Mr. Kurland and I left a voice mail message for Ms. Cook.

THE COURT: Yeah. She has been ill, and as you can see, she is not here today. She has had some issues, but I am sure she will produce them for you.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}.$ HARDING: She did call me back and she did agree to produce that stuff.

THE COURT: Sure. They will be available. They will be available.

MR. KURLAND: Your Honor, the other housekeeping matter is based on what happened this morning, I will get together with Mr. Harding to see if we can come up

with a proposal with respect to a schedule with respect to written pleadings on the co-conspirator issue that we talked about this morning.

THE COURT: You mean Montgomery?

MR. KURLAND: Yeah. Yes.

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THE COURT: Well, I don't think we need much of a schedule. I mean just submit a motion. I mean I thought I heard pretty comprehensive argument this morning.

MR. KURLAND: Your Honor --

THE COURT: It appears to me, based on Mr.

Harding's proffer, that prima facially, Mr. Montgomery
is a member of the conspiracy at the time he has the
conversation with Mr. Gardner.

Now it is true that for a co-conspirator exception to come into play, the recipient doesn't have to be a member of the conspiracy.

MR. KURLAND: That's true.

THE COURT: But there are certain statements made to a non-conspirator which fall outside the rule under circumstances where those same statements made to a member of the conspiracy clearly are encompassed by the rule.

Based on Mr. Harding's proffer of Mr. Montgomery's alleged membership in the conspiracy, and

the circumstances under which these alleged conversations occurred between Mr. Gardner and Mr. Montgomery, I would be prepared to conclude that Mr. Gardner's statements about Mr. Martin were indeed statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy, and during the conspiracy. That's not a final ruling.

MR. KURLAND: I understand.

THE COURT: But I don't think I need 27 pages of legal briefs on that. I think I need at most a couple of citations, and maybe Mr. Harding can reduce his proffer to writing so that you can better get your hands around it.

MR. KURLAND: Judge, here's my problem. The representations that Mr. Harding made today are substantially at variance with all of the evidence and discovery that I have, not just the Grand Jury testimony, but of the pages and pages and pages of the prior statements of Mr. Montgomery, including his under oath testimony and the full record in the state court case.

So if Mr. Harding is not going to submit anything, that's fine, but I then certainly want to file a very detailed counter-proffer that will support the position --

THE COURT: I absolutely invite you to do that.

In fact, that's probably the way we ought to go. You ought to make the first filing, and I will ask you to do it in two weeks, and Mr. Harding will have an opportunity to respond.

But Mr. Montgomery's own motion or belief or even his protestation about whether he was or was not a member of a particular conspiracy, as you all know, is not controlling.

MR. KURLAND: It's certainly not controlling.

THE COURT: Exactly.

MR. KURLAND: But neither is it irrelevant.

THE COURT: Mr. Harding clearly is correct, a person can be a member of a conspiracy and at the same time do some solo work or do some work for some other conspiracy.

MR. KURLAND: And vice versa. That's the thing.

THE COURT: What's the vice?

MR. KURLAND: That simply because somebody is a member of one conspiracy doesn't mean they can't be a member of another, and simply because they are a member of a conspiracy doesn't mean that everything they do is in furtherance of that conspiracy.

But rather than belabor the point now, Your

Honor, I just wanted to get this clear. I will

certainly be -- I have no problem with being the first

person to draft. I will say this, though, that the representations again made by the government today are substantially inconsistent with the under oath record.

So to the extent that Mr. Harding in his representations is relying on information or evidence that I don't have, I would like to see that because again, the status, and the nature and the circumstances surrounding that alleged conversation, and the motivations for the Darius Spence robbery, have been established under oath time and time and time again, and none of them comport with the representations that were made today.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

 $\mbox{MR. KURLAND:}\mbox{ And I will lay it out, Your Honor.}$ Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Very good. Thank you.

Mr. Harding.

MR. HARDING: Well, I think it's actually a good idea for the Court to consider some of this co-conspirator statement evidence pretrial because I do think there are some issues that the Court is going to have to decide, and it might be better to do it before trial rather than during trial, which is when motions like this are normally decided. But I don't see why it has to be done five and a half or six

months before trial.

I think that this is not a constitutional issue. This is simply an issue about whether or not evidence comes in under 801(d)(2)(E) and I think that the Court should allow this to be briefed in the weeks immediately before trial, not now.

THE COURT: I'm not going to do that. If Mr. Kurland wants to file a motion in two weeks or three weeks, he can do that and you can respond, and I will give you whatever time you need to respond, but let's get it worked out.

I'm not even sure, I mean I'm not sure why Mr.

Kurland is so interested in this. Well, I think I

know. It's Mr. Crowe who really is most interested in this.

MR. HARDING: Mr. Crowe is interested also.

THE COURT: All right. He is interested a lot more than Mr. Kurland because the statement is going to come in against Mr. Gardner no matter what. It is Mr. Martin who has the standing to challenge Mr. Gardner's hearsay statement. Mr. Gardner doesn't have standing to challenge a hearsay statement by Mr. Gardner.

MR. HARDING: Right.

THE COURT: Right? But Mr. Kurland, Mr. Kurland

is concerned about this and it seems to be related perhaps to the identification, and it clearly is related significantly to the specific Spence murder.

So you can file it. You can file it.

MR. KURLAND: Thank you.

THE COURT: You don't have to wait until August.

MR. HARDING: I would add, Your Honor, just by way of explanation that there is nothing about the Wyche brothers' murder or about Mr. Martin or Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Harris in the state court record that Mr. Kurland keeps referring to.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HARDING: Of course there isn't, because Mr. Gardner was tried for a single murder in Baltimore

County. The state court prosecutor didn't even know about the Wyche brothers' murder until I told him about it. So there isn't going to be anything about any of that stuff in the transcript of the state case, the record of the state case.

Mr. Kurland's pleadings on this cited things like the statement of facts in Jermaine Johnson's plea agreement and some statement that Dean Stocksdale, the state prosecutor, made. They haven't got a clue about this Mitchell organization.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

192

1 MR. HARDING: Okay. 2 THE COURT: All right. 3 MR. KURLAND: Your Honor, one brief --THE COURT: No, Mr. Kurland. 4 5 MR. KURLAND: That was a bastion of misrepresentation. If the Court would give me a 6 7 moment to correct one thing? 8 THE COURT: Go a head. 9 MR. KURLAND: This highly compromised key 10 witness of the government, Mr. Montgomery, it has been 11 said over and over again, including I think in 12 statements to the U.S. Attorneys, that as part of his 13 wonderful deal that Mr. Montgomery got, he was to tell 14 them everything about everything, and there is no 15 mention, and the connection to the government is, it 16 has halfway convinced the Court today of this seamless 17 connection between the Mitchell enterprise, robbery of 18 Mr. A that morphs into the plan to rob Darius Spence, 19 this seamless connection. 20 Mr. Montgomery was told over and over and over 21 again that he had to be completely truthful and candid 22 on every connection, and he fessed up to all sorts of 23 other crimes that he got passes on. 24 And so for the government to stand up here and

make it seem like I'm the idiot, a disingenuous idiot

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to the Court by saying that, of course, he was only 1 2 tried for one murder blatantly distorts the record 3 which will be set forth in the pleadings. THE COURT: I don't think Mr. Harding called you 4 5 a disingenuous idiot. 6 MR. KURLAND: Not in so many words. 7 THE COURT: All right. May 10 and 11, we will do the identification. Then we have two days in June. 8 9 I haven't forgotten you, Mr. Mitchell. 10 Then we have two days in June. 11 What are we going to do in June, Mr. Harding, 12 that you think we should or can? MR. HARDING: Your Honor, could I address a 13 14 letter to the Court and counsel on that? 15 THE COURT: That would be great. I am looking 16 at your prior status report. We still have Mr. 17 Mitchell's post-arrest statements issue? 18 MR. HARDING: Yes. 19 THE COURT: I haven't resolved that? 20 MR. HARDING: There would be a couple witnesses 21 on that on May 10th, if that's all right with the 22 Court. 23 THE COURT: Can you do that and the 24 identification? 25 MR. HARDING: Oh, sure.

1 THE COURT: Okay. Then Mr. Harris's post-arrest 2 statements. 3 MR. HARDING: Well, I don't have more witnesses 4 on that. 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. HARDING: There are a number of pleadings 7 relating to that, and I think it's ripe for decision 8 on the papers, unless Mr. Martin and Mr. Treem 9 disagree. 10 THE COURT: Okay. I may want some brief 11 additional argument. 12 The death penalty motions are all submitted, I believe. 13 14 MR. HARDING: Oh, yeah. They have been 15 submitted for some time. 16 THE COURT: Right. 17 MR. HARDING: And I think those can be decided 18 on the papers. 19 THE COURT: On the papers, definitely. 20 MR. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, no. The notice to 21 strike, they filed a new notice in January, which we 22 haven't filed. We will get it in in the next two weeks or so. They added new aggravators. We have the 23 24 right to move to strike those. 25 THE COURT: Of course.

MR. SULLIVAN: So those aren't ripe yet.

THE COURT: All right. So perhaps we will get to those in June or perhaps not until July.

All right. Now we need to get serious about the jury questionnaire. Mr. Kurland and Mr. Coburn, I guess preserving certain exceptions, signed off on it. I assume that all counsel have a copy or that a copy is readily available. So I would ask you to take a look at it and be prepared on May 11th to bring to the Court's attention any changes or modifications that need to be put in.

Obviously it's going to be expanded because now we are talking about all four defendants. So we need to massage that, but I would like to get it out by June 1st or certainly by June 15th. Okay?

All right. Anything else, anybody, other than Mr. Mitchell?

MR. COBURN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Mitchell, I'll hear you briefly, sir.

DEFENDANT MITCHELL: First of all, let me thank the Court for honoring me. I would like to state that I fully accept the government's offer for value. I fully accept Mr. Attorney, doing business as Timothy Sullivan, cross-examination of the said officer on

April 1st.

I would like to accept for value Mrs. Attorney doing business, motion to sever, trial and sentencing proceedings. I would like to return each and every offer for value for close and settlement of the account. I would like to state my five requests.

I do not argue the facts, request the Court to issue me an appearance bond, waive all public costs. I request the Court to close all the accounts and release order of the Court to me immediately. I request the Court to set off and adjust all public charges by the exemption, in accord with Uniform Commercial Code 3-419, House Joint Resolution 192, Public Law 73-10. I request immediate discharge, and I thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Mitchell, I am willing to permit you to make those statements at the beginning of each session and at the end of each session. But as you saw, to the extent that there is disruption during court proceedings, the defendants are going to be excluded from the courtroom.

So the way you did it here this afternoon is exactly the way the Court -- doesn't think it's appropriate, but the Court is willing to accede to your request to make that speech at the conclusion of

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197
        the proceedings.
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              All right. Thank you very much, counsel. I'll
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 3
        see you on May 10th.
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               (The proceedings concluded.)
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C	Case 1:04-cr-00029-RDB Document 64	2 Filed 03/30/09	Page 198 of 218
			198
1	IND	ΞX	
2	GOVERNMENT'S' WITNESSES	PAGE	
3	DONALD KRAMER		
4	By Mr. Harding:	29	
5	By Mr. Sullivan:	38	
6	By Mr. Coburn:	46	
7	RICHARD WILLARD		
8	By Mr. Harding:	116-133	
9	By Mr. Crowe:	122-136	
.0	GOVERNMENT'S MOTION EXHIBIT	MARKED	REC'D
.1	RW-1		137
.2	2		134
.3	DEFENDANT MARTIN MOTION EXHI	BITS MARKED	REC'D
4	1		127
. 5	2		131
. 6			
. 7			
. 8			
. 9			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the foregoing transcript in the matter of United States of America vs. Willie Mitchell, et al., Defendants, Criminal Action No. AMD-04-029, before the Honorable Andre M. Davis, United States District Judge, on April 26, 2007 is true and accurate.

Gail A. Simpkins

Official Court Reporter

Document 642

2004 - 57:7, 57:12, 57:14, 57:17, 99:2, 62:12, 94:7, 111:8, 122:11, 175:20, 38:10, 111:15 85:21, 92:23, 92:24, 93:1, 93:3, 95:4, 122:19, 133:3, 171:21, 172:1, 174:15 145:5, 146:11, 157:4, 150:12, 196:14 176:1, 196:6 'interests - 99:25 169:9, 174:3 7th - 92:7 accounted - 152:25 admission - 85:19, 2005 - 53:24, 87:19, accounts - 9:4, 95:5, 95:10 8 10:19, 12:24, 18:13, 20:2, 20:16, 38:5, 155:21, 159:14, admit - 85:17, 183:8 admits - 143:20 **1** - 21:22, 30:10, 38:20, 39:6, 39:10, 94:10, 111:11, 122:14, 132:20, 132:23, 150:8, 196:9 **800** - 123:10 admitted - 131:3 **2006** - 54:6 **801(d)(2)(e** - 190:4 **836** - 127:20 2007 - 1:9, 40:21. 134:13. 138:1. 172:20 admitting - 82:19, 40:22, 40:23, 42:12, 146:4, 199:6 126:18, 127:7, accuracy - 182:18, **218-219** - 171:1 **853** - 170:25 **24** - 137:20, 159:14 **877** - 171:15 ado - 50:13 advice - 17:7, 19:4 176:12, 198:14 **1.2** - 26:18 182:19 **25** - 129:18 accurate - 39:13, **10** - 178:3, 193:7 26 - 1:9, 40:21, 199.7 advise - 23:11, **10:30** - 127:19 accurately - 25:4 199:6 116:11 10th - 193:21, 197:3 **27** - 187:8 **90** - 109:19 accusation - 114:17 advised - 7:19, 15:25, 164:17, 166:20 advocate - 23:4 **11** - 83:21, 159:14, 281 - 171:15 acknowledged -178:3, 193:7 29 - 198·4 A 81:20 **116-133** - 198:8 Act - 28:11 afar - 82:10 11th - 195:9 act - 78:7, 105:8, affect - 106:15 abandonment -12.2 - 50:10, 51:22 171:3 affidavit - 91:19, 169:5 **122-136** - 198:9 3-419 - 5:9, 9:9, abetted - 56:21 acted - 169:19, 10:23, 13:5, 17:21, 18:17, 20:5, 20:19, abetter - 54:13 afraid - 164:6 **127** - 198:14 172:7 acting - 157:19 action - 42:8, 172:6 Action - 199:4 **131** - 198:15 abetters - 54:12. African - 89:25 21:9, 38:9, 94:13, 111:14, 122:18, **134** - 198:12 **137** - 198:11 **afternoon** - 4:3, 23:14, 33:16, 115:15, 56.7 abettor - 55:1, 55:2 150:11, 196:13 **30-1** - 131:11, activated - 35:1 activities - 57:6, 115:19, 115:21, 116:1, 117:2, 117:23, **14** - 155:21 abide - 26:20, 27:8, **15** - 117:7 **1500** - 134:2 **1503** - 173:5, 173:7, 131:12, 131:22 **300** - 118:4, 118:23, **ability** - 6:25 **able** - 5:11, 11:19, 65:8, 87:8, 96:8, 122:24, 123:24, 163:7, 184:18, 196:22 57:8, 172:18 **activity** - 57:15, 169:20, 170:2, 170:4, 173:3, 173:5, 173:6, 173:12, 174:9 **15th** - 195:15 119:2, 119:10, **Afternoon** - 115:25 129:20, 135:8, 136:18, 138:5 97:13, 107:12, 146:16 agency - 148:13, **16** - 59:1, 59:9, above-entitled -174:8, 174:14, 174:16 **agents** - 31:1, 31:11, 157:20 137:16 302's - 64:2 acts - 57:15, 78:5, abruptly - 106:8 absent - 64:8, 172:2 absolutely - 7:6, 8:18, 12:8, 65:14, 16th - 137:20 30th - 39:2, 39:4, 79:1, 163:15, 164:25 **17** - 59:16 actual - 44:11, aggravators - 7:10, **17-10** - 94:14 **316** - 99:1 44:13 **170** - 170:22 330 - 99:1 Adam - 2:6 ago - 41:15, 41:21, **339** - 99:3 66:1, 67:16, 88:2, 44:1, 49:17, 59:2, 17th - 61:17, 92:5, add - 15:9, 15:12, 59:23, 100:12, 163:15, 191:7 64:21, 124:8, 125:18, 126:15, 152:10, 164:10, 179:2, 181:17 agree - 31:4, 70:10, 34-301 - 133·2 106:10 88:3, 128:14, 139:5, **18** - 29:24, 39:15, 117:22, 138:3, 159:16, 173:5 **38** - 198:5 **388** - 174:3 187.25 **Absolutely** - 33:11, 62:22, 67:16, 67:19, added - 103:9. 3d - 174:4 194.23 86:16, 93:5, 93:8, 69:4, 69:7, 144:16, addition - 55:4, 18th - 127:20 93:15, 93:19, 105:6, **192** - 5:9, 9:9, 10:24, 155:14 139:15, 181:24 108:13, 147:17, 161:19, 170:17, 185:11, 185:20 17:21, 18:18, 20:6, abstract - 79:15 additional - 3:18, 54:4, 64:5, 64:17, 65:3, 110:25, 194:11 20:20, 21:10, 38:9, **4** - 145:5, 146:11, abstraction - 87:11, 94:14, 111:15, 157:4 122:19, 133:3, **40** - 103:2 abundance - 173:23 address - 4:11, agreed - 165:4 5:22, 7:2, 7:3, 11:1, 25:21, 76:9, 88:17, 150:11, 196:13 **409** - 131:2 accede - 196:24 Agreement -143:13, 143:23, 153:25, 160:1 **410** - 131:2 accept - 5:12, 10:8, **1941** - 177:6 10:13, 17:11, 18:2, 18:7, 19:20, 20:11, 20:25, 37:24, 46:14, 88:24, 155:16, 174:17, 178:7, 178:11, 193:13 **1961** - 173:7 **413** - 134:12 **414** - 134:12 agreement - 31:3, 1962(c - 176:16 **1986** - 171:17 **1987** - 171:18, 421d - 126:19, 137:14, 191:22 62:2, 62:8, 88:19. addressed - 15:19, agreements -133:22 97:3, 99:5, 143:19, 154:2, 154:5 46 - 198.6 94:5, 111:6, 122:8 67:14, 104:4 172.13 **agrees** - 93:6 **Aguilar** - 173:11 132:18, 133:4, 150:3, 195:23, 195:24, 196:2 **1997** - 101:24, **48** - 113:5 4th - 144:13, 145:2 addressing - 59:12 104.12 ahead - 27:13, **1999** - 117:18. accepted - 4:22 adduce - 53:13 5 117:19, 117:22, access - 63:8 adequate - 141:11 46:17, 63:5, 73:5, 82:11, 140:18, 144:21, 181:25, 185:1 127:20, 137:16, accidentally - 92:12 adjudication -**50** - 129:18 137:20, 138:3 accommodating -1:30 - 117:22, **507** - 174:4 53:8 adjust - 5:7, 10:21, Aid - 155:6 13:1, 17:19, 18:15, 20:4, 20:18, 21:8, 38:7, 94:12, 111:13, 117:23, 123:24, 138:4 **515** - 173:11 accommodation aided - 56:21 1st - 195:15, 196:1 **52** - 113:5 aider - 54:13, 55:1, 13.6 **593** - 173:11 accomplish - 3:14, 122:16, 133:1, 150:10, 196:11 **598** - 173:12 3:15 aiders - 54:11, 56:7 accord - 5:8. 10:22. air - 35:14, 44:24 17:20, 18:16, 20:5, 20:19, 21:9, 38:8, **2** - 115:23, 130:25, adjustment - 9:7 **al** - 1:6, 199:4 **Adjustment** - 145:8, 146:13, 157:7, 160:15 **albeit** - 164:20, 166:10, 177:12 131:4, 134:14, 198:12, 198:15 **6(c** - 63:18 122:17, 133:1 **6(e** - 65:13, 69:3, alcohol - 35:21, **20** - 145:5, 146:11, 150:10, 196:12 Administration -112·5 accordance - 13:2, **200** - 120:11, 135:17 **2002** - 21:22, 30:1, alibi - 92:20, 92:22, 94:12, 111:14 administration according - 106:21, 107:12, 107:13, 110:20, 110:21 173:15, 173:20, 174:1 30:10, 38:20, 39:2, 148:9, 160:19 administrative -39:4, 39:6, 39:10, 40:23, 42:12, 45:23, account - 4:25, 5:5, 40:9, 40:25 aliunde - 101:14 **7** - 168:18 10:15, 17:13, 17:17, 73-10 - 5:10, 9:10, admissibility -Allegany - 160:16, 10:24, 17:22, 18:18, 20:6, 20:20, 21:10, 18:9, 19:22, 20:13, 21:2, 21:6, 38:1, 47:1, 92:6, 168:18, 140:1, 181:22 160:22, 161:9 168:23 admissible - 85:18, allegation - 157:5

Document 642

arose - 154:7 array - 178:25

30:17, 30:22, 31:6,

38:20, 39:4, 39:10,

arrest - 21:22, 30:9,

allegations - 54:7, 57:5, 114:12 alleged - 56:3, 78:4, 95:4, 113:25, 114:4, 160:10, 160:11, 163:14, 182:20, 186:25, 187:1, 189:8 allegedly - 83:1, 179:23, 181:15 alleges - 55:12 alleging - 78:8 allow - 190:5 allowed - 116:8 allows - 97:11 alluded - 98:13 alludes - 97:24 alluding - 164:23 almost - 58:3, 77:23, 78:8 alone - 31:24 aloud - 137:24 alternative - 142:20 Alwan - 174:3 ambiguous - 26:6. 26:11 ambit - 158:22 Amd-04-0029 - 3:4 Amd-04-029 - 1:5, 199.5 amend - 176:13 amending - 168:7 Amendment - 3:23, 28:17, 99:10, 140:1 140:5, 142:12, 142:18 amendment -163:11, 163:12 America - 1:4, 3:3, Americans - 89:25 amount - 91.8 amounts - 53:2 analysis - 86:8 ancillary - 95:9 **Andre** - 1:12, 199:5 Andrea - 179:1, 179:21, 181:14, 181:17 ankle - 35:16 Annotated - 174:11 answer - 39:23, 44:3, 73:18, 81:3 101:6, 112:12, 132:6, 153:20 answered - 85:4 antagonism - 87:20 antagonistic -79:10, 80:3, 80:21, 80:22, 81:5, 87:4, 87:11, 87:13, 87:14, 87:17, 88:4, 93:21 Anthony - 56:24, anti - 143:22, 154:20 anti-shuttling -143:22, 154:20 anticipate - 133:10, 168:3 anticipated - 103:10 anticipates - 184:24 anyway - 66:20, Anyway - 140:18 apart - 177:16 apartment - 37:17 apologize - 67:24 apparent - 75:6, appeal - 160:5, 160.7

appear - 143:18 appearance - 5:4, 9:1, 10:18, 12:13, 12:14, 12:17, 17:16, 18:11, 19:25, 20:14, 21:4, 38:4, 94:8, 111:10, 122:12, 125:22, 132:22, 150:6, 155:5, 196:8 appeared - 139:4 application applied - 170:14 applies - 171:1 apply - 99:22, 140:5 appointed - 13:12, appointment appreciate - 25:1, 68:19, 101:2, 150:2, 177:25 approached -120:12, 128:16, 128:18, 135:21, 135:23, 141:22 approaching appropriate - 14:13, 23:10, 26:22, 63:10, 76:10, 87:6, 97:10, 97:11, 175:15, 196:24 appropriately -16:5, 76:9 approved - 52:15 approving - 99:13 April - 1:9, 21:22, 30:1, 30:10, 38:20, 39:6, 40:21, 40:22, 40:23, 42:12, 45:23, 47:1, 92:5, 106:9, 155:21, 159:14, 168:23, 196:1, 199:6 area - 35:16, 118:3, 118:23, 118:24, 119:7, 120:9, 120:15, 135:11, 138:10 argue - 5:3, 5:19, 7:1, 7:13, 7:17, 10:17, 12:6, 12:9, 12:10, 13:13, 14:2, 14:3, 17:15, 18:9, 19:23, 20:13, 21:3, 38:3, 77:2, 91:9, 91:11, 94:7, 97:8, 111:9, 122:11, 132:21, 133:11, 143:11, 150:5, 162:25, 196:7 argued - 108:20 argues - 171:24 **arguing** - 77:9, 78:2, 80:4, 110:7 argument - 22:14, 24:6, 70:22, 70:23, 72:5, 72:14, 72:18, 72:5, 72:14, 72:18, 76:15, 77:10, 78:6, 79:7, 79:16, 96:20, 99:4, 100:10, 100:19, 103:14, 108:20, 115:9, 144:24, 150:1, 156:10, 156:12, 160:14, 163:6 160:14, 163:6, 164:11, 164:21, 166:9, 168:11, 171:12, 172:25, 182:5, 186:8, 194:11 arguments - 22:20, 23:22, 24:3, 27:5, 75:8, 76:14, 76:23

86:16, 88:24, 178:1

40:23, 42:3, 42:13, 42:21, 43:11, 44:4, 44:9, 92:7, 117:21, 143, 92.7, 177.21, 117:23, 117:25, 121:23, 123:23, 124:3, 127:18, 128:22, 128:25, 129:1, 134:3, 137:15, 140:24, 141:24, 142:13, 169:8, 171:24, 172:1, 172:10, 172:14, 172:16, 175:10, 193:17, 194:1 arrested - 30:13, 35:25, 39:1, 39:8, 39:19, 56:3, 106:9, 106:11, 109:14, 109:15, 125:14, 138:17, 168:20 arresting - 30:13, 31:7, 31:16, 32:4 arrests - 129:3, 130:6, 134:2, 163:17 arrived - 27:10 arriving - 6:5 Article - 143:24, 154:18, 154:23 Ashton - 119:11, aside - 75:17, 156:9 aspect - 64:10, 86:4 assault - 169:10, 175:7 assertion - 101:12 asserts - 55:14 assigned - 30:2. 117.19 assignment - 29:17, 29:25, 47:8, 117:8, 117:17 assigns - 28:14 assistance - 45:22, Assistant - 159:23 associate - 69:12 associated - 91:21 associates - 56:9, 57:12 assume - 16:4, 16:23, 23:15, 59:4. 101:13, 119:18, 136:13, 195:7 **assuming** - 108:5, 141:5, 141:7 assumption -12:14, 89:3 assure - 59:6, 80:2 attached - 150:23 attack - 75:18 attacked - 82:9 attacking - 81:9 attempted - 175:7 attempting - 1750:20 attention - 117:21, 134:21, 144:23, 159:5, 176:18, 177:19, 195:10 **attorney** - 5:1, 5:11, 5:19, 6:11, 107:3, 107:9, 137:17, 150:4 Attorney - 11:23, 28:5, 159:23, 195:24, 196:2 attorney's - 111:7,

32:18 Attorney's - 4:22 attorneys - 10:12, 16:19, 17:9, 18:5, 19:14, 26:7, 59:4 59:5, 59:18, 65:10, 110:6 **Attorneys** - 192:12 August - 54:6, 61:17, 144:12, 145:2, 145:5, 146:11, 157:4, 191.6 authored - 40:25. 41.3 authorities - 13:3 authority - 58:3, 170:13 authorized - 7:8 authorship - 69:13 automatic - 114:25 automatically 113:24 autopsies - 55:23 availability - 16:7 available - 21:17, 23:13, 106:20, 184:21, 185:21, 185:22, 195:8 averaging - 134:2 avoid - 77:20 aware - 75:6, 90:2 123:2, 126:23, 177:21 В

balance - 17:9, 18:6, 19:2, 19:17, 133:14 Baltimore - 1:8. 29:12, 29:18, 29:23, 30:2, 32:4, 32:7, 32:21, 32:22, 32:24, 33:1, 33:3, 34:10, 34:12, 34:22 34:10, 34:12, 34:22, 34:23, 35:1, 36:9, 36:22, 46:23, 47:8, 48:8, 48:10, 89:21, 104:23, 110:10, 117:4, 117:12, 138:4, 138:5, 151:12, 152:6, 152:24, 153:18, 154:4, 191:14 Banks - 164:11 bar - 57:5 bargain - 10:10 Barry - 2:5 baseball - 177:6 Based - 121:10, 186:24 based - 63:8, 77:7, 103:14, 121:11, 151:7, 185:24, 186:11 basic - 57:24 basis - 6:20, 7:12 9:2, 9:5, 65:11, 65:12, 79:7, 79:15, 82:18, 85:17, 87:6, 87:9, 05.17, 07.0, 07.1 104:14, 110:9, 110:18, 124:18, 124:19, 139:8, 139:13, 139:14, 142:20, 153:4, 153:5, 153:19, 172:11 **bastion** - 192:5 Bates - 126:19 131:2, 133:22, 134:12 bears - 133:22, 134:11 beat - 92:19 became - 30:18,

become - 30:17, 72:11, 75:6, 164:24, 165:2 becomes - 82:2, 111:19, 140:3 beforehand - 16:11 began - 7:20, 55:18 begin - 78:4, 150:20 beginning - 196:18 begins - 12:11, 74:12, 134:22 behalf - 7:4, 8:13, 11:7, 15:4, 22:20, 23:4, 24:3, 24:6, 24:24, 28:12, 29:5, 53:20, 79:25, 104:8, 116.17 behavior - 21:15, 133:13, 164:2, 165:2, 166:19, 167:17 behind - 34:24, 76:12 belabor - 188:23 belief - 188:5 believes - 98:8 belive - 119:11 bench - 17:7, 19:4 benefit - 10:2, 18:3, 59:23 benefited - 66:24 **Benson** - 32:2, 32:23, 33:2, 34:11, 36:22, 43:17 Bermuda - 171:19 best - 3:10, 6:22, 6:25, 84:5, 84:6, 113:4, 118:6, 119:16, 120:25, 121:5, 153:8 bet - 161:7 better - 5:23, 5:25, 63:2, 187:11, 189:22 between - 10:5, 60:21, 60:22, 75:7, 75:11, 87:21, 92:5, 108:10, 129:15, 131:13, 135:24, 148:5, 158:10, 159:14, 176:15, 176:25, 177:11, 187:2, 192:17 beyond - 11:17, 57:22, 165:11 bifurcation - 70:2 big - 8:16 Bill - 53:23, 54:2, 57:1, 58:4, 58:8, 58:9, 58:11, 61:14 Bills - 58:2 binding - 100:3, 100:6 bit - 6:5, 35:20, 64:10, 74:21, 152:6 bizarre - 159:21, 164:21 black - 68:17 blades - 127:21 blah - 93:12, 93:13 blah - 93:12, 93:1 blaming - 88:5 blatantly - 193:2 bleed - 75:9 block - 118:4, 118:23, 119:2, 119:10, 120:11, 123:10, 129:21, 135:8, 135:17. 135:8, 135:17, 136:19, 136:23, 138:5, 156:9, 156:13 blood - 164:11,

166:4, 174:21

cage - 36:10

caliber - 103:2

calibrate - 144:24 California - 162:1 amera - 61:21, :22, 79:6, 87:9 cancel - 11:8 candid - 192:21 candidly - 8:10 cannot - 16:21 capable - 22:19 capacity - 40:13 capital - 49:19, 1:6, 77:11, 79:13, 0:2, 86:5, 86:10, 5:17, 90:4, 90:18, :2, 97:8, 97:9, 7:17, 97:19, 97:20, 3:4, 99:14 car - 31:20, 34:13, 1:19, 36:10, 37:10, :23, 55:16, 110:3, 9:1, 119:9, 120:21, 21:24, 123:17, 24:21, 124:22, 28:16, 128:18,, 128:18, 29:4, 129:13, 137:3, 38:12 card - 92:22, 107:17 care - 63:24 cared - 164:8 career - 129:2 careful - 68:10, 59:8, 168:5 carefully - 156:11, 59:15 carried - 118:25, 11:1, 166:11 carries - 95:8 carry - 99:21, 10:14 carrying - 118:3 case - 1:11, 7:4, 24, 9:14, 11:25, 3:8, 13:23, 17:2, :25, 18:22, 23:3 :5, 28:4, 28:15, 5:6, 45:19, 51:23 1:18, 57:24, 58:6, :7, 66:4, 68:4, 1:22, 74:15, 76:7, 6:19, 77:11, 78:11, 9:13, 80:2, 80:9, 2:16, 86:5, 86:10, S:17, 87:16, 87:18, 9:15, 90:3, 90:9, 7:22, 98:4, 99:23, 00:13, 105:7, 108:3, 08:22, 114:21, 22:5, 123:2, 123:5, 26:3, 127:25 37:15, 139:6 39:25, 140:2, 40:20, 144:1, 5:21, 146:4, 6:10, 152:12 52:21, 152:23, 52.21, 152.23, 55:2, 159:24, 62:17, 162:19, 64:10, 164:16, 65:16, 170:11, 70:12, 170:15, 70:20, 170:23, 70:25, 171:8, 71:10, 171:14 71:23, 173:1, 73:10, 173:11 3:23, 174:2, 174:3, 174:10, 174:16, 175:10, 177:18, 181:2, 187:20, 191:18, 191:19

Case - 3:3 cases - 42:16, 45:21, 49:19, 80:7, 91:9, 97:3, 97:17, 98:20, 123:6, 145:13, 146:3, 146:21, 149:5, 149:11, 152:18, 154:9, 156:6, 158:20, 170:3, 170:11. 170:12, 171:9, 172:22 cast - 77:21 catchall - 173:9, 173:13, 174:8 categories - 151:7 category - 154:3, 154:4 caught - 120:10, caused - 4:17, 55:19, 130:3, 130:9 cease - 165:20 cell - 55:16, 83:4, 83:15, 105:18, 106:25, 156:19 center - 108:6, 109:17 **Center** - 104:23, 145:8, 146:13, 157:8, 160:16, 160:23 certain - 5:16, 14:5, 33:16, 57:5, 175:22, 186:19, 195:6 certainly - 12:20 13:15, 22:10, 23:17, 24:1, 25:25, 51:2, 53:4, 53:7, 56:1, 56:12, 60:15, 67:6, 71:21, 72:23, 73:4, 73:6, 75:20, 77:12, 87:6, 110:6, 141:17, 147:25, 165:2, 165:6, 166:15, 168:3, 168:13, 178:18, 187:22, 188:9, 188:25, 195:15 Certainly - 115:22 126:24, 150:19, 167:8 Certificate - 199:1 certify - 199:2 challenge - 89:10, 140:1, 140:4, 190:20, 190:22 challenges - 89:11 **chance** - 23:20, 109:3, 109:4, 110:25, 147:20 chances - 91:4 change - 77:1, 163:16 changes - 149:3, 175:20, 195:10 **charge** - 72:20, 92:19, 92:22, 117:10, 145:19, 146:24, 154:13, 154:16, 166:22 **charged** - 54:20, 58:12, 90:18, 113:14, 170:20, 173:4, 174:13 charges - 5:8, 9:8, 10:22, 13:2, 17:19, 18:16, 20:4, 20:18, 21:9, 38:8, 92:11, 94:12, 111:13, 122:17, 131:24 132:3, 133:1, 150:10, 196:12 Charles - 127:22, 127:24 Cheeks - 103:19

chemist - 133:20 chitchat - 109:17 choice - 72:7 choose - 75:18, 143.5 chosen - 133:13 Chris - 43:16 Christopher -123:19 chronology - 151:4 cigar - 119:13, 121:12, 121:20, 129:25, 130:2, 130:4, 130:9, 130:13 130:16, 131:17 132:9, 135:13, 136:3, 141:10, 141:15, 142:6 cigars - 129:4, 130:6, 135:15 Circuit - 58:8 79:10, 97:5, 151:22, 152:19, 164:9, 164:15, 167:2, 167:4, 170:15, 170:23, 171:23, 172:22 174:3, 177:2 circuit - 98:25, 170:25, 171:1 circumstance -162:17 circumstances -25:14, 53:9, 76:10, 82:14, 84:20, 85:22 186:21, 187:1, 189:8 citations - 174:10, 187:10 cite - 103:16 151:20, 158:21 cited - 89:17, 89:23, 98:20, 170:3, 191:20 cites - 98:23, 174.23 citing - 149:5 citizen - 125:10 city - 33:4, 42:21, 43:12 **City** - 29:12, 29:18, 29:23, 30:2, 32:21, 32:22, 34:22, 41:10, 46:23, 47:8, 48:10, 89:21, 104:23, 117:4, 117:13, 138:4 claim - 57:18, 74:12, 90:19, 103:15, 110:5, 125:22, 165:21 **claimed** - 82:9, 98:16, 171:20 claiming - 54:22, 54:24, 60:3 claims - 78:14, 177:16 classic - 174:6 clause - 173:12, 173:15, 173:18 clauses - 173:17 clean - 86:15 clear - 8:18, 26:11, 28:8, 58:6, 58:9, 58:16, 59:25, 68:25, 70:14, 70:22, 73:4, 73:6, 73:25, 75:7, 84:14, 99:16, 100:3, 100:7, 111:20, 139:11, 151:21, 155:18, 100:7 166:16, 169:22 177:2, 177:18, 179:3, 188:24 Clearly - 108:10, 142.7

clearly - 75:5, 80:10, 86:1, 101:9, 107:23, 108:24, 186:22, 188:12, 191:2 clenches - 114:5 Clerk - 29:3, 29:8, 116:20 clerk - 137:10 clever - 107:15 client - 6:18, 8:14, 11:21, 12:8, 13:12, 13:15, 13:18, 26:23, 27:20, 50:24, 54:20, 54:23, 56:4, 69:25, 72:14, 73:7, 77:7, 78:1, 78:3, 78:7, 92:6, 98:12, 110:20, 125:25, 127:18, 156:17, 168:22 client's - 26:20, 59:25, 60:7, 83:1, 125:22 **Clients** - 169:14 clients - 3:4, 8:5. 13:24, 14:5, 14:14, 23:5, 26:2, 28:13, 66:18, 67:4, 67:9 clients' - 66:18 Cliff - 123:16 close - 4:24, 5:5, 10:14, 10:19, 12:24, 17:12, 17:17, 18:9, 18:13, 19:21, 20:1, 20:13, 20:16, 21:2, 21:5, 38:1, 38:5, 62:12, 94:6, 94:9, 111:8, 111:11, 122:10, 122:13, 132:20, 132:23, 150:7, 196:5, 196:9 closed - 76:13, closely - 13:17, 146:17 closer - 93:24 closest - 129:17 closure - 21:2 clue - 191:23 co - 25:16, 54:11, 56:6, 60:4, 72:8, 72:15, 82:18, 83:1, 92:18, 103:8, 103:19, 106:2, 107:24, 112:1, 164:24, 165:1, 167:15, 171:18, 172:14, 186:2, 186:15, 189:20 co-conspirator -60:4, 82:18, 103:8, 103:19, 107:24, 112:1, 186:2, 186:15, 189.20 co-conspirators -54:11, 56:6, 106:2, 164:24, 165:1, 171:18, 172:14 co-counsel - 25:16 co-defendant -72:15, 83:1, 92:18 co-defendants -72:8, 167:15 **Coburn** - 2:5, 15:9, 15:11, 15:20, 46:9, 46:11, 46:17, 46:18, 46:20, 49:1, 49:3, 51:5, 51:6, 52:3, 52:6, 60:16, 61:18, 61:19, 61:24, 62:20, 62:22, 63:3, 63:6, 63:17, 64:3, 65:21, 66:7

66:8, 66:23, 67:21, 67:22, 68:2, 68:16, 68:19, 68:21, 68:22, 101:10, 103:13, 108:18, 111:2, 143:7, 143:8, 143:10, 143:15, 144:16, 144:21, 144:22, 147:12, 147:16, 147:19, 147:25, 148:4, 148:8, 148:15, 149:14, 149:19, 150:2, 152:10, 155:13, 155:14, 155:22, 156:20, 157:2, 157:13, 157:17, 157:21, 157:23, 157:25, 158:4, 158:7, 158:15, 159:2, 159:7, 159:21, 160:4, 160:6, 160:8, 160:11, 160:13, 160:14, 160:17, 160:19, 161:2, 161:8, 161:12, 162:5, 162:7, 162:18, 162:23, 163:3, 195:5, 195:18, 198.6 Coburn's - 65:2 cocaine - 118:23 Code - 5:9, 9:8, 10:23, 17:21, 18:17, 20:5, 20:19, 38:9, 94:13, 111:14, 122:18, 133:2, 173:6, 174:11, 196:13 coercion - 10:1, cognizable - 6:20, coincidentally -106.12 collected - 167:17 collective - 6:15 collectively - 8:3 colloquial - 167:7 color - 33:18 Colorado - 154:7 come-up - 153:4 coming - 126:1 commences 146:10 comment - 65:2 comments - 22:22. 69:24 commerce - 138:21 Commercial - 5:9, 9:8, 10:23, 17:20, 18:17, 20:5, 20:19, 38:9, 94:13, 111:14 122:18, 133:2, 196:13 Commission - 28:5 commission - 78:4 commit - 77:22 committed - 55:15, 56:14, 56:17, 57:17 **common** - 116:24, 134:7, 135:14, 162:4, 162:9, 162:11 commonly - 119:13 communicate -33:2, 66:19 communication -32:5, 32:19 communications -32:22, 32:23, 32:24, 34:2 community - 90:8 99.18 comparative - 86:8

compare - 68:13, 8:14, 71:18, 87:16, 168:5 compelling - 71:11, considered - 98:3, 90:10 160:24, 161:15 compels - 86:25 considering - 71:13 considers - 161:16 consistent - 25:15, complete - 25:23 **completely** - 60:6, 74:20, 78:23, 80:21, 145:20, 169:19, 135:1, 144:6 console - 120:20 conspiracy - 54:6, 56:10, 56:11, 57:21, 192:21 complex - 57:25 80:15, 88:13, 93:3, 93:14, 93:18, 94:23, complicated -103·3 152·7 95:8, 95:17, 95:24, 96:6, 101:9, 101:13, complication -49:23 105:9, 108:1, 108:2, 108:3, 108:11, component -166:21 108:13, 108:19, 108:21, 108:24, comport - 189:11 comported - 142:12 comprehensive -110:6, 110:22 112:20, 112:21, 113:25, 114:4, 114:6, 143:16, 186:8 compromise -114:8, 114:24, 175:16 163:14, 165:17, 163:14, 165:17, 167:21, 168:8, 169:1, 169:12, 170:5, compromised -192.9 concealed - 102:23 170:10, 170:16, 170:19, 170:21, concede - 159:10, 159.22 170:24, 171:2, 171:4, 171:6, 171:10, conceded - 85:11 concedes - 145:2, 171:13, 171:21, 171:25, 172:4, 172:6, 145:6, 146:8 **concern** - 63:12, 67:23, 68:22, 75:22 172:8, 172:16, 186:13, 186:17 186:22, 186:25 76:22, 77:14, 78:23, 86:4, 86:5 concerned - 58:15, 187:5, 187:6, 188:7, 188:13, 188:15, 188:19, 188:21, 67:5, 125:9, 183:16, 191:1 concerning - 26:21, 92:1, 139:6, 179:4, 181:13, 182:19 concerns - 4:9, 188:22 conspiracy's -172.18 conspirator - 54:13. 65:15, 65:23, 75:15, 60:4, 82:18, 103:8, 103:15, 103:19, 77:13. 97:14 **conclude** - 3:18, 115:10, 133:24, 187:3 107:24, 112:1, 172:3, 186:2, 186:15, concluded -186:20, 189:20 141:16, 197:4 conspiratorial **concludes** - 142:15 conclusion - 28:21, conspirators -54:11, 56:6, 106:2, 164:24, 165:1, 171:18, 172:14 76:2, 154:25, 196:25 conclusory - 157:5 condition - 66:22 constituted conditions - 53:2 conduct - 37:16, 171:24 Constitution conducted - 169:18 99:17 conducting - 23:9 constitutional conferences - 3:7 26:5, 90:16, 100:8 confine - 108:25 conflict - 84:10 101:1, 181:13, 190:2 consult - 13:17, conflicting - 81:23, 26:22 contact - 37:19, confronted - 100:13 44:11, 44:13 confusing - 74:22 confusion - 84:17 containing - 136:3, 142:6 conjecture - 73:4 **contains** - 173:9 connection contemplates -182:23, 192:15, 192:17, 192:19, 79·11 154·23 contemporaneous 192.22 179.4 contempt - 173:8, 174:7, 174:11 connects - 55:8 conscientiously contends - 165:3 99:21 consent - 11:8, 15:5 contention - 180:7, consider - 50:12, 182:6 61:6, 70:2, 161:23, 183:15, 183:22, contest - 24:5 context - 81:25, 189.19

consideration -

continue - 6:10,

19:15, 23:4, 25:16, 26:1, 27:2, 28:11, 28:13, 115:13, 143:17, 172:5, 177:10 continued - 172:3, continues - 171:2 continuing - 87:22, 104:14, 169:24 contraband -141:19, 142:6 contract - 148:5, 148:12, 148:16, 148:18, 148:24 149:3, 149:24, 156:21, 158:9, 161:3, 161:14 contracts - 149:10 contradicted -80.22 contradictory - 88:8 contrary - 155:20 control - 72:15, 74:15 controlled - 157:18 controlling - 80:5, 81:7, 188:8, 188:9 controversy - 4:17. 147:13, 147:14, 153:14 conversation -12:7, 15:18, 55:19, 91:24, 92:4, 93:16, 106:23, 108:10, 186:14, 189:8 conversations -187.2 convict - 61:4, 89:14. 100:16 convicted - 7:8, 91.5 conviction - 138:22 convinced - 192:16 convincing - 90:10 Cook - 185:7, 185:12, 185:15 cooperate - 66:19 cooperating -165:20 cooperation - 73:2 cooperative -165:19 cooperator - 91:15 **cooperators** - 59:14, 59:24 Copies - 67:16 copies - 63:24, 65:3, 67:15, 69:2 copious - 108:3 **copy** - 127:6, 131:1, 137:14, 144:18, 148:16, 195:7 Copy - 68:11 core - 87:15 corner - 119:10 Correct - 38:25, 45:5, 47:11, 48:21, 130:1 correct - 6:6, 9:15, 39:16, 39:25, 40:14, 40:20, 44:19, 45:4, 45:7, 45:15, 45:16, 45:20, 45:23, 45:24, 46:24, 47:2, 47:17, 47:19, 47:22, 48:11, 48:16, 93:23, 110:1, 112:4, 119:20, 123:8, 123:24, 124:20, 125:2, 125:17, 128:5, 129:25, 130:22,

136:19, 149:12, 164:18, 179:17, 188:12, 192:7 corrected - 14:16 Correctional -145:7, 146:13, 157:7 correctional -145:25 Corrections -145:12, 146:20, 147:3, 147:7, 147:8, 147:22, 149:2, 149:8, 158:11, 158:18 **correctly** - 12:20, 147:5, 148:4 corruptly - 173:19, 173:21 cost - 18:12, 20:1, 38:4, 68:21 costs - 5:5, 9:2 10:19, 12:14, 17:16, 20:15, 21:5, 94:9, 111:10, 122:13, 132:22, 150:7, 196:8 Counsel - 3:4, 23:4 counsel - 4:8, 6:21, 8:3, 14:4, 14:17, 15:5, 15:9, 19:1, 23:3, 23:21, 25:3, 25:16, 26:1, 28:1, 28:4, 28:9, 28:45, 28:10, 28:15, 28:22, 49:11, 49:13, 53:9, 59:6, 61:19, 64:15, 65:24, 66:17, 66:19, 67:4, 67:8, 67:15, 68:12, 78:13, 81:4, 88:1, 108:16, 136:13, 143:5, 185:9, 193:14, 195:7, 197:2 counsel's - 177:25 Count - 176:12 count - 7:8, 173:4 counter - 187:23 counter-proffer -187:23 countermanded counting - 153:1 counts - 56:23, 57:9 Counts - 50.23, 57.9 County - 32:4, 32:7, 32:15, 32:24, 33:1, 33:3, 34:10, 34:12, 34:22, 34:23, 35:1, 36:9, 36:22, 48:8, 89:20, 89:21, 110:10, 146:23, 146:25, 151:12, 152:6, 152:24, 153:19, 154:4, 160:22, 161:9, 191:15 **county** - 33:4, 42:20, 43:12, 44:17, 44:19, 45:14, 144:3 147:21, 156:8, 156:14 couple - 3:18, 51:12, 51:17, 79:5, 135:20, 136:14, 135.20, 136.14, 146:3, 164:13, 168:16, 169:6, 176:18, 178:5, 184:18, 187:9, 193:20 course - 13:17 27:24, 40:6, 61:2, 68:18, 68:20, 79:13, 79:14, 87:18, 100:25, 101:4, 104:10, 110:1, 115:3, 115:6, 143:12, 143:21, 147:10, 153:25, 162:15, 166:19, 170:19,

164:25, 173:2, 174:13, 174:23,

176:21, 196:21

courts - 151:17,

91:13, 193:1, 194:25 Court - 1:1, 1:25, 3:2, 3:7, 4:2, 4:4, 4:7, 4:8, 4:11, 4:12, 5:3, 5:5, 5:6, 5:7, 5:13, 6:3, 6:10, 6:22, 6:23, 7:2, 7:22, 8:1, 8:7, 8:8, 8:10, 8:20, 8:23 9:13, 9:17, 9:19, 9:22, 10:3, 10:5, 10:9, 10:17, 10:19, 10:20, 10:21, 10:25, 11:1, 11:3, 11:11, 11:16, 12:1, 12:3, 12:16, 12:24, 13:1, 13:10, 14:9, 14:11, 14:15, 14:21, 14:24, 15:8 15:14, 15:17, 15:20, 16:21, 16:25, 17:4, 17:8, 17:15, 17:17, 17:18, 17:19, 17:23, 18:4, 18:12, 18:13, 18:15, 18:20, 18:25, 19:5, 19:10, 19:14, 19:16, 19:23, 19:24, 19:25, 20:1, 20:2, 20:3, 20:8, 20:14, 20:15, 20:17, 20:22 21:6, 21:12, 21:20, 21:25, 22:5, 22:10, 22:23, 22:24, 23:13, 23:17, 23:25, 24:18, 25:1, 25:2, 25:5, 25:8, 25:19, 25:22, 26:3, 26:5, 26:10, 26:13, 27:9, 27:13, 27:17, 27:23, 27:24, 28:3, 28:8, 28:16, 28:20, 36:6, 37:15, 38:3, 38:5, 38:6, 38:7, 38:11, 41:4, 46:5 46:11, 46:13, 46:17, 49:1, 49:5, 49:8, 49:18, 49:21, 50:6, 50:8, 50:11, 50:18, 50:20, 51:1, 51:4, 51:24, 52:1, 52:5, 52:7, 52:9, 52:13, 52:14, 53:6, 53:7 53:19, 54:8, 54:14, 55:5, 55:21, 56:17, 57:4, 58:10, 58:19, 58:22, 59:7, 59:15, 59:20, 60:9, 60:14, 60:18, 60:20, 61:1, 61:5, 61:11, 61:13, 61:16, 62:3, 62:7, 62:10, 62:13, 62:17, 62:19, 63:1, 63:5, 63:14, 64:1, 64:6, 64:8, 64:25, 65:1, 65:5, 65:11, 65:17 65:19, 66:22, 67:3 67:16, 67:19, 67:23, 68:1, 68:7, 68:9, 68:17, 68:20, 68:24, 69:4, 69:7, 69:14, 70:1, 70:16, 70:21, 71:17, 71:24, 72:21, 73:5, 73:10, 73:13, 73:23, 74:3, 74:18, 74:24, 75:2, 76:8, 77:9, 77:18, 77:24 78:10, 78:16, 78:19 78:24, 78:25, 79:11, 79:14, 79:18, 79:21, 79:24, 80:11, 80:16, 81:12, 81:17, 81:24, 82:11, 82:17, 83:2, 83:4, 83:7, 83:9,

83:12, 83:14, 83:18, 83:20, 83:22, 83:24, 84:2, 84:5, 84:12, 84:16, 84:18, 84:24 85:1, 85:3, 85:7, 85:8, 85:13, 85:16, 86:9, 86:12, 86:15, 86:20, 86:22, 86:23, 86:24, 87:7, 87:20, 88:2, 88:9, 88:17, 88:18, 88:22, 89:11, 90:9, 90:15, 91:12, 91:17, 92:23, 93:5, 93:6, 93:8, 93:16, 93:23 94:1, 94:4, 94:8, 94:9, 94:10, 94:11, 94:16, 94:21, 94:23, 95:1, 95:6, 95:12, 95:16, 95:20, 95:22, 96:2, 96:7, 96:10, 96:15, 96:18, 96:24, 97:3, 97:13, 98:6, 98:10, 98:14, 98:22, 99:2, 99:5, 99:6, 99:11, 99:16, 100:1, 100:3, 100:5, 100:6, 100:13, 100:16, 100:22, 101:2, 101:4, 101:7, 101:12, 101:16, 101:22, 102:1, 102:5, 102:7, 102:11, 102:7, 102:71, 102:13, 102:15, 102:17, 102:20, 103:1, 103:5, 104:11, 104:22, 105:1, 105:5, 105:13, 105:16, 105:18, 105:21, 105:24, 106:4, 106:7, 107:20, 108:4, 108:9, 108:22, 109:2, 109:10, 109:13, 109:18, 109:21, 109:24, 110:17, 111:4, 111:9, 111:11, 111:12, 111:17, 112:7, 112:14, 112:16, 112:22, 112:23, 113:6, 113:10, 113:16, 114:2, 114:10, 114:13, 114:10, 114:13, 114:16, 115:1, 115:3, 115:6, 115:22, 116:1, 116:5, 116:10, 116:11, 116:13, 122:7, 122:12, 122:13, 122:14, 122:16, 122:21, 126:20, 126:25, 127:4, 131:3, 132:25, 133:6, 133:10, 134:13, 134:25, 135:3, 135:6, 136:12, 136:15, 137:8, 138:1, 138:23, 139:19, 139:24, 140:15, 141:2, 141:6, 142:2, 142:15, 142:2, 143:8, 143:14, 144:14, 144:20, 147:10, 147:14, 147:24, 148:2 147:24, 148:3, 148:7, 148:13, 149:13, 149:16, 149:20, 149:25, 150:8, 150:13, 150:18, 153:6, 155:10, 155:12, 155:21, 156:19, 156:25, 157:11, 157:15,

157:19, 157:22, 157:24, 158:1, 158:5, 158:14, 158:24 159:6, 159:19, 160:3, 160:5, 160:7, 160:10, 160:15, 160:14, 160:18, 161:1, 161:4, 161:7, 161:9, 161:19, 162:15, 162:21, 162:24, 163:4 162:13, 162:21, 162:24, 163:4, 163:19, 163:23, 164:6, 164:13, 165:1, 165:11, 166:1, 166:5, 166:14, 166:16, 166:24, 168:1, 168:3, 169:17, 170:6, 172:9, 109.17, 170.6, 172.9, 172.24, 173.10, 174.2, 175.18, 175.18, 176.6, 176.8, 177.20, 178.7, 178.8, 178.11, 178.12, 178.19, 178.20, 178.23, 179.20 179:14, 179:19, 179:25, 180:6, 180:11, 180:13, 180:16, 180:21, 180:23, 181:1, 181:5, 181:11, 181:21, 181:25, 182:9, 182:11, 182:14 182:17, 182:21 183:4, 183:5, 183:13, 183:15, 183:21 184:2, 184:8, 184:10, 184:2, 184:8, 184:10, 184:14, 184:22, 184:25, 185:6, 185:21, 186:4, 186:6, 186:11, 186:19, 187:8, 187:25, 188:10, 188:12, 188:17, 189:13, 189:16, 189:19, 189:21, 190:4, 190:7 189:21, 190:4, 190:7, 190:17, 190:25, 191:6, 191:12, 191:25, 192:2, 192:4, 192:6, 192:8, 192:16, 193:1, 193:4, 193:7, 193:14, 193:15, 193:14, 193:15, 193:19, 193:22, 193:23, 194:1, 194:5, 194:10, 194:16, 194:19, 195:2, 195:2, 195:22, 196:7, 196:9, 196:10, 196:10, 196:11 196:10, 196:11, 196:16, 196:23, 196:24, 199:11 court - 6:12, 11:24, 23:16, 28:10, 96:4, 98:25, 153:3, 153:4, 153:10, 154:13, 164:2, 169:20, 174:6, 174:7, 175:4, 180:14, 180:19, 181:23, 182:9, 187:20, 191:10, 191:15, 196:20 Court's - 22:25, 23:1, 23:9, 23:12, 25:23, 25:24, 26:19, 41:24, 81:3, 87:24, 90:2, 97:22, 137:22, 137:23, 140:16, 168:6, 195:10 courtroom - 19:18, 20:9, 20:10, 20:23, 20:24, 74:11, 91:7, 111:18, 128:9

Document 642

cover - 68:7, 68:12, 68:14, 167:22 cover-up - 167:22 covered - 168:13 covert - 135:9 create - 82:22, 92:22 created - 7:14 credit - 107:17, 141:14, 152:25 credited - 152:15 credits - 142:2 crew - 101:23, 104:1 Crime - 117:12 **crime** - 55:9, 58:12, 60:8, 108:12, 173:18 crimes - 126:14, 169:6. 192:23 **Criminal** - 1:5, 28:10, 170:23, 199:4 **criminal** - 28:15, 67:6, 101:24, 102:5 104:4, 128:5, 164:25, 166:22, 177:7 criminalism -167:15 criminalize - 164:20 criminally - 69:2 criteria - 89:12 critical - 80:8, 112:18, 168:18, 179:6, 179:13, 182:17, 183:2 **cross** - 7:3, 70:3, 90:8, 99:18, 122:6, 183:4, 195:25 Cross - 38:15. 46:19, 122:22 cross-examination 122:6, 195:25 Cross-examination 38:15, 46:19, 122:22 cross-examine cross-examined -183:4 cross-section -90:8. 99:18 crossed - 7:16 Crowe - 2:2, 6:17, 11:16, 11:19, 12:5, 14:15, 14:24, 50:21, 50:22, 51:2, 53:19, 53:20, 54:14, 54:17, 55:6, 56:1, 56:20, 59:8, 59:13, 59:23, 60:6, 61:8, 61:16, 85:7, 88:14, 88:15 88:22, 88:23, 91:13, 91:14, 92:24, 93:6, 91:14, 92:24, 93:6, 93:15, 93:15, 93:19, 98:11, 98:20, 100:19, 105:1, 105:3, 109:2, 109:4, 109:6, 109:7, 109:11, 109:18, 109:22, 110:1, 111:4, 122:7, 122:21, 122:21, 126:16, 126:24 126:16, 126:24, 127:2, 127:5, 127:9, 130:24, 131:6, 132:12, 133:11, 133:20, 134:25, 136:14, 136:15, 136:17, 137:6,

138:25, 139:1, 139:23, 140:11, 140:19, 141:2, 168:10, 168:12, 170:6, 190:14, 190:16, 198:9 Crowe's - 62:16. 141:7 cruiser - 34:23, 35:1, 44:17 **Cs-3** - 91:23 cuffed - 37:9 culpability - 72:18, 75:19, 97:12 cumulative - 84:7 **current** - 155:1 **custodial** - 150:22 **custody** - 37:12, 52:24, 84:22, 92:18, 109:8, 145:15, 145:17, 145:20, 147:24, 149:9, 152:16, 152:21, 153:19, 156:5, 156:15, 156:20, 157:1, 157:3 customary - 23:5, 28:13. 28:23 cut - 65:19, 87:14, 165:15, 166:4

danger - 106:17 dangerous - 166:22 Darius - 105:9, 107:5, 189:9, 192:18 dark - 33:18 Darryl - 56:23, 123:3 date - 30:18, 39:9, 40:2, 57:7, 57:8, 63:10, 92:6, 92:7, 137:21, 155:24, 155:25, 163:13, 168:19, 169:4 dated - 137:15 dates - 39:13, 137:19, 156:25, 168:16 Davis - 1:12, 4:10, 11:2, 40:17, 199:5 **days** - 124:6, 134:1, 153:2, 159:16, 193:8, 193:10 Dc - 146:16, 159:23 de - 72:11 Dea - 30:6, 40:4 **Dea-6** - 40:6 **deal** - 9:11, 95:11, 96:22, 172:22, 192:13 dealer - 105:10, dealing - 94:19, 117:11, 150:23, 153:15, 153:21, 154:9, 170:15 deals - 171:11 dealt - 100:20, 101:1, 152:18, 171:15 **Dean** - 191:22 death - 73:7, 76:19, 77:15, 77:17, 77:20, 89:2, 89:5, 89:7 89:13, 89:17, 89:19, 89:24, 90:17, 90:21, 90:25, 91:1, 91:4, 98:13, 98:17, 98:18, 98:19, 99:7, 99:8, 100:4, 100:8, 100:15,

death-qualified -89:5, 89:13, 91:4, 98:13, 98:18, 99:7 100:4, 100:8, 100:15 debt - 4:19, 11:9, decide - 23:20. 24:21, 72:17, 120:7, 183:21, 189:22 decided - 98:22. 189:24, 194:17 deciding - 77:15 decision - 8:13, 26:21, 31:10, 31:13, 32:25, 74:9, 74:10, 74:17, 79:22, 89:7, 90:2, 97:5, 97:15, 97:18, 98:2, 98:8, 98:24, 99:2, 99:12, 142:20, 151:20, 154:6, 154:7, 194:7 decision-making **decisions** - 13:16, 13:18, 13:20, 28:14, 58:8, 97:6, 98:23, 151.19 declarant - 107:25 declaration - 50:16 decorous - 169:19 defaulted - 26:5 defeat - 171:3, 171:5, 172:7 defeating - 164:17 defend - 8:4 defendant - 22:12, 24:4, 28:18, 28:24, 71:7, 71:8, 72:15, 74:6, 74:0 74:6, 74:9, 74:11, 74:15, 81:2, 83:1, 84:1, 86:17, 89:1, 90.4 90.16 90.18 92:18, 98:16, 99:9 131:11, 132:2, 138:9, 139:25, 145:6, 145:14, 145:17, 145:22, 146:2, 146:9, 151:9, 151:10, 160:6, 172:7, 173:25 Defendant - 1:20, 2:1, 2:4, 2:7, 4:10, 4:14, 9:21, 9:24, 10:7, 10:13, 11:1, 11:4, 11:14, 14:16, 14:20, 14:22, 15:1, 17:3, 17:6, 17:11, 18:1, 18:7, 18:23, 19:3, 19:9, 19:12, 19:20, 20:11, 20:25, 37:24, 46:4, 46:8, 46:12 46:14, 52:8, 52:10, 61:15, 62:2, 62:6, 62:8, 62:11, 88:16, 88:19, 94:3, 94:5, 96:12, 111:6, 122:8, 126:17, 126:22, 127:7, 131:4, 132:16, 132:18, 150:3, 159:16, 178:9, 178:13, 195:21, 198.13 defendant's -87:15, 99:10, 127:22, 140:4, 150:21, 150:22, 172:4 Defendant's -Defendants - 1:7, 99.4

defendants - 3:3, 16:17, 21:14, 22:6, 22:25, 23:2, 24:17, 50:3, 53:12, 67:11, 71:4, 72:8, 73:16, 86:10, 87:21, 87:22, 91:2, 93:22, 97:9, 97:10, 97:19, 97:20, 98:17, 100:9, 101:19, 102:4, 102:6, 102:9, 104:15, 104:21, 111:17, 115:13, 115:14, 165:19, 167:15, 173:3, 175:11, 175:17, 177:15, 177:24, 195:13, 196:20 defendants' - 79:1, 99:4, 100:10, 174:22 **Defender's** - 137:18 defending - 7:9, defense - 3:13, 6:16, 7:14, 16:19, 27:21, 50:25, 53:2. 58:14, 59:6, 66:9, 66:17, 67:15, 72:21, 81:10, 86:16, 87:17, 88:10, 88:11, 93:21, 108:16, 133:21, 168:4, 178:22, 181:5, 182:16 **Defense** - 65:24 defenses - 79:10, 80:4, 80:21, 80:22, 81:5, 87:4, 87:11, 87:14, 88:4, 174:22 defer - 69:12 defined - 57:16 definitely - 194:19 definition - 138:20 degree - 11:19, 4:11, 72:19 **Delaware** - 135:11 deliberately - 92:21 delighted - 63:20 demeanor - 44:25 demonstrate -21:15 denied - 22:12, 62:18, 175:23 **deny** - 25:9, 25:10, 61:13, 79:3 denying - 58:5, 88:7 depart - 20:9, 20:23 Department - 11:24, 29:12, 29:18, 29:23, 46:24, 47:9, 117:5, 145:12, 146:19, 147:3, 147:6, 147:8 147:22, 149:2, 149:7, 158:11, 158:17 department - 34:9, 41:11, 148:13 deployed - 33:5 deprived - 90:7 described - 66:9. 125:23, 131:17, 132:9, 138:10, 164:1, 181:18, 181:19, 182:3 describes - 179:6 describing - 164:16 description -119:25, 120:3, 141:12 deserve - 80:1 deserves - 76:1, 76:2, 167:12 designated - 134:4 designed - 167:17 desire - 19:19, 24:8

despite - 9:2, 9:6, 113.25 detail - 30:5, 92:3 detailed - 111:25, 31:23, 187:23 detain - 156:3 detained - 16:6 detainee - 161:1 detainer - 145:19, 155:24 **Detainers** - 143:13, 143:23, 153:25, 160:1 detective - 27:7, 32:5, 32:16, 32:21, 33:1, 34:12, 36:7, 36:22, 39:14, 39:17, 41:10, 42:23, 122:25, 123:1, 141:8, 141:14, 184:10 Detective - 4:5, 32:2, 33:2, 34:11, 36:21, 41:3, 41:5, 41:6. 43:16. 43:17. 49:8, 91:19, 127:13, 139:2 detectives - 37:18, **Detention** - 104:23, 160:23 detention - 12:15, 104:25, 108:6, 109:16, 145:18, 145:24, 147:11 determination -22:25, 23:2, 183:6 determine - 130:3 determined - 73:15, 172:10 developing - 27:3 development -22:15, 24:14 dial - 83:9 die - 76:2, 76:7, 76:11 died - 56:2 diem - 158:14, 158:16 difference - 160:16, 160:17, 160:18, 162:3 different - 50:23, 77:10, 79:13, 81:21, 81:22, 83:25, 88:8, 104:4, 146:7, 146:21, 151:15, 177:8 differently - 161:21 difficult - 73:3, 73.18 dilemma - 16:19 Dimaggio - 177:8 diminish - 87:10 direct - 7:4, 27:6, 149:21 Direct - 29:13, 116:25 directed - 51:8 Directing - 144:23 directing - 28:9, 82.10 direction - 48:24, 60:24, 60:25, 136:25, 137:1, 166:22 directly - 24:15, 28:6, 64:13, 80:22 97:3, 116:21, 148:25, 155:16 directs - 27:17 disagree - 147:16, 172:4, 194:9 disagrees - 62:25

disavow - 172:8 discharge - 5:10, 10:24, 17:8, 17:22, 18:5, 18:19, 19:1, 20:7, 20:21, 21:11, 23:21, 23:23, 24:22, 25:3, 38:10, 94:15, 111:16, 122:20, 133:4, 150:12, 196:14 discharged - 8:6, 150:13, 160:6 disclose - 24:17, disclosed - 64:12 disclosure - 51:11, 51:19, 51:22 **discovery** - 49:16, 49:22, 53:16, 53:18, 53:21, 61:20, 62:14, 64:15, 64:16, 67:14, 91:17, 111:1, 140:19, 187:16 discovery-related -53:18 discretion - 58:10, 86:20, 86:23, 86:24, 162:19 discuss - 13:5. 16:12, 42:8, 42:13, 52:17, 52:19 discussed - 6:16, 62:23, 106:15 discussing - 7:20, 106:3 discussion -105:14, 165:18 dishonor - 5:12 dishonorable -178:10 dishonored - 6.14 disingenuous -192:25, 193:5 disliked - 125:11 dismiss - 57:5, 57:18, 115:10, 143:3, 162:19, 168:11, 175:19, 175:22, 176:5, 176:12 dismissal - 24:7, 162:16 dismissed - 159:24 displaying - 178:22 dispose - 102:13 disputed - 157:15 disputes - 60:12, 60:20, 60:21 disrupt - 174:1 disruption - 163:18, 164:3, 164:4, 173:3, 174:14, 174:24, 196:20 disruptions - 38:12, 62:4, 133:9, 133:12 **disruptive** - 6:11, 115:13, 165:2, 167:23 distance - 129:15 distinction - 145:9 distorts - 193:2 distribute - 63:24 **district** - 29:21, 49:20, 98:25, 117:20, 119:2, 123:8, 123:11, 123:12, 147:13 **District** - 1:1, 1:2, 1:13, 99:1, 172:9, 199:6 division - 29:19 Division - 30:3, 47:10, 117:12 Doc - 155:7

doctor - 115:20 document - 127:10, 127:11, 127:16, 127:19, 133:25, 137:21, 138:19 documentation -150:23, 151:3 documents - 73:1. 127:17. 137:10 Donald - 4:5, 29:4, 29:11, 198:3 **done** - 6:15, 8:8, 24:23, 27:4, 40:11, 50:14, 56:4, 86:24, 87:1, 107:7, 114:23, 140:8, 140:11, 154:22, 158:16, 171:7, 178:12, 189:25 door - 135:22 doors - 76:13 doubt - 91:6, 126:9, down - 14:25, 27:20, 35:15, 44:18. 45:14, 54:1, 55:13, 93:7, 96:10, 96:11, 100:5, 118:18, 120:15, 120:19, 121:20, 134:8, 146:16, 157:15, 165:15 Down - 120:18 downtrodden draft - 161:20, 189:1 draw - 73:8, 76:3, 176:18, 177:19 drawing - 76:15, 145:9 drawn - 45:3, 45:7, 48.23 drew - 45:12 drive - 135:10 driver - 113:7, 138:6 driver's - 120:12, 120:22, 120:23, 129:20, 129:22, 135:22, 136:6, 138:16 drives - 118:22 driving - 32:2 33:19, 34:4, 34:6, 110:2, 129:13, 129:24, 137:3, 138:10 **drop** - 75:10, 118:25 drops - 118:22 drove - 35:4, 44:16, 141:10 **Drug** - 30:3 drug - 56:11, 104:14, 105:10, 107:5, 126:13, 166:4, 167:24 drugs - 104:16, 112:11, 112:13, 118:3, 118:25, 125:11 ducks - 73:19 due - 25:15, 173:15 duly - 29:6, 116:18 duress - 9:25, 18:1, 72:21, 88:11 During - 135:21, 138:9 during - 7:6, 36:13, 152:10, 153:15, 155:1, 155:3, 160:24, 182:6, 187:6, 189:23, 196:20 duties - 5:2, 5:12 duty - 99:22

Document 642

E earl - 14:23, 15:2 early - 30:1, 89:15 earth - 66:10 earth-shaking easier - 63:22, 65:2, 90:23, 152:5, 158:15 easily - 167:16 Eastern - 98:25 echo - 22:24, 65:1 Edward - 4:14 effect - 11:11, 12:19, 24:9, 50:19, 51:19, 51:20, 69:5, 75:9, 104:22, 141:24, 142:17, 156:13 effected - 47:16 48:5, 141:21, 175:20 effectively - 26:2 effectuated - 44:17 efficient - 177:25 effort - 91:20 efforts - 53:9 eight - 118:7, 124:8, 125:18, 126:15, 171.17 either - 12:16, 14:4, 15:14, 16:7, 23:13, 28:24, 56:10, 58:4, 58:11, 90:22, 132:11, 164:8, 164:9 elaboration - 10:4 elected - 50:14 election - 28:25 **element** - 103:9 eliminate - 77:12 embark - 6:21 emerged - 109:13 emergency - 34:14, employed - 47:1, 117:3, 117:4, 117:6 employee - 46:23 employees - 158:1, 158:3 encompassed encounter - 104:22 end - 57:8, 196:18 endeavor - 173:19 endeavoring -173.14 ended - 45:14, **ends** - 167:17, 170:10, 170:18, 170.19 Enforcement - 30:3, 30:21 enforcement -30:18, 40:13, 42:4 engaged - 22:5, enter - 11:7, 50:6, 52:1, 69:4 entered - 15:4. 155:8. 164:22 enterprise - 56:7 56:11, 57:10, 57:21, 168:25, 169:13, 169:23, 170:4, 170:10, 170:18, 172:25, 176:16, 177:17, 192:17 entirely - 25:14, 139:7, 139:8 entitled - 1:11, 54:16, 58:9, 58:18,

```
63:7, 98:16
  entry - 51:3
  envision - 166:13
  epileptic - 16:3
  equally - 56:5
  equipment - 34:14
  equity - 98:7
err - 78:21
  escape - 74:4
  especially - 24:12,
170:20
Esquire - 1:18, 1:19, 1:21, 1:22, 2:2, 2:5, 2:6, 2:9, 2:10
  essence - 72:11,
81:10, 166:5
  essential - 61:7,
essentially - 27:22,
86:7, 140:13, 151:3,
151:20, 184:23
  establish - 141:17
  established -
112:24, 189:10
 et - 1:6, 199:4
ethical - 26:3
  ethically - 8:12
evaluates - 112:22
  evaluating - 182:17
event - 6:12, 119:19
  events - 52:22
  eventually - 64:18
Evidence - 139:10
  evidence - 49:24,
53:1, 53:13, 55:7,
55:8, 57:6, 57:21,
59:12, 60:2, 60:7,
60:24, 60:25, 80:6, 90:11, 95:14, 100:14,
90.11, 93.14, 10
100:17, 101:14,
104:9, 110:16,
111:19, 112:25,
113:3, 114:17,
114:21, 122:4,
137:23, 140:2,
140:23, 165:4,
166:21, 171:3
171:21, 171:24
172:1, 172:7, 172:10,
172:17, 172:19,
172:17, 172:19,
175:8, 180:8, 181:2,
181:8, 181:10,
181:11, 181:12,
181:16, 182:17,
183:8, 184:6, 187:15,
189:5, 189:20, 190:3
                                       175:25
                                       180:8
  evident - 141:4
  evidentiary - 22:16,
                                       97.13
22:17, 95:9, 114:23
  evidentiary-type -
  evolving - 140:17
  exact - 124:2
Exactly - 95:6, 155:22, 188:10
                                       107:1
exactly - 23:1,
42:18, 49:24, 65:20,
70:19, 73:1, 73:24,
108:9, 140:9, 154:10,
158:4, 180:3, 196:23
                                       191.8
  Examination -
29:13, 116:25,
132:13, 136:16
  examination - 27:6,
38:15, 46:19, 122:6,
122:22, 139:16,
195:25
  examinations - 50:2
  examine - 7:3
  examined - 29:6
                                         extensive - 51:9
```

```
116:18, 183:4
  example - 50:1,
 56:13, 72:19, 144:12,
 174:6, 177:4
  except - 8:22, 75:5
  Except - 24:18
 exception - 152:23,
153:9, 153:18, 186:16
exceptions - 195:6
  exclude - 112:16,
 115:14
  excluded - 196:21
Excuse - 27:9, 73:5,
 150:3, 178:9
  excuse - 169:6
  excused - 3:19,
22:9, 115:19, 133:6, 137:9, 150:14
  execute - 50:24
  executing - 43:10
execution - 42:8
  exemption - 5:8,
10:22, 13:2, 17:20, 18:16, 20:4, 20:18,
21:9, 38:8, 94:12,
111:13, 122:17,
133:1, 150:10, 196:12
  exercise - 162:18
exercising - 77:21
Exhibit - 126:18,
127:7, 130:25, 131:4,
134:14, 138:2, 198:10
exhibit - 133:22,
 134:10, 136:11,
 137:12
  exhibited - 166:20
  exhibits - 7:5
Exhibits - 198:13
  exist - 61:11.
 143:17, 149:12
  existence - 149:3,
 149.10
  existent - 139:4
  exists - 148:18,
 158:10
  exit - 121:13
  exited - 35:9
  expanded - 195:12
  expansive - 167:6
  expect - 61:16,
109:23, 139:16,
165:22, 166:10,
  expected - 118:17,
  expecting - 184:19
  expects - 7:23,
  expenses - 158:13
  experience - 91:8
  expert - 72:23
  experts - 52:18
  explain - 5:25, 6:22,
 10:6, 32:19, 92:12,
  explained - 92:17,
 92:18, 107:10
  explanation - 10:4.
  explicit - 4:20,
 11:10, 15:6, 46:15.
52:11, 88:20, 96:13
  express - 78:2
  expressed - 28:21 expressly - 99:12
  extend - 165:17
  extending - 76:23 extends - 163:13
  extension - 54:5
```

extent - 23:19, 24:4, 60:10, 60:23, 64:11, 69:19, 74:8, 75:10, 149:12, 155:16, 189:4, 196:19 extraordinarily -168:12 Exxon - 35:3 eyewitness -178:24

F.2d - 171:1, 171:15 **F.supp.2d** - 99:1 face - 79:8, 145:18, 146:24 faced - 77:14, 77:16, 98:15 faces - 166:17 facially - 186:12 facilities - 144:3, 152:12, 153:21 facility - 145:12, 145:16, 145:24, 145:25, 146:1, 147:4, 147:7, 147:11, 147:23, 148:22, 148:24, 151:9, 151:11, 151:16, 151:18, 152:1, 152:14, 155:7, 156:8, 156:14, 157:14, 157:16, 157:18, 158:17 facing - 73:7, 77:16, facing - 73:7, 77:16 129:24, 137:1, 137:2 fact - 7:13, 7:18, 10:17, 12:10, 14:3, 25:8, 33:3, 51:23, 59:1, 63:22, 66:24, 77:2, 80:11, 82:13, 84:15, 90:24, 91:10, 91:17, 103:16, 103:22, 104:4, 107:3, 122:24, 125:2, 125:25, 126:7, 127:24, 128:8, 130:20, 131:7, 138:20, 150:23 155:3, 161:16, 161:24, 175:1, 176:21, 182:23, 188:1 **facto** - 72:11 factor - 27:4, 183:2 factors - 9:11, 73:8, 182.19 facts - 5:3, 5:20. 7:1, 7:20, 12:6, 12:9, 13:14, 14:3, 17:15, 18:10, 19:23, 20:14, 21:3, 24:5, 27:5, 28:20, 38:3, 70:20, 78:2, 83:2, 92:1, 94:7, 99:22, 111:9, 122:11, 132:21, 139:5, 139:22, 140:9, 141:4, 146:6, 150:5, 191:21, 196.7 factual - 22:15, 24:13, 72:17, 75:19, 137:25, 138:18 factually - 72:13 failure - 174:4 fair - 25:16, 28:19, 45:17, 73:14, 87:15, 89:3, 90:8, 99:18, 118:12 fairly - 57:19, 89:15, 93:1, 143:15

fairness - 98:7 faith - 53:14 fall - 186:20 falls - 177:15 false - 110:21 far - 58:15, 60:11, 61:20, 63:1, 92:8, 93:1, 104:18, 129:11, 144:7, 162:23, 162:24, 164:15, 167:22, 173:16 far-fetched - 93:1 Faretta - 8:7, 8:8, 14:9, 14:12, 22:5, 23:10, 23:17 fashion - 23:7, 56:9, 56:10, 110:21 **fast** - 63:3 fat - 165:15 favor - 70:1 fear - 18:2, 27:16 feature - 175:12 **features** - 175:3 February - 57:7, 57:11, 57:17, 145:5, 146:11, 157:3 Federal - 137:17 federal - 9:11. 71:1. 91:8, 96:4, 103:16, 137:15, 142:16, 144:1, 145:7, 145:17, 145:18, 145:19, 146:12, 147:11, 147:24, 148:5, 149:9, 151:10, 151:17, 151:24, 152:11, 152:14, 152:15, 152:16, 152:25, 153:2, 153:5, 153:6, 153:16, 153:17, 154:1, 154:13, 155:4, 155:24, 156:9, 156:13, 156:15, 156:19, 156:20 157:1, 157:3, 157:6, 158:1, 160:24, 161:1, 161:17, 162:2, 169:16, 173:7 feedup - 158:2 feet - 129:17, 129:18 fellow - 30:25, 31:11, 59:6, 91:16 **felt** - 54:2 fessed - 192:22 fetched - 93:1 few - 164:10 fewer - 71:5 fields - 72:24 Fifth - 174:3 fifth - 9:18 fight - 113:19 figure - 9:6, 73:1 figured - 107:6 figuring - 147:5 file - 12:19, 39:13, 51:10, 181:16, 187:23, 190:8, 191:4 filed - 51:11, 53:23, 60:1, 89:16, 91:20, 94:19, 111:23, 112:3, 143:15, 179:2, 194:21, 194:22 files - 111:24, 115:5 filing - 188:2 final - 13:9, 143:2, 167:21, 187:6

finally - 94:2 **fine** - 26:15, 112:23, 149:19, 156:22,

finger - 80:23 fingerprints - 55:8 finish - 19:13, 178:11 finished - 19:9 finishes - 27:6 firearm - 138:8, 138:16. 138:20 firearms - 104:17 fired - 27:1, 55:1 first - 3:6, 7:1, 7:17, 12:5, 65:14, 74:17, 75:14, 75:19, 80:1, 88:25, 96:17, 99:4, 101:8, 106:16, 106:19, 109:21, 109:22, 121:3, 121:19, 131:16, 137:24, 138:24, 146:8, 149:18, 152:9, 153:10, 153:20, 154:3, 156:2, 156:4, 183:25, 188:2, 188:25 **First** - 96:18, 152:19, 155:17, 195:21 fit - 88:1 five - 6:9, 6:13, 41:21, 50:4, 50:5, 88:12, 129:17, 159:13, 160:13, 189:25, 196:6 flavor - 175:4 fledged - 14:12 flee - 35:6 flesh - 79:6, 164:11, 166:4, 174:21 Flex - 117:19. 118:15, 126:4, 126:9, 126:12, 134:1 floor - 35:22, 131:12, 131:13 floorboard - 120:15, 120:18, 121:15, 135:24 flowing - 182:2 focus - 22:20, 45:11, 58:22, 81:17, 96:19, 97:1, 98:10, focused - 126:13, 143:22, 144:5, 152:10 focusing - 152:9 folders - 68:6 follow - 7:22, 33:15, 38.19 follow-up - 7:22 followed - 184:16 **following** - 4:3, 5:1, 5:12, 10:16, 17:14, 19:22, 33:24, 38:2, 74:18, 74:19, 77:18, 162:20, 179:15 follows - 29:7, 116:19, 143:19 foot - 31:17, 181:19, 181:20, 182:13 footnote - 108:25. 109:1, 110:12, 110:13 force - 9:25, 18:2, 42:2, 117:10 Force - 45:18, 47:5 forced - 77:22 forcefully - 57:19 forcing - 10:1, 86:7 Ford - 118:22, 120:2, 135:10, 138:11 foregoing - 199:2 forensic - 55:8

forfeit - 53:12 forgive - 146:15 forgot - 183:1 forgotten - 193:9 form - 61:9, 69:17 formal - 169:17 formality - 151:24 former - 164:3 forth - 50:11, 184:21, 184:24, 193:3 fortuity - 63:9, 66:2, 147:20 **forward** - 28:22, 165:9, 168:4 forwarding - 28:3 four - 8:23, 8:25, 12:22, 70:7, 70:8, 71:4, 71:5, 81:1, 88:12, 127:21, 167:15, 168:24, 168:25, 195:13 four-month - 70:7 fourth - 165:22 Fourth - 3:23, 58:8. 79:10, 97:5, 140:1, 140:4, 142:12, 142:18, 151:22, 164:9, 164:14, 167:1, 167:4, 170:14, 170:22, 171:23 172:22, 177:2 frank - 69:21 Frankly - 63:11, frankly - 63:23, 77:14, 139:2, 156:12, 164:3 Frederick - 146:23, 146:25 free - 12:1 front - 34:24, 35:2, 71:5, 71:15, 73:15, full - 14:12, 21:2 108:16, 150:5, 185:9, 187:19 full-fledged - 14:12 fully - 22:19, 23:3, 37:24, 69:9, 90:2, 195:23, 195:24 funding - 156:23 funny - 58:2 furnishes - 58:11 furtherance - 93:2. 93:13, 93:18, 94:22, 95:7, 105:8, 108:2, 108:13, 108:19, 108:24, 110:22, 112:21, 114:24 187:5, 188:22 furthest - 129:18 future - 165:22

Case 1:04-cr-00029-RDB

G

Gail - 1:25, 199:10 ganging - 81:1 garden - 170:5 Gardner - 2:4, 14:19, 14:20, 14:22, 14:23, 15:1, 15:2, 15:8, 18:21, 18:23, 19:3, 19:5, 19:7, 19:9, 19:12, 20:22, 20:25, 21:12, 52:8, 52:9, 52:10, 59:2, 64:22, 77:19, 91:24, 91:25, 92:8, 92:9, 92:11, 92:13, 92:17, 93:11, 95:5, 96:10, 96:12,

100:23, 102:23, 106:1, 106:11, 106:17, 106:21, 107:1, 107:10, 107:24, 109:14, 144:2, 145:11, 150:3, 150:13, 150:14, 150:13, 150:14, 152:11, 152:24, 153:7, 176:1, 177:23, 179:7, 180:1, 180:4, 180:9, 180:25, 181:4, 181:15, 186:14, 187:2, 190:19, 190:21, 190:23, 191:14 Gardner's - 59:4, 59:5, 59:18, 95:1, 95:2, 95:3, 100:23, 102:24, 110:6, 110:20, 151:1, 155:3, 179:15, 181:7, 187:4, 190:21 **general** - 126:15, 173:16 **generally** - 13:19, 96:18, 143:20, 167:19 generous - 167:3 genesis - 167:10 gentlemen - 167:14 George's - 89:21 **Gerard** - 2:9 gestures - 121:16 Giganti - 41:3, 41:6, 43:17, 91:19, 91:22 girlfriend - 33:19 girlfriend's - 32:10, 37:17, 102:24 Given - 73:21, 99:24, 172:15 given - 64:15, 66:18, 120:4, 141:11 glad - 126:25, 163:5 gold - 9:12, 118:22, 120:2, 135:10, 136:21, 138:11 Goo - 107:10 goodness - 161:10 Goose - 105:11, 107:5 government - 3:5, 3:9, 3:21, 41:23, 49:15, 49:21, 50:6, 50:17, 50:23, 51:10, 54:24, 55:12, 55:14, 57:6, 57:20, 58:20, 58:25, 60:2, 60:21, 61:2, 63:23, 64:18, 65:3, 65:9, 65:13, 65:22, 66:3, 66:11, 66:12, 66:13, 66:20, 66:25, 67:7, 68:9, 70:14, 78:8, 81:12 81:14, 83:25, 85:25, 89:2, 90:19, 92:25, 95:25, 96:4, 97:21, 98:8, 98:9, 108:7, 110:19, 111:24, 112:2, 112:24, 114:20, 115:5, 122:10, 126:19, 140:9, 143:15, 143:20, 144:8, 144:12, 145:2, 145:6, 146:3, 146:8, 146:22, 148:5, 148:15, 154:11, 156:7, 157:6, 158:5, 158:8, 158:9, 158:10, 160:5, 160:7, 163:10, 165:3, 174:20, 175:8,

177:16, 178:15, 178:17, 178:18, 179:11, 182:22 183:7, 184:24, 189:2, 192:10, 192:15, Government - 1:17, 29:5, 116:17 government's 3:12, 7:9, 25:4, 37:25, 52:2, 60:4, 65:23, 69:18, 76:14, 77:5, 84:10, 99:24, 107:21, 122:9, 131:2, 138:24, 138:25, 140:25, 143:25, 144:15 148:1, 150:1, 153:20, 172:11, 174:19, 175:13, 180:3, 180:7, 182:5, 195:23 Government's 134:14, 138:2, 198:10 Government's' -198:2 governments -163:23 grab - 62:24 Grand - 59:10, 59:14, 64:1, 64:4, 64:9, 80:17, 101:10, 110:12, 110:14 112:6, 113:2, 113:16, 113:18, 165:3, 165:8, 182:10, 182:11, 182:24, 183:9, 183:24, 187:16 **grant** - 25:6, 25:10, 58:10, 86:21, 89:11, 176:1 granting - 58:5 graphic - 182:2 Graul - 43:16 great - 97:6, 193:15 green - 136:3 grew - 101:25 Grievance - 28:5 **Grimm's** - 161:25 **Gross** - 113:6 ground - 91:12, grounds - 141:11, 183:10, 183:11 Group - 30:4, 30:6, 37:18 group - 6:16, 119:8 grouped - 77:4 guess - 13:11, 16:18, 36:19, 44:22, 49:22, 51:12, 58:22, 73:25, 77:9, 77:25, 111:1, 153:23, 162:7, 163:21, 165:14, 165:22, 176:13, 195:6 guidance - 26:4 guided - 13:19 guilt - 69:23, 70:7, 70:23, 71:2, 71:12, 71:19, 73:15, 75:2, 75:4, 75:7, 99:14 guilt/innocence -7:7, 24:14, 72:5, 75:9, 76:4, 86:6 guilty - 4:16, 5:15, 11:6, 15:3, 167:16 gun - 102:19, 103:3, 138:20, 169:9 guns - 102:9, 118:3 guy - 90:12, 120:8, 171:15, 180:20, 180:23, 181:19, 183:3

guys - 42:9, 112:11

Hagin - 43:16 half - 114:7, 136:2, 169:16, 189:25 halfway - 192:16 hand - 29:3, 111:2, 119:12, 129:14, 137:10, 141:15, 142:5, 151:13 hand-rolled 119:12, 141:15, 142:5 **Handbook** - 170:23 handgun - 35:16, 118:25, 120:21, 121:17, 121:19, 121:21, 136:7, 138:13, 138:15, 142:9, 142:24 handguns - 117:11 hands - 35:14, 37:2, 44:22, 44:24, 45:13, 48:19, 187:12 Hanlon - 1:19, 3:5, 89:4, 144:18, 149:17, 149:25, 150:16, 150:17, 150:19, 153:8, 155:10, 155:11, 161:20, 184:9, 184:10, 184:12, 184:15, 184:23 Hanlon's - 144:17 happy - 108:15, hard - 61:23, 110:17 hardest - 160:2 Harding - 1:18, 3:5, 3:21, 3:24, 4:5, 21:18, 21:19, 21:23, 27:6, 29:1, 29:2, 29:14, 30:24, 36:12, 37:22, 43:25, 46:6, 46:7 47:13, 48:14, 49:6, 49:7, 49:14, 49:15, 50:12, 51:7, 58:21, 58:23, 58:24, 59:17, 59:22, 60:12, 60:15, 60:19, 60:23, 61:2, 61:6, 61:12, 64:20, 65:6, 65:7, 65:9, 65:12, 65:18, 66:16, 66:24, 67:13, 67:18, 81:20, 85:9, 85:10, 85:14, 89:4, 91:10, 94:2, 94:18, 95:14, 96:7, 96:9, 96:11, 96:16, 96:17, 96:21 97:2, 100:6, 100:25, 101:5, 101:8, 101:15, 101:18, 101:23 101:18, 101:23, 102:3, 102:6, 102:9, 102:12, 102:14, 102:16, 102:18, 102:22, 103:2, 103:12, 104:12, 104:24, 105:3, 105:6, 105:15, 105:17 105:15, 105:17, 105:19, 105:23, 106:1, 106:6, 106:8, 107:21, 108:4, 108:8, 108:15, 109:20, 110:24, 116:2, 116:3, 116:14, 117:1, 122:3, 124:9, 132:14, 132:17, 133:15, 133:16, 133:17, 134:10, 134:16,

135:19, 136:9, 137:12, 137:13,
138:3, 138:23, 139:21, 141:3, 142:25, 143:1, 170:7, 170:8, 175:18, 184:3,
139:21, 141:3, 142:25, 143:1, 170:7.
170:8, 175:18, 184:3,
104.5, 104.7, 104.9,
185:19, 185:25,
187:10, 187:14, 187:21 188:3
185:3, 185:14, 185:3, 185:25, 187:10, 187:14, 187:21, 188:3, 188:12, 189:4, 189:17, 189:18, 190:16, 190:24, 191:7, 191:13, 192:1, 193:4, 193:11, 193:13, 193:18
189:17, 189:18, 190:16 190:24
191:7, 191:13, 192:1,
193:4, 193:11, 193:13, 193:18.
193:13, 193:18, 193:20, 193:25,
194:3, 194:6, 194:14, 194:17, 198:4, 198:8 Harding's - 139:20,
Harding's - 139:20,
176:20, 186:12, 186:24
Harris - 2:7, 14:16,
22:6, 22:18, 22:21,
Harris - 2:7, 14:16, 15:24, 16:11, 22:4, 22:6, 22:18, 22:21, 23:1, 23:11, 23:18, 24:2, 24:4, 24:16,
52:18, 52:23, 73:14,
52:18, 52:23, 73:14, 77:21, 78:3, 79:24, 80:23, 91:21, 115:15,
116:7, 168:20, 169:8,
116:7, 168:20, 169:8, 175:7, 175:11, 177:22, 191:10
Harrie'e - 77.77
25:15, 82:16, 194:1 hat - 179:7, 179:12, 180:20, 180:24, 181:20, 182:13, 182:25, 183:3, 183:20 head - 27:5, 36:6, 75:25, 102:8
180:20, 180:24,
181:20, 182:13, 182:25, 183:3, 183:20
head - 27:5, 36:6, 75:25, 192:8
headings - 34:21
Headquarters - 117:14
health - 16:4, 49:12.
49:17, 49:22, 49:24, 50:7, 50:25, 52:17,
53:1
hear - 4:8, 14:17, 37:6, 58:19, 61:17,
61:21, 61:24, 71:1,
74:1, 94:1, 94:2, 96:7, 108:4, 138:24, 141:3,
143:4, 143:8, 147:25,
108:4, 138:24, 141:3, 143:4, 143:8, 147:25, 149:17, 149:25, 163:5, 175:8, 184:2,
195:19 heard - 10:5, 21:24,
49:11, 62:13, 69:8,
49:11, 62:13, 69:8, 71:2, 79:18, 83:23, 92:9, 109:19, 182:1,
186:8
hearing - 1:12, 12:15, 21:21, 22:17,
70:20. 109:22.
133:14, 139:22, 146:18, 167:9,
146:18, 167:9, 180:19, 183:17, 183:22, 184:19
hearings - 3:7,
22:8, 22:16 hears - 71:22, 72:2,
72:16
hearsay - 183:10, 183:11, 190:21,
190:22
heart - 161:10 heightened - 97:18
held - 36:16, 99:3,

```
99:7, 145:6, 145:14,
145:23, 146:9,
146:12, 151:16,
152:11, 153:18,
157:4, 157:6, 157:14,
161:24
  help - 42:1
 helped - 155:15
helpful - 54:14,
149:18, 149:20,
155:12
 helpfully - 3:9
hence - 164:9
 hereby - 199:2
herself - 86:18
  hesitation - 28:21
  Hi - 136:7, 138:14
  Hi-point - 136:7,
  hid - 102:22
  Hidta - 126:11
  high - 89:25, 168:14
  highly - 162:12,
  himself - 86:18
  hired - 103:18,
 Hirshman - 27:19,
 historical - 53:1,
53:5
  history - 153:13,
  hit - 103:23, 104:7
  hold - 90:16, 126:21
  holding - 99:11
  holds - 174:7
  Hollingsworth -
123:18, 123:19,
Holly - 179:12, 182:12, 182:24,
183:20
  home - 104:13
  Homicide - 30:2,
41:12, 47:10
  homicide - 41:13
  honestly - 91:3
Honor - 4:6, 6:2, 6:7, 6:24, 7:25, 9:1,
9:10, 9:16, 11:19,
12:5, 15:11, 15:17
15:25, 15:11, 15:17,
15:22, 15:23, 15:24,
21:19, 21:23, 22:1,
23:8, 23:20, 24:10,
24:20, 25:18, 26:17
27:16, 37:23, 38:14, 46:4, 46:7, 46:8, 46:9,
46:18, 49:4, 49:7
49:15, 50:10, 50:22
51:6, 51:13, 51:21,
51:25, 52:3, 52:14
53:17, 53:20, 54:17,
59:22, 60:12, 60:19,
61:15, 62:6, 62:15,
62:22, 63:18, 63:23,
64:4, 66:16, 67:13,
67:18, 67:22, 68:19,
68:23, 69:10, 69:15,
69:21, 70:13, 71:21, 74:21, 75:6, 76:13,
79:20, 79:23, 84:23,
85:7, 86:3, 88:15,
88:16, 88:23, 91:14, 93:19, 94:17, 96:21,
96:22, 98:11, 100:12,
100:18, 101:15,
101:20, 103:4,
107:23, 108:8, 109:7, 111:6, 112:17, 113:1,
```

```
113:11, 113:12,
 113:19, 114:9,
115:18, 116:3, 116:4,
 116:14, 122:5, 122:8,
126:16, 126:22
 127:5, 131:1, 132:12,
132:16, 133:16,
133:18, 134:25,
136:14, 137:7,
137:13, 138:22,
139:1, 140:11, 143:1,
143:10, 144:16,
144:19, 144:22,
146:15, 146:16,
148:11, 149:15,
 150:2, 155:11,
 155:14, 156:3,
 156:16, 157:3
 157:13, 157:21,
159:3, 159:17,
159:22, 160:21,
161:13, 162:18,
 163:3, 163:8, 163:21.
163:25, 165:14,
170:8, 173:3, 174:18,
175:3, 178:9, 178:14,
184:7, 185:2, 185:23, 186:10, 188:24, 189:14, 191:7, 192:3, 193:13, 194:20,
 195:18
   honor - 8:19
   Honor's - 159:5
   Honorable - 1:12,
   honoring - 195:22
hope - 3:12, 3:14, 3:17, 42:7, 76:9, 115:11, 115:14,
 146:15, 155:12,
 155:17
   hopefully - 112:5
   hopes - 4:1
   hoping - 143:11
   hour - 114:7
   hours - 3:18, 124:4
   house - 102:24
   House - 5:9, 9:9,
10:23, 17:21, 18:17, 20:5, 20:19, 21:9,
 38:9, 94:13, 111:15,
122:18, 133:2,
150:11, 196:13
  housed - 151:9.
 151:25, 159:16
housekeeping -
 178:6, 185:23
housing - 153:21
   Hunnewell -
 151:19, 152:19, 154:6
   hurdle - 114:22
   Hurson - 2:10, 16:1,
 22:8, 22:18, 69:11
69:14, 69:15, 70:13,
70:18, 71:16, 71:20,
70:18, 71:16, 71:20, 71:25, 72:23, 73:6, 73:11, 73:17, 74:4, 74:20, 75:1, 75:4, 76:12, 77:12, 77:23, 77:25, 78:12, 78:18, 78:20, 79:17, 88:10, 73:24, 163:2, 163:21
97:24, 163:8, 163:21, 163:25, 164:8,
 164:14, 165:6,
 165:13, 166:15,
166:18, 167:8, 168:1, 168:2, 168:13, 169:3, 176:4, 176:7,
176.9
  hypertechnical -
```

159:18, 159:19 lad - 143:21, 143:24, 146:5, 148:21, 149:1, 149:22, 150:25, 151:21, 152:1, 152:4, 153:11, 153:12, 153:22, 153:24, 154:16, 154:23, 155:9, 155:25, 156:14, 158:20 158:22, 159:10, 161:18, 175:24 idea - 56:4, 124:7, 128:1, 128:2, 128:3, 189:19 ideal - 76:17 identical - 62:16 identification -54:10, 82:25, 85:14, 85:24, 178:4, 178:24, 179:1, 179:16, 179:24, 179:25, 181:2, 181:8, 181:15, 181:23, 182:20, 183:16, 191:2, 193:8, 193:24 Identification identified - 55:11, 62:21, 84:1, 84:3, 84:11, 84:13, 85:4, 180:4, 180:8 identifies - 59:24 identify - 84:8 identifying - 82:6 identity - 56:18, 81:25, 82:1, 179:4 idiot - 192:25, 193:5 ignored - 27:22 **Iii -** 4:15 ill - 164:17, 166:20, 185:16 ill-advised - 164:17, 166:20 imagine - 61:23, 93:9, 167:7 immediate - 5:10, 10:24, 17:22, 18:18, 20:6, 20:21, 38:10, 94:15, 107:4, 111:16, 122:19, 133:3, 196:14 immediately - 4:2, 5:6, 9:5, 10:20, 12:25, 17:18, 18:14, 19:24, 20:3, 20:17, 21:7, 21:11, 38:6, 94:11, 111:12, 122:15, 132:24, 150:9, 190:6, 196:10 impact - 93:22 impaneled - 90:24 impartial - 28:19, 87:15, 90:7, 99:10, 99:18, 100:2 **impede** - 173:14, 173:19, 173:20 implicate - 24:16 import - 179:6 important - 56:5, 81:24, 82:2, 82:6, 82:8, 98:2, 98:3, 140:3, 168:16 importantly - 89:9, 110:24 impose - 89:9

impossible - 73:12, imprisonment -152:3, 154:18, 154:22 in-court - 164:2 In-law - 83:11 in-law - 83:12 inadmissible -135:1 inadvertently -106:24 incarcerated -171.11 incarceration -155:4 incident - 104:7 incidents - 82:7, 104:20 inclined - 7:15 included - 92:5 including - 11:23, 68:11, 151:19, 152:19, 187:18, 192:11 Including - 102:18 inconsistent -97:16, 189:3 incorporated -26:19 incurs - 158:13 Indeed - 12:18 indeed - 28:9, 103:23, 142:17, 187:4 independent -28:16, 124:20, 124:25, 125:1 Index - 198:1 indicate - 131:10, 131:15 indicated - 6:8 11:20, 12:11, 13:22, 48:22, 89:18, 89:22, 89:24, 94:21, 96:5, 127:13, 133:9, 153:2, 178:16 indicates - 87:25, indictment - 24:7, 54:1, 54:5, 57:4, 57:13, 79:9, 95:21, 95:23, 101:21, 103:17, 103:22, 104:3, 113:14, 114:1, 114:11, 114:25, 103:17, 103:25, 103:17, 103:25, 103:17, 103:25, 103:17, 103:25, 103:17, 103:25, 103:17, 103 163:1, 165:23, 166:13, 169:4, 169:15, 169:16, 174:23, 175:2, 175:15, 175:16, 175:20, 175:21, 175:23, 176:13, 176.14 indictments -164:20, 168:7 individual - 54:23, 77:2, 91:23, 99:19, 125:20, 125:21, 126:7, 127:14, 128:3, 128:8, 131:16, 177:12 individuals - 55:10, 55:15, 56:14, 56:21, 76:5, 77:16, 123:3, 176.25 indulgence - 41:24 inequity - 97:16 infer - 16:15, 16:23 influence - 77:21, 78:6, 78:15, 173:14, 173:19, 173:20 inform - 106:19

Document 642

10

informant - 117:25, 118:5, 118:13, 118:20, 120:4, 124:1, 124:10, 124:16, 125:2, 125:5, 125:7, 125:9, 125:20, 125:25, 126:2, 126:6, 127:24, 138:6 informants - 118:8, 118:17 information - 16:7, 31:15, 32:10, 33:17, 33:21, 33:23, 34:1, 42:16, 42:19, 54:4, 54:11, 57:12, 57:24, 58:5, 58:12, 59:5, 65:13, 67:9, 67:20, 73:22, 81:23, 113:1, 116:12, 118:16, 119:7, 121:10, 121:11, 124:13, 124:19, 124:23, 128:4, 134:22, 135:5, 135:8, 135:16, 138:6, 189:5 informed - 55:10 infringement - 100:1 initial - 4:16, 11:6, 15:3, 51:22, 53:23, 54:9, 155:4, 167:24, 179:5 initiate - 14:9 initiated - 117:25 innocence - 70:7, 70:24, 71:2, 71:12, 71:19, 73:15, 75:3, 75:5, 75:8 inquiry - 8:8, 9:3, 14:10, 14:13, 22:5, 23:10, 23:17, 25:23, 51:7, 81:3 inserted - 175:14 instruction - 16:22, 114:10 instructions - 6:18, 16:13, 16:24 instru
14:10, 14:13, 22:5, 23:10, 23:17, 25:23, 51:7, 81:3 inserted - 175:14 instance - 57:2 instances - 175:6 instead - 171:24 institution - 116:8, 158:13, 161:3 instructed - 27:16 instruction - 16:22,
16:13, 16:24 instructs - 11:22 instruments - 13:7 insure - 28:17 integrating - 68:5
intends - 67:7 intent - 89:17, 173:24 intention - 23:9, 23:22, 24:1 intercepted - 106:24 interested - 97:22, 190:13, 190:14, 190:16, 190:17 interesting - 144:9, 175:25, 176:18 interests - 97:25,
98:1

```
internal - 160:22
  interpretation -
25:24, 162:4
  interpreting - 12:20
  interrupt - 26:10,
149:15, 176:4
  interstate - 138:21
  Interstate - 143:13,
143:23, 153:25, 160:1
 interview - 31:2,
31:12, 44:5
  intimidate - 175:7
  intimidation -
163:18, 174:24, 175:1
 introduce - 7:5,
104:9, 184:5
  introduction -
  Intuitively - 89:13
  invasion - 104:13
  investigation -
30:16, 40:10
  investigative -
128.21
 investigators -
42:20
  invite - 28:3, 187:25
  invoke - 142:23,
153:24
  invoked - 26:8,
153:11
  involve - 87:5
involved - 30:9,
30:15, 30:17, 30:18,
43:10, 56:9, 56:10,
80:14, 104:13,
104:18, 104:20,
105:11, 113:23,
123:6, 129:3
 involvement -
45:15, 104:5
  involves - 123:2
 involving - 105:10 irrelevant - 113:8,
113:10, 113:11,
113:12, 188:11
issue - 3:23, 5:4,
10:18, 12:13, 15:15,
17:16, 18:11, 19:25,
20:14, 21:4, 25:24,
26:3, 26:6, 38:4,
49:12, 49:21, 51:16,
60:3, 61:7, 62:20,
71:11, 74:4, 77:8,
81:4, 82:14, 82:24,
87:4, 93:21, 94:8,
97:2, 97:25, 98:5
98.6 98.11 101.1
109:1, 111:9, 111:11,
111:25, 112:18,
113:15, 113:16,
114:23, 122:12,
132:21, 140:3, 143:3,
146:17, 150:6,
150:20, 152:6, 154:2,
150.20, 152.6, 154.2,
163:11, 165:7,
165:25, 166:1, 166:3,
167:20, 167:25,
170:17, 172:22,
174:17, 175:24,
176:15, 176:24,
177:21, 186:3, 190:2, 190:3, 193:17, 196:8
  issued - 49:19,
153:5, 153:7
  issues - 24:6,
24:12, 49:10, 49:13,
49:17, 49:22, 50:7,
51:17, 52:17, 53:15,
53:21, 59:12, 62:14
```

```
64:12, 71:13, 71:14, 94:20, 95:9, 113:21,
143:16, 152:9,
153:15, 155:15,
163:2, 178:25,
185:18, 189:21
  items - 8:24, 8:25,
55:16
  itself - 91:18.
139:14, 169:17
  lv - 143:24
  Jail - 146:24, 159:9
  jail - 91:25, 92:6,
106:13, 107:11,
145:23, 147:21,
168:22, 169:2,
169:14, 169:15, 172:3
  James - 2:2, 43:16,
January - 171:16, 171:18, 172:13,
194.21
  Jencks - 59:3, 59:9,
59:15, 61:17, 63:12, 64:19, 64:21, 64:23,
67:2, 109:25
  Jermaine - 191:21
  jittery - 35:20
  Joe - 177:8
  Johnson's - 191:21
  join - 16:16, 115:15
  joined - 177:22
joining - 11:12
Joint - 5:9, 9:9,
10:23, 17:21, 18:17,
20:5, 20:20, 21:10,
38:9, 94:13, 111:15,
122:18, 133:2
150:11, 196:13
joint - 97:8, 97:9,
97:19, 97:20, 99:7,
99:25, 100:9
  Jones - 60:17
102:19, 104:19,
110:3, 110:10, 168:20
  Jones-spence
60:17, 102:19,
104:19, 110:3,
110:10, 168:20
  Joshua - 2:9
judge - 127:2,
132:21, 150:6, 150:7,
150:9, 153:5, 160:2
Judge - 1:13, 11:23, 12:12, 15:18, 18:11, 40:17, 58:21, 65:9,
66:16, 96:17, 111:22,
161:25, 170:9
187:13, 199:6
  July - 87:8, 195:3
  jump - 163:21
  June - 87:8, 92:7,
117:18, 117:19,
117:22, 127:20,
138:3, 168:18, 193:8,
193:10, 193:11,
195:3, 195:15
  iuries - 90:24
  jurisdiction - 149:7,
154:15, 159:11
  jurisprudence -
140:17
  juror - 89:5
  jurors - 89:14
```

```
70:15, 70:16, 70:20, 71:1, 71:5, 71:15, 72:2, 71:23, 72:2,
72:16, 73:16, 74:1,
74:8, 75:24, 76:8, 77:14, 86:7, 90:7,
90:17, 90:20, 91:1,
91:4, 98:13, 98:17,
98:18, 98:19, 99:7,
99:11, 99:13, 99:17, 99:20, 100:2, 100:4,
100:7, 100:8, 114:11, 183:17, 195:5
Jury - 59:10, 59:14, 64:2, 64:4, 64:9,
80:17, 101:10,
110:12, 110:14,
112:6, 113:2, 113:17,
113:18, 165:3, 165:8,
182:10, 182:11,
182:24, 183:9,
183:24, 187:16
  justice - 167:18,
173:8, 173:15,
173:21, 174:1
  Justice - 11:24,
28.11
  iustifies - 79:12
  jut - 87:17, 114:11,
175:10
keep - 39:12, 39:13, 39:18, 39:24, 40:1,
59:20, 73:10, 115:1,
135:20
  keeps - 191:11
  Keith - 32:2, 32:23,
43.17
Kelsey - 1:22
Kentucky - 90:3,
97:4, 98:14, 99:6
  Kevin - 123:15,
 123:17
key - 174:20,
177:12, 192:9
Kga - 32:22
  kill - 103:19
  killing - 81:22
kind - 42:4, 79:10,
87:9, 102:1, 103:3,
118:5, 140:7, 144:2,
144:8, 146:17,
157:11, 174:7, 175:25
kinds - 104:20
  knowing - 78:13
knowingly - 142:21
  knowledge - 83:15,
102:8, 119:16, 123:5,
153:8, 164:15
  known - 4:17, 52:23
  knows - 52:3,
52:14, 57:4, 59:24,
76:12, 85:19, 135:14,
146:16
  Kramer - 4:5, 21:17,
25:20, 29:4, 29:11,
29:15, 31:1, 46:21,
```

49:9, 198:3 **Kurland** - 2:6,

60:16, 61:19, 61:25,

62:23, 64:6, 64:7, 65:21, 66:7, 66:23, 68:8, 68:25, 69:5,

69:6, 94:2, 94:16,

94:17, 95:3, 95:7

95:25, 96:3, 96:8

95:13, 95:18, 95:21,

100:20, 101:9, 103:7

97:11, 97:13, 99:21,

jury - 7:18, 70:9

100:15

```
103:9, 103:13,
 108:18, 111:3, 111:5,
 111:21, 111:22,
112:9, 112:15,
112:17, 113:8,
113:11, 113:18,
114:9, 114:15,
114:9, 114:15,
114:19, 115:4, 178:5,
178:14, 178:21,
178:25, 179:14,
179:18, 179:21,
180:2, 180:10,
180:12, 180:15,
180:17, 180:22
180:17, 180:22,
180:25, 181:3, 181:9,
 181:12, 181:24,
182:1, 182:10,
182:12, 182:15,
183:1, 183:7, 183:14,
183:19, 183:25,
184:17, 184:18,
185:1, 185:2, 185:8,
 185:14, 185:23,
186:5, 186:10.
186:18, 187:7,
187:13, 188:9,
188:11, 188:16,
188:18, 189:14,
190:8, 190:13,
190:18, 190:25,
191:5, 191:11, 192:3,
192:4, 192:5, 192:9, 193:6, 195:5
   Kurland's - 191:20
   label - 157:10,
 157:11. 157:13
```

labeled - 163:10, 164.2 laid - 163:9. 177:18 **Lambert** - 15:18 lane - 136:25 lanes - 136:23 language - 158:19, 175:14, 175:15, 175:22 lapse - 169:25 large - 163:13 largely - 170:18 larger - 113:25 Last - 29:11 last - 6:8, 14:12 54:1, 116:24, 137:20, 168:19, 169:5 lasted - 44:12 latter - 173:15 Laura - 1:22 **Law** - 5:10, 9:9, 10:24, 17:21, 18:18, 20:6, 20:20, 21:10, 38:10, 89:23, 94:14 111:15, 122:19, 133:3, 150:12, 196:14 law - 12:10, 13:13, 14:2, 40:13, 42:3, 71:1, 71:3, 76:9, 76:17, 80:12, 83:11, 83:12, 86:19, 86:25, 97:22, 99:22, 108:3, 108:22, 128:5, 129:6, 139:24, 141:4, 142:9, 151:23, 152:12, 161:23, 169:22, 170:15, 170:23, 173:1, 173:23, 174:15, 177:18 lawyer - 4:23, 26:20 lawyers - 14:2,

Document 642

62:11, 62:14, 62:15, 62:18, 62:19, 82:25,

84:3, 84:19, 85:13,

85:18, 85:23, 89:1,

90:20, 90:24, 91:3,

92:10, 92:19, 92:20,

93:12, 93:17, 94:3,

94:4, 94:5, 100:24

123:5, 124:21, 126:17, 126:22,

127:1, 132:16,

137:16, 138:10, 138:12, 138:17, 141:5, 141:10,

141:18, 141:24, 141:25, 142:8,

94.4, 94.5, 100.24, 105:11, 106:1, 106:8, 106:21, 107:10, 107:15, 111:6, 115:17, 115:18, 115:22, 122:2, 122:8,

132:18, 133:6, 133:8, 133:12, 135:12, 135:23, 136:1,

22:7, 26:18, 66:7, 67:12, 108:11 lay - 73:23, 176:11, 189:14 laying - 120:19, 121:15, 121:21 leader - 80:14, 81:7 leading - 3:8 leads - 118:18, leafy - 136:3 learned - 33:20 learning - 109:21, 167:10 least - 14:8, 23:11, 24:21, 31:8, 36:22, 42:21, 51:12, 52:22, 64:12, 66:9, 67:6, 116:9, 143:18, 144:7, 146:1, 146:6, 147:5, 148:25, 156:1, 156:6, 157:2, 177:23 leave - 19:18, 53:14, leaves - 26:17 Leavis - 170:25 led - 78:7 Lee - 99:2 left - 8:4, 129:14, 185.14 left-hand - 129:14 leg - 120:20 legal - 6:20, 7:13 9:5, 17:6, 19:3, 22:14, 22:20, 24:6, 49:10, 87:6, 140:8, 164:17, 164:21, 166:20, 166:25, 167:4, 167:5, 174:22, 187:9 legislation - 159:22 legitimate - 63:11 legs - 131:13, 135.24 length - 76:24, 77:1, 97.6 less - 28:8, 89:20 lesser - 72:19 letter - 68:7, 68:12 68:14, 139:20, 193:14 letting - 82:17 level - 126:9, 126:12 licensed - 26:18 life - 77:15, 165:17 light - 10:4, 11:17, 16:18, 66:8, 79:22, 114:19 lights - 35:2 likelihood - 52:25 likely - 50:25, 53:4, 79:9, 89:14, 89:20, 91:11, 100:16 limine - 168:4 limit - 71:17, 166:2 limited - 22:14, 54:2, 56:25, 58:17, 104:6 line - 75:7, 112:5, 170:13, 171:9 lines - 107:8, 135:20 list - 8:24, 184:20 listed - 173:6 listen - 75:25 live - 76:1, 174:21 lives - 23:6 loaded - 35:15 Local - 26:19 located - 121:17, 129:19, 136:5

location - 48:7

locations - 33:10 locked - 105:2, 171:12, 171:16 Lockhart - 99:12, 100:12 log - 153:3 logistical - 67:23 long-standing long-term - 30:5 Look - 79:3 look - 41:14, 134:6, 134:17, 158:19, 158:20, 158:24, 159:1, 162:5, 175:24, 177:21, 195:9 looked - 41:18 135:13, 151:6, 154:2 looking - 27:23, 76:5, 147:9, 193:15 lose - 161:4 loss - 22:2 lower - 126:12 lunch - 3:20, 4:3, 109:5, 115:7, 178:14 luncheon - 115:24 lunchtime - 4:1 lyrics - 82:15, 82:19

141.25, 142.6, 142:13, 142:17, 142:21, 170:17, 187:4, 190:20, 191:9, 194:8, 198:13 **Martin's** - 84:6, 85:14, 107:2, 107:9, 127:7, 131:4, 137:14, M machine - 83:13, Maryland - 1:2, 1:8, 26:18, 89:18, 129:6, 138:5, 145:7, 145:12, mail - 55:20, 83:10, 92:12, 106:25, 185:15 main - 162:7 146:13, 146:19, 146:13, 146:19, 147:3, 147:6, 147:22, 148:7, 148:8, 148:9, 148:14, 149:1, 151:18, 152:22, 157:7, 158:11, 158:17, 160:15 major - 75:22 Mall - 32:13, 33:6 man - 103:19. 124:10, 132:8 manner - 169:19 maps - 3:10 March - 39:2, 39:4, massage - 195:14 master - 144:20 match - 120:3 39:10, 40:22, 159:14 marijuana - 119:14, 120:17, 120:19, 121:3, 121:10, material - 59:3, 59:8, 59:9, 63:8, 121:13, 121:14, 128:16, 129:5, 129:10, 130:5, 63:13, 64:5, 64:9 64:17, 64:19, 64:21, 64:23, 66:17, 67:2, 135:15, 135:25, 136:4, 141:23, 67:25 materially - 146:7 matter - 12:10, 13:9, 171:19, 172:13 Marked - 198:10, 28:18, 66:14, 80:11, 80:12, 93:23, 140:25, 198:13 marked - 31:19, 34:12, 34:19, 68:1, 126:17, 126:20, 127:6, 130:24, 133:21 152:13, 185:24, 190:19, 199:3 matters - 178:6 Max - 16:5 markings - 68:2 Mcac - 145:8, 146:19, 147:7, 148:11, 148:12, Marsh - 97:4 Marshal - 157:20, 161:16, 161:25 156:5, 156:18 marshal - 127:4, Mccree - 99:12, 150.14 99:16 Marshal's - 116:6, Mcwhite - 123:16 169:10 meals - 158:6, Marshals - 133:6 158:8 marshals - 16:1, 151:3, 153:1, 161:10, mean - 5:16, 32:19, 47:25, 51:16, 55:13, 56:2, 56:18, 58:2, 161.23 **Martin** - 2:1, 2:9, 11:1, 11:3, 11:4, 11:5, 11:11, 11:14, 15:21, 59:13, 60:21, 63:6 63:11, 63:13, 69:21, 70:19, 72:21, 73:8, 75:18, 77:17, 80:19, 15:23, 15:25, 17:24, 84:12, 85:18, 87:10, 18:1, 18:7, 18:20, 19:7, 20:8, 20:11, 22:8, 22:19, 52:16, 88:10, 93:9, 95:20, 96:24, 103:7, 103:25, 113:20, 113:24, 118:7, 118:14, 53:20, 59:13, 61:15 62:2, 62:3, 62:6, 62:8

130:14, 140:7, 140:19, 144:8, 145:1, 147:16, 147:19, 148:17, 149:12, 149:14, 149:15, 149:20, 155:19, 157:23, 158:15, 159:8, 165:18, 166:8, 166:16, 168:10, 183:16, 186:4, 186:7, 188:19, 188:21, 190.12 meaningful - 67:12 meaningless -161:17 means - 26:23 33:20, 152:20, 161:17 measure - 66:21 **meet** - 16:11, 42:20, 89:12, 126:1 meeting - 4:1, 42:7, 42:13, 42:15 member - 42:2 95:16, 95:23, 96:5. 101:9, 101:13, 101:14, 101:16, 101:23, 103:25, 104:3, 107:25, 108:1, 108:21, 110:5, 112:19, 114:7, 171:5, 171:20, 186:13 186:17, 186:22, 188:7, 188:13, 188:19, 188:20, 188:21 members - 44:9, 56:8, 57:10, 57:11, 101:19, 108:10, 168:24, 169:1 membership -88:12, 172:4, 172:15, 186:25 memorandum -25:4, 144:15, 144:25, 145:1, 151:5 memory - 40:24 mental - 49:12, 49:16, 49:22, 49:24, 50:7, 50:25, 52:17, mention - 132:10, 192:15 mentioned - 13:3; 13:16, 106:22, 110:11 merit - 100:11 message - 185:15 messages - 92:13 met - 6:7, 6:15, 78:5 methodology -161:13 Michael - 1:19 microphone - 14:25 middle - 164:3 might - 3:10, 16:8, 16:13, 23:22, 24:3, 24:14, 24:24, 45:18, 50:12, 51:19, 59:23, 64:5, 64:23, 94:18, 94:24, 95:4, 103:10, 177:7, 181:5, 189:22 Might - 23:8 millimeter - 35:16, 136:7, 138:14 Mills - 32:13, 33:6 mind - 109:14, 115:1, 130:15, 177:5 mine - 112:13 minimal - 64:5 **minimum** - 12:1

minivan - 31:21

34:14, 35:4, 44:16, 47:14, 47:18 minute - 36:4, 36:8, 36:13, 44:12, 105:13, 158:22 minutes - 44:1, 83:21, 124:4 **Miranda** - 36:25, 37:4, 37:5, 37:6, 85:3, misimpression -112.4 misrepresentation 192:6 missing - 68:13 **mistake** - 4:19, 11:8, 15:5, 39:7, 109:8 mistaken - 37:16, 141:8, 141:9 misunderstood -109:3, 109:6 **Mitchell** - 1:6, 1:20, 4:10, 4:12, 4:14, 5:13, 6:7, 6:8, 7:5, 7:19, 8:18, 8:21, 9:5, 9:18, 9:20, 9:21, 9:24, 10:7, 10:9, 10:13, 17:1, 17:3, 17:6, 17:11, 17:23, 19:7, 19:19, 19:20, 27:4, 27:16, 27:18, 30:14, 30:16, 31:2, 31:12, 32:4, 33:18, 35:6, 35:11, 35:12, 35:19, 35:24, 36:2, 36:23, 37:20, 37:24, 38:12, 38:20, 39:5, 40:23, 42:14, 39:5, 40:23, 42:14, 42:18, 42:24, 43:7, 43:11, 43:19, 44:12, 44:18, 44:21, 45:11, 45:13, 46:4, 46:8, 46:12, 46:13, 46:14, 48:15, 50:14, 77:19, 78:5, 78:11, 79:25, 80:5, 80:6, 80:16, 80:5, 80:6, 80:16, 80:24, 81:6, 82:4, 82:6, 84:4, 85:22 88:16, 88:18, 88:19 89:15, 92:10, 92:15, 101:16, 101:20, 104:2, 113:13, 142:3, 104.2, 113.13, 1 163:16, 168:22, 174:25, 176:23, 178:9, 178:12, 178:13, 191:10, 191:24, 192:17, 193:9, 195:17, 195:19, 195:21, 196:16, 199:4 Mitchell's - 6:19, 7:13, 8:11, 11:12, 21:21, 27:8, 47:15, 47:21, 78:6, 78:13, 84:8, 85:12, 85:15, 85:19, 193:17 mitigating - 73:8 mitigation - 7:9, 86:7 mix - 99:19 Model - 26:17 modeled - 49:18 modifications -195:10 moment - 14:18, 16:4, 21:24, 61:18, 61:25, 126:16, 130:25, 144:14 148:2, 152:10, 180:7, 192:7

12

money - 76:20, 107:2, 107:3, 107:9,
108:12, 161:4
Montgomery - 89:20, 91:16, 91:22, 92:9, 95:16, 100:24,
101:8, 101:25,
101:8, 101:25, 103:15, 103:22, 103:23, 104:12,
106.5 106.16
106:19, 107:2, 108:1, 108:5, 108:21, 109:15, 109:24
109:15, 109:24, 110:2, 110:14, 112:19, 113:3,
113:22, 178:17,
113:22, 178:17, 178:20, 179:10, 179:11, 182:2, 182:6, 182:7, 182:22,
182:7, 182:22, 183:18, 186:4,
183:18, 186:4, 186:12, 187:3, 187:18, 192:10,
192:13. 192:20
Montgomery's - 93:9, 93:11, 100:22, 104:5, 112:6, 183:9,
186:25, 188:5
month - 41:15, 59:18, 64:24, 66:25,
70:7 months - 3:8,
49:17, 50:4, 50:5, 79:5, 156:17, 169:14, 171:17, 190:1 moot - 66:18, 67:10
171:17, 190:1 moot - 66:18, 67:10
moral - 4:15, 11:5,
14:23, 15:2 morally - 89:8
morning - 6:1, 6:2, 6:4, 7:19, 7:20, 15:21,
16:22, 15:23, 16:1, 16:2. 16:10. 27:10.
27.12, 23.13, 23.10,
38:17, 38:18, 46:21, 46:22, 115:12, 185:24, 186:3, 186:9
morphs - 192:18 most - 8:10, 57:24,
64:9, 65:7, 97:22,
64:9, 65:7, 97:22, 98:10, 167:1, 167:6, 187:9, 190:14
mostly - 170:11 mother - 83:10 mother's - 106:25
51:14, 53:23, 54:9, 57:5, 57:18, 60:1, 61:14, 62:15, 62:18,
61:14, 62:15, 62:18,
61:14, 62:15, 62:18, 69:17, 79:3, 89:16, 98:4, 98:15, 108:20, 115:9, 133:11, 143:11, 143:12, 143:16, 150:22, 168:11, 170:9, 173:22, 176:2, 176:5, 176:12, 179:16, 181:7, 183:15, 186:7
115:9, 133:11, 143:11, 143:12,
143:16, 150:22, 168:11, 170:9,
173:22, 176:2, 176:5, 176:12, 179:16.
181:7, 183:15, 186:7, 188:5, 190:8, 196:3
Mation 100:10
127:7, 131:4, 134:14, 138:2, 198:10, 198:13 motions - 1:11, 3:6, 11:7, 15:4, 111:23, 120:15, 143:3, 168:4, 169:5, 140:15
motions - 1:11, 3:6, 11:7, 15:4, 111:23,
100.5, 100.15,
175:21, 189:24, 194:12
motivations - 189:9 move - 14:25,
53:15, 194:24

movie - 92:20, 107:16, 107:18 movies - 93:12 moving - 179:2 muddle - 71:11 multiple - 87:5 Murder - 104:1 murder - 55:12, 55:15, 56:14, 56:18, 56:22, 59:3, 59:25, 60:17, 61:4, 72:19, 88:11, 92:2, 92:11, 99:14, 102:18, 102:19, 102:23, 102:25, 104:19, 105:25, 107:6, 107:16, 107:19, 110:3, 110:10, 113:7, 113:13, 113:23, 113:24, 114:3, 144:5, 166:25, 168:19, 168:20, 168:21, 180:9, 191:3, 191:9, 191:14, 191:16, 193:2 murders - 54:21, 56:23, 58:23, 60:10, 60:18, 77:22, 104:18, 105:14, 105:20, 106:9, 123:3 must - 71:1, 98:3, 172:6 mute - 24:9

N

name - 29:9, 29:11, 30:12, 32:15, 37:16, 91:16, 91:23, 95:22, 105:11, 106:23, 116:22, 116:24, 118:12, 122:1, 123:3, 124:10, 127:22 named - 95:21. 103:19, 103:21, 104:1, 107:5, 168:24, 169:1, 171:16 namely - 105:9 names - 43:13, 43:14, 54:10, 56:13, Narcotics - 29:19 narcotics - 41:12 narrow - 165:15 nature - 189:7 near - 32:14, 33:6, 120:19 necessarily - 42:10, 73:19, 75:11, 75:17, 78:17, 140:14 necessary - 54:3 58:12, 58:13, 139:17 Neck - 159:9 need - 34:12, 61:21, 65:23, 68:11, 68:17, 70:11, 70:23, 70:24, 85:8, 95:22, 97:1 107:2, 107:3, 115:10, 141:3, 141:13, 141:13, 147:15, 163:20, 178:1, 178:20, 181:6, 183:17, 183:23, 185:9, 1 185:8, 185:9, 186:6, 187:8, 187:9, 190:10, 195:4, 195:11, 195:13 needed - 107:9, 153:3 needing - 108:11 needs - 15:19, 26:3,

140:10, 154:21, 163:23, 185:12

negotiable - 13:6 neighborhood -42:6, 118:10, 119:9, 119:25 nervous - 35:20 never - 61:9, 126:11, 145:11, 153:6, 153:22, 180:15 New - 102:3. 104:15, 177:6 new - 117:10, 146:24, 154:13, 154:15, 163:15, 175:13, 194:21, 194:23 next - 12:25, 23:16, 35:8, 63:2, 79:5, 106:5, 108:12, 134:23, 137:19, 178:2, 194:22 night - 114:7 nine - 35:15, 136:7, 138:14 Nobody - 76:12 nobody - 82:5, 82:6 non - 7:10, 51:19, 90:4, 90:17, 97:9, 97:20, 98:17, 98:19, 100:7, 139:4, 186:20 non-capital - 90:4, 97:9, 97:20 non-conspirator -186:20 non-death - 90:17, 98:17 non-deathqualified - 98:19 non-disclosure -51:19 non-existent -139.4

Document 642

non-qualified -100.7 non-statutory -7:10 noncapital - 99:4, 99:9, 100:9 none - 64:12, 101:18, 189:11 None - 164:8, 169:11, 169:12 normally - 189:24 north - 129:24 Northbound - 137:4 northbound - 137:5 Northern - 29:21, 159.9 nose - 166:16 note - 6:3, 108:18, 134:25 noted - 15:24, 110:13 **nothing** - 7:6, 7:8, 9:13, 12:9, 15:18, 50:13, 59:7, 94:24, 161:18, 191:8 Nothing - 132:12 notice - 35:18, 50:18, 52:20, 89:16,

121:19, 194:20,

notify - 11:22 noting - 7:24 notion - 87:10,

November - 14:12,

54:1, 87:19, 137:16, 137:20, 169:21

Number - 3:3, 126:19, 127:7, 131:4,

194.21

45.10

134:12, 134:14, 136:8, 138:15 number - 49:10, 53:21, 71:7, 71:8, 71:9, 74:9, 74:11, 89:8, 89:19, 131:12, 131:13, 138:20, 144:10, 151:19, 172:21, 194:6 Numbers - 131:2 numbers - 134:8 numerous - 101:24, 130:5, 130:6

o'clock - 115:23 O'gavin - 123:15 oath - 113:3, 179:8, 179:11, 180:18, 187:19, 189:3, 189:10 object - 50:18, 51:2, 52:3, 65:22, 135:23, 183:10. 183:11 objected - 90:6 objection - 51:13 65:11, 135:1, 135:3 Objection - 36:5 objectives - 26:21 **objects** - 65:9 obligation - 8:12, 63:15 observation -129:16, 135:16 observations 121:12 observed - 119:8, 119:9, 120:14, 129:9, 129:12, 129:25, 130:19, 131:11, 131:22, 132:2, 132 132:2, 132:8, 135:10, 135:12, 135:23 138:10, 138:15 141:9, 141:15, 142:6 obstruct - 173:14, 173:19, 173:20 obstructing -163:17 obstruction - 173:8 obtain - 91:20 obtained - 151:2 obviated - 75:15, 78.23 **obvious** - 7:22, 52:21, 73:21 **obviously** - 28:16, 73:3, 75:13, 78:12, 103:8 **Obviously** - 195:12 occasion - 45:22, 130.8 occasions - 102:10, 175:9 occupant - 121:23 occupants - 34:17 occurred - 52:24, 123:7, 123:23, 139:19, 144:11, 187:2 occurs - 96:25 odd - 70:5 odor - 128:15, 129:8, 135:25, 141:22 offense - 90:18 offenses - 81:22 offer - 4:23, 4:24, 9:21, 9:22, 10:6, 10:13, 10:14, 11:15

17:3, 17:11, 17:12, 18:7, 18:8, 18:23, 19:20, 19:21, 20:11, 20:12, 20:25, 21:1, 37:25, 46:14, 62:8, 62:11, 88:19, 94:5, 111:7, 122:9, 132:18, 133:4, 133:5, 134:10, 137:23, 195:23, 196:5 offering - 19:3 offers - 10:8 **Office** - 28:6, 116:6, 137:18, 169:10 office - 28:6, 69:12, Officer - 123:18, 127:13, 136:18 officer - 36:6, 37:12, 39:15, 44:19, 45:14, 39:15, 44:19, 45:14, 123:14, 134:22, 135:4, 135:7, 135:12, 135:14, 136:1, 136:2, 136:5, 140:21, 141:8, 142:4, 180:18, 195:25
officer's - 131:1, 140:20 140.20 officers - 28:9, 31:1, 31:11, 36:18, 36:19, 36:20, 36:21, 45:6, 123:14, 135:21, 135:22, 138:4, 138:11, 179:9, 179:22, 184:13, 184:14, 184:18 official - 40:13 Official - 1:25, 199:11 offset - 122:16 Oklahoma - 162:2 omnibus - 173:12 once - 44:16, 121:9, 142.17 Once - 141:21 once-and-for-all -142:17 **one** - 3:15, 3:22, 3:25, 5:14, 8:16, 13:4, 15:15, 21:24, 25:21, 27:4, 31:8, 31:10, 33:5, 39:17, 39:24, 42:21, 43:18, 44:12, 48:12, 55:17, 59:24, 60:24, 64:14, 67:22, 70:9, 70:17, 71:5, 71:7, 72:10, 72:12, 74:6, 74:9, 75:20, 76:25, 77:3, 81:2, 81:22, 83:3, 83:7, 84:4, 89:19, 90:24 91:15, 92:14, 97:10, 97:14, 98:6, 99:9, 97:14, 98:6, 99:9, 100:20, 103:2, 103:10, 104:1, 104:6, 107:25, 112:4, 112:5, 114:6, 115:8, 122:4, 127:12, 131:12, 131:13, 133:20, 136:11, 138:14, 139:16, 139:25. 139:16, 139:25, 140:13, 143:7, 147:15, 147:20, 151:13, 153:9, 158:22, 159:4, 159:25, 166:14, 167:7, 167:20, 173:2, 175:2, 175:5, 176:7, 176:21, 177:15,

183:1, 188:19, 192:3, 192:7, 193:2

13

181:23 outburst - 169:20 outside - 186:20 Outstanding - 31:8 outstanding - 31:8 42:3, 42:17, 53:18 overhead - 158:13 overnight - 162:3 override - 65:23 override - 65:23 override - 135:3 Overruled - 36:6 Owings - 32:13, 33:6 own - 63:6, 68:17, 79:1, 151:1, 188:5

owned - 157:16

P040255 - 136:8, 138:15 packet - 67:24 **page** - 99:3, 131:9, 137:20, 145:1, 159:13, 160:13, 173:11 Page - 198:2 pages - 187:8, paid - 104:8, 159:20 panacea - 96:25 paper - 54:18, 92:22, 108:16, 114:11, 114:14, 114:18, 156:22 **papers** - 11:21, 11:22, 12:1, 12:7, 12:18, 51:13, 51:25, 60:1, 92:2, 143:6, 163:5, 163:9, 176:11, 176:17, 177:1, 179:2, 185:6, 194:8, 194:18, 194.19 paperwork - 51:25, 155:18, 160:22 paragraph - 137:24 paraphrase - 112:7, 112:8 parcel - 114:4 Pardon - 132:4 parole - 106:12 parroted - 87:23 part - 5:13, 5:18, 30:1, 43:4, 45:18, 47:4, 48:10, 64:16, 67:14, 73:9, 80:8, 81:19, 88:4, 113:13, 113:24, 114:4, 114:6, 139:23, 146:19, 147:7, 158:17, 163:19, 163:22 167:15, 167:23, 168:25, 169:11, 169:12, 178:22, 181:9, 181:12, 185:10, 192:12 Part - 181:11 partial - 144:9 participants - 67:6, participate - 22:7, 117:22, 133:14 participated -30:13, 104:7 participating -126:25 participation - 60:8 particular - 29:20, 48:7, 61:3, 64:14,

74:13, 74:14, 96:19, 99:23, 138:7, 142:19, 143:5, 145:15, 148:2, 148:20, 158:20, 164:16, 171:4, 188:7 particularly - 56:15, 66:8, 78:13, 82:5, 139:20, 143:24, 171:8 Particulars - 53:24. 54:2, 57:1, 58:4, 58:8, 58:10, 58:11, 61:14 particulars - 55:14, 58:2 parties - 11:23, 13:6, 50:11 partner - 32:2 parts - 93:16 passed - 36:2, 129:13 **passenger** - 33:18, 34:5, 35:5, 44:16, 48:3 passes - 192:23 past - 123:5, 139:17, 141:10, 169:6 pat - 35:15 path - 27:20 pathway - 53:11 patrol - 31:19, 34:13, 34:19, 36:10, 37:10 patted - 44:18, 45:13 pattern - 174:15 Pause - 41:25, 133:7, 150:15 pay - 107:2 pays - 66:14, 158:6, 158:8, 158:11 peculiar - 140:15 penalized - 77:8 penalty - 7:10, 8:19, 70:3, 70:8, 70:12, 70:24, 71:2, 71:6, 71:7, 71:8, 71:9, 71:13, 71:14, 71:23, 72:2, 72:6, 72:25, 73:8, 75:14, 76:4, 76:19, 76:20, 77:6, 77:17, 77:20, 89:3, 89:7, 89:17, 89:19, 89:25, 90:25, 99:8, 99:14, 194:12 penned - 40:18 People - 118:10 people - 31:25, 34:8, 39:8, 56:2, 56:8, 57:11, 69:22, 80:5, 82:2, 84:1, 84:11, 84:15, 89:6, 89:12 89:19, 93:20, 118:8, 126:15, 134:3, 134:8, 156:24, 158:16, 168:24, 168:25 **per** - 42:15, 158:14, 158:15 perceive - 24:1 perceived - 87:20 percent - 109:19 perception - 88:3 perfectly - 104:3, 149:19, 175:15 perform - 5:1, 5:11, 6:13 performed - 6:9 **Perhaps** - 56:5, 165:13 perhaps - 23:14, 23:16, 28:8, 70:5, 76:5, 79:4, 79:5, 84:5

110:21, 110:24, 164:18, 167:8, 167:22, 177:23 191:2, 195:2, 195:3 period - 3:15 permanent - 175:2, 175:12 permissible - 89:8, 141:20, 142:14 permission - 4:11, 115:18, 137:22, 137.23 permit - 4:2, 38:11, 62:3, 62:4, 137:24, 196:17 permits - 4:7, 86:25 permitted - 67:20 perpetrators -179:5 **person** - 30:12, 35:15, 39:19, 41:9, 42:7, 42:23, 45:25, 54:25, 56:19, 61:3, 75:14, 91:6, 103:18 103:21, 110:2, 118:3, 118:5, 118:21, 125:11, 125:14, 134:4, 176:15, 179:6, 188:13, 189:1 personal - 12:17 personally - 185:8 personnel - 11:24, 157:18 persons - 83:15, 173:13 perspective - 66:9, 66:10 persuade - 158:25 persuaded - 175:19 pertains - 73:7 petit - 89:5 petitioner - 90:12 petitioner's - 100:2 phase - 7:7, 7:11, 8:19, 24:14, 24:15, 70:3, 70:25, 71:2, 71:6, 72:6, 72:25, 74:5, 74:23, 74:25, 75:3, 75:5, 86:6, 96:23 phases - 27:3, 71:23, 72:3, 74:2, 75:14, 99:14 phone - 27:25, 28:4. 55:17, 83:5, 83:16, 92:16, 105:18, 106:25, 126:7, 185:4 photocopied - 65:8 photocopying -66:15, 68:21 photographic -179:16 phrase - 101:21 phraseology 159:8, 160:20 physical - 44:13, physically - 56:14. 56:17 Pick - 83:20 pick - 39:8 picked - 83:13. 83:14, 106:21, 154:14 picture - 109:13, 130:15 piece - 114:11, 114:14, 114:18, 122:4, 156:21, 159:21 piggybacked -

pit - 75:20 pits - 72:8 pitted - 76:25 pitting - 69:22 place - 30:21, 31:6, 32:10, 32:25, 37:2, 44:23, 65:15, 74:17, 152:3, 153:10, 154:17, 154:22 placed - 27:25, 32:5, 35:4, 35:14 36:9, 131:12, 131:13, 151.11 places - 149:6 placing - 50:19, 135:23 plain - 142:6, 161:25 plainclothes -31:22, 31:23 plan - 42:8, 73:24, 105:10, 192:18 planning - 42:4, plans - 106:16. 108:11 plant - 8:22 plants - 13:22 play - 76:19, 186:16 played - 54:12, 56:22, 85:1, 175:4 plays - 168:9 plea - 4:16, 5:15, 8:16, 11:6, 15:3, 137:14, 191:21 pleading - 96:5, 97:7, 103:13, 166:1 **pleadings** - 53:18, 85:11, 94:19, 100:21, 186:2, 191:20, 193:3, 194.6 pled - 169:11. 169:12 **Plus** - 76:23 **Pm** - 115:8, 117:22, 138:4 **point** - 24:18, 27:19, 32:25, 50:24, 53:3, 63:6, 64:8, 67:10, 69:21, 70:11, 73:20, 76:13, 78:4, 78:21, 79:4, 80:12, 87:8, 87:12, 90:15, 92:1 93:24, 93:25, 96:23, 103:11, 103:12, 104:10, 109:9, 110:18, 112:15, 118:13, 121:23, 128:23, 129:2, 129:5, 129:17, 129:18, 136:7, 138:14, 140:12, 140:18, 141:5, 141:13, 143:18, 145:4, 146:9, 149:20, 153:20, 149.20, 153.20, 156:4, 158:4, 159:12, 161:18, 162:7, 162:8, 162:13, 164:19, 165:10, 165:14, 165:15, 165:19, 166:1, 166:7, 167:13, 167:21, 168:16, 169:6, 174:20, 176:24, 188:23 pointed - 48:23, 98:14, 169:3 pointing - 80:23, points - 25:4, 58:6, 60:24, 60:25, 93:20,

psychiatric - 50:2

168:14
Police - 29:12, 29:18, 29:23, 46:23,
47:9, 117:4
police - 34.9 34.23
39:15, 41:10, 44:19,
138:4, 139:11, 179:9,
180:18 politely - 178:18
polls - 89:18
portion - 75:19
poses - 100:8
positing - 88:7 position - 8:10,
11:12. 11:25. 35:6.
11:12, 11:25, 35:6, 50:23, 52:20, 60:4,
72:1, 82:20, 82:21,
86:18, 92:25, 95:18,
107:21, 143:25, 148:1, 149:17,
174:19. 175:13.
187:24
positioned - 32:7
positions - 16:17, 180:3
possession - 83:15,
138.7 141.18
possibility - 24:2,
possibility - 24:2, 24:11, 52:17, 141:16 possible - 13:7,
13:8, 104:3, 106:2,
121:13
possibly - 24:8, 53:8, 77:3, 77:20,
53:8, 77:3, 77:20, 123:15
post - 172·1
172:10, 175:10, 193:17, 194:1
193:17, 194:1
post-arrest - 172:1,
172:10, 175:10, 193:17, 194:1
postponed - 66:5
potential - 52:18,
94:20, 178:16
potentially - 111:19 potted - 8:22, 13:22
powder - 127:21
power - 168:6
practice - 99:13
precedent - 72:1, 100:3, 100:6
precinct - 29:20
preclude - 60:2
preclusive - 51:19
predisposition - 100:15
preferred - 66:4
preferred - 66:4 prejudice - 4:20, 11:10, 15:7, 24:2,
11:10, 15:7, 24:2,
79:4, 88:21 96:14
24:8, 46:16, 52:12, 79:4, 88:21, 96:14, 159:25, 162:16,
162:19
prejudiced - 23:21
preliminary - 111:23, 180:19
prematurely - 67:2 preparations - 27:2
preparations - 27:2
prepare - 58:13, 119:19
prepared - 12:18,
38:19, 184:15, 187:3,
195:9
preponderance -
112:25 present - 3:4, 6:4,
14:17, 22:13, 22:14, 25:2, 25:13, 25:14, 28:24, 32:18, 54:23, 71:17, 76:6, 87:3,
25:2, 25:13, 25:14,
28:24, 32:18, 54:23,
11.11, 10.0, 01.3,

```
114:21, 133:10,
178:17, 182:6, 183:12
 presentation -
178:1
 presented - 73:22,
74:6, 164:12, 165:8
 presenting - 22:19,
167:14
 presently - 54:15
preserve - 109:1
  preserved - 83:18
 preserving - 195:6
pressed - 110:18
  presumed - 172:5
  presumption -
172:15
presupposes -
99:17
 presupposition -
99:24
pretrial - 112:22, 168:7, 189:20
pretty - 51:9, 54:9, 57:19, 63:1, 64:4,
89:3, 92:8, 107:13, 114:5, 144:23,
146:18, 147:7,
176:11, 176:17, 186:8
  preventing - 163:17
  previous - 72:3,
139.9
  previously - 29:6,
116:18, 133:20
 prima - 186:12
  prime - 98:5
  Prince - 89:21
  principal - 88:23,
  prism - 162:9
 prison - 145:16, 45:25, 146:1
  prisoner - 36:9,
145:7, 146:12,
151:10, 151:12
151:24, 151:25,
152:2, 152:11,
152:15, 152:25,
153:2, 153:17,
154:12, 154:24
157:7, 160:24, 161:17
  prisoners - 153:24,
156:10, 156:13
  private - 4:23, 4:25
  Probable - 119:22,
134:11, 134:18
probable - 141:23,
 probative - 176:23
  problem - 77:6,
82:15, 82:23, 82:25,
85:12, 85:25, 86:1,
100:8, 103:14, 152:5,
187:13, 188:25
 problems - 6:12,
87:3, 92:10, 95:9
  procedural - 178:6
procedurally -
51:17
  procedure - 50:11,
184:16, 184:24
procedures -
  proceed - 3:10,
3:22, 8:15, 16:10,
16:14, 16:20, 21:20,
23:6, 38:13, 50:3,
50:15, 115:16, 116:1,
122:21, 133:15
  proceeded - 107:7
  proceeding - 7:7.
```

```
25:16, 72:4, 87:25, 88:1, 97:21, 140:13,
140:14, 144:5,
180:14, 182:9
  proceedings - 3:11,
3:19, 16:12, 16:15, 17:10, 18:6, 19:2, 19:18, 20:24, 22:13, 28:22, 62:5, 87:20,
26.22, 02.3, 67.20,
110:9, 113:4, 144:4,
165:12, 165:23,
185:5, 196:4, 196:20,
197:1, 197:4
  process - 25:15,
98:8
  produce - 53:9,
 182:22, 185:18,
185.20
  produced - 185:13
  product - 68:18
  professional - 23:6
Professor - 62:23,
111.2
  proffer - 79:6, 87:9,
110:19, 112:23,
114:22, 180:8,
186:12, 186:24,
187:11, 187:23
  proffered - 148:16,
181:16
  profit - 104:1
  prognosis - 16:8
  prohibiting - 173:13
  prongs - 154:19
proof - 140:25,
163:11, 163:22,
165:18, 165:25
proper - 12:21, 175:15
properly - 99:21,
142:4, 169:18, 172:19
property - 91:21
   proportionate -
158.12
  proposal - 186:1
  proposals - 3:13
proposed - 49:16,
49:18, 52:2, 174:17
proposition - 58:3, 65:25, 91:9, 144:7, 149:8, 162:12, 162:13
propounded -
51:15
  prosecuted - 69:3
  prosecuting - 91:8
  prosecution -
72:22, 142:16, 163:18
  prosecutor -
155:19, 191:15,
191:23
prosecutors - 72:12, 80:19, 81:1,
87:5
prospective - 155:20
  protestation - 188:6
  prove - 61:3, 114:20
proven - 165:9,
172:16
  provide - 59:15,
67:15, 69:1
provided - 3:9, 59:17, 67:17, 113:4,
172:24
  provides - 144:8
  proving - 172:17
provision - 154:21, 173:9, 174:8, 174:12
  provisions
 143:23 172:21
```

```
psychological -
  public - 5:4, 5:7
9:1, 9:7, 10:18, 10:22,
12:13, 13:1, 17:16, 17:19, 18:12, 18:16,
20:1, 20:4, 20:15,
20:18, 21:5, 21:8,
20:18, 21:5, 21:8, 38:4, 38:7, 94:9, 94:12, 111:10, 111:13, 122:13, 122:17, 132:22, 133:1, 150:7, 150:10, 196:8, 196:11
   Public - 5:10, 9:9,
10:24, 17:21, 18:18, 20:6, 20:20, 21:10,
 38:10, 94:14, 111:15,
 122:19, 133:3,
137:17, 150:11,
 196:14
   published - 89:23
   Pulaski - 118:4,
118:24, 119:3,
119:11, 129:21
129:23, 135:8,
136:19, 136:24, 138:5
   pull - 35:2, 120:8,
 144:14
  pulled - 34:23,
 54:25, 171:8
   pulling - 119:9
   punctuated -
 169:25, 175:9
   punishment - 89:8
   purchases - 117:11
purpose - 93:4,
163:16, 171:3
Purposes - 128:25
purposes - 30:19,
30:20, 30:21, 32:6,
32:19, 40:1, 70:12,
 71:19, 104:2, 128:22,
 156:14, 156:15,
157:19, 172:8, 174:25
   Pursley - 154:7
   pursuant - 64:25
 154:18, 154:23, 158:9
  pursued - 26:24
   pushed - 55:19,
92:14, 92:15
92.14, 92.15

put - 4:2, 28:3, 37:9,

44:22, 45:13, 48:19,

52:20, 68:2, 72:16,

74:22, 75:25, 108:15,

110:17, 121:2, 151:3
119:17, 121:2, 151:3, 151:4, 157:11,
 157:13, 195:11
 putting - 57:6,
157:10, 181:9,
181:11, 181:12
   Pyne - 2:2, 6:17,
 11:16, 11:20, 13:16,
14:7, 50:21, 59:8
                 Q
   qualified - 89:5,
```

qualified - 89:5, 89:13, 90:17, 90:21, 91:1, 91:4, 98:13, 98:17, 98:18, 98:19, 99:7, 100:4, 100:7, 100:8, 100:15 quandary - 8:3, 16:9, 27:7 questioning - 141:7 questionnaire -195:5 questions - 37:23, 43:8, 43:19, 44:1, 44:5, 46:9, 47:13, 48:13, 49:3, 74:16, 76:18, 85:4, 122:3, 136:10, 136:13 quickly - 107:3, 107:7 quite - 8:20, 8:21, 25:4, 27:14, 58:9, 58:16, 59:25, 63:22, 72:13, 91:3, 108:23, 139:2, 139:11, 141:4, 169:22 quoted - 97:6 quoting - 99:3

F

racketeering -57:15, 163:15, 169:5, 170:10, 173:5, 173:6, 174:14, 174:16 radio - 33:25, 34:2, 34:8. 34:18 Raise - 29:3 raise - 15:16, 67:22, 108:19 raised - 98:11. 177:22 raises - 165:6 ran - 116:6 rap - 175:4 rape - 159:24 rapist - 160:9, rather - 63:24, 78:10, 113:19, 188:23, 189:23 razor - 127:21 reaching - 154:11 read - 98:24, 108:22, 110:11, 110:25, 112:5 126:23, 134:23, 137:24, 139:21, 166:9 readily - 195:8 reading - 89:6, 127:19, 135:20, 165:12 Ready - 116:1 ready - 143:7 real - 24:11, 77:14 really - 7:16, 54:19, 56:25, 57:20, 57:23, 65:25, 66:12, 91:9, 10:23, 143:17, 153:13, 162:9, 162:22, 163:12, 164:22, 165:16, 166:3, 167:24, 190:14 **Really** - 161:8 reason - 22:23 25:5, 25:8, 61:23, 63:7, 65:12, 66:1, 66:6, 71:11, 74:12, 74:14, 98:20, 107:4, 108:7, 139:12, 162:20. 179:10 reasonable - 141:17 reasonably - 141:16 reasons - 39:18, 39:24, 97:10, 142:11 Rec'd - 198:10, 198:13 receipt - 107:18 receive - 28:5, 61:16, 73:14 received - 6:17, 11:21, 14:7, 31:15, 32:9, 33:17, 54:18,

15

55:23, 55:24, 61:20, 66:23, 91:17, 118:2, 126:18, 127:8, 127:16, 131:5, 134:15, 138:2
126:18, 127:8,
134:15, 138:2
receives - 28:19 receiving - 42:16,
59:9
recent - 89:6, 146:4 recently - 49:19,
115:20 recess - 115:23,
115:24 recipient - 186:16
recited - 12:23, 92:1 recognizance -
12:17 recognize - 27:7,
127:10 recollection -
39:20, 41:16, 41:19, 41:20, 118:6, 120:25, 121:5, 124:20, 125:16, 139:3, 139:5, 139:10, 139:17
121:5, 124:20, 124:25, 125:1, 125:4,
125:16, 139:3, 139:5, 139:10. 139:17
150:21
record - 3:2, 4:21, 7:15, 11:4, 14:22, 15:1, 15:10, 25:13, 27:9, 29:9, 29:10, 40:2, 53:11, 87:19, 92:22, 116:22, 133:8, 130:21, 144:8
15:1, 15:10, 25:13,
27:9, 29:9, 29:10, 40:2, 53:11, 87:19,
187:19, 189:3, 191:10, 191:19, 193:2 recorded - 139:18
recorded - 139:18
recording - 83:18 recovered - 121:17,
134:7, 136:2, 138:16 Recross - 136:16
100.00
180:20, 180:24,
181:20, 182:13, 182:25, 183:3, 183:20
red - 163:20 red - 179:7, 179:12, 180:20, 180:24, 181:20, 182:13, 182:25, 183:3, 183:20 Red - 30:4, 30:5, 31:1, 32:14, 33:5, 37:18, 40:4, 45:18,
37:18, 40:4, 45:18, 47:5
redacted - 95:10
redaction - 95:5 Redirect - 132:13
reduce - 187:10 reference - 103:18 references - 92:5
references - 92:5 referred - 47:4,
140:22
referring - 191:11 refers - 91:23
reflect - 4:21, 11:4, 14:22, 15:1, 27:9,
133:8
refrain - 81:8 refresh - 39:20,
41:16, 125:4 refusal - 66:19,
174:5 refused - 178:18
regard - 23:10, 24:10, 24:12, 24:25,
52:18 regarding - 60:7,
65:16
regardless - 99:19 Regional - 159:9 regular - 90:17

regular - 90:17

regulated - 157:17 regulates - 156:22

```
rehabilitation -
  reimbursed - 68:20
  reindict - 165:20
  reinvigorated -
 Reisterstown -
34:21, 35:3, 36:3,
47:18, 47:21, 48:4,
 rejected - 99:5.
100:17
 rejoin - 107:12
related - 53:18,
74:14, 94:20, 127:17,
143:12, 191:1, 191:3
  relates - 172:25
  relating - 15:15,
144:4, 149:5, 149:6,
194.7
                                140.21
  relationship - 24:16
  relatively - 164:4
release - 5:6, 9:17, 10:20, 12:16, 12:24,
13:10, 17:17, 18:13, 19:24, 20:2, 20:16,
21:6, 38:6, 94:10,
122:14, 132:23,
150:8, 196:10
 releasing - 9:4
  relevance - 13:8
relevant - 22:15,
64:16, 85:20, 172:10,
  reliability - 97:18,
181:22, 182:18,
182:19, 183:5
  relied - 99:11,
131:25, 132:3, 151:2
  relief - 176:1
  relies - 146:3, 156:7
  rely - 172:23
relying - 145:13,
146:22, 189:5
  remain - 19:17
20:9, 20:22, 21:14,
23:3, 160:11
 remainder - 20:24,
 remained - 153:17
  remaining - 3:23,
23:2, 53:16
 remains - 19:16,
149.9
remedy - 140:5,
140:16, 142:23
remember - 31:14,
34:10, 39:20, 42:15,
43:25, 44:6, 47:20,
64:3, 83:4, 118:12,
123:15, 123:17
124:21, 124:22
125:19, 126:2, 126:3
  Remind - 83:2
 remind - 84:18,
111:17
 removed - 121:13
 renewing - 69:24
reopen - 12:15
repeat - 183:23
  repeated - 38:11,
62:4, 133:9
  repeatedly - 144:3
  repent - 15:6
  repented - 4:18,
  reply - 69:18, 72:11
                                58:25
  report - 40:9, 40:10,
40:18, 40:25, 41:2,
41:3, 41:14, 119:17,
```

```
119:19, 121:2,
124:13, 124:17
124:19, 125:1, 125:4,
                                        173.25
125:7, 126:18,
125:7, 126:18,
130:16, 130:17,
130:21, 131:1, 131:7,
131:10, 131:21,
131:23, 131:24,
131:25, 132:5, 132:7,
133:20, 134:7,
139:11, 139:12,
139:14, 193:16
 139:14, 193:16
  Reporter - 1:25,
 199:11
  Reporter's - 199:1
  reports - 38:19,
38:24, 39:1, 39:12
39:13, 39:18, 39:22,
39:25, 40:1, 55:23,
  represent - 8:5,
10:11, 13:12, 13:25,
14:3, 17:1, 17:5, 17:9,
17:24, 18:5, 18:21, 19:1, 19:11, 19:15, 24:18, 25:17, 26:2
                                        155.5
  representation -
8:9, 8:15, 26:9, 26:14,
26:22, 27:15, 28:11,
172:12, 176:20
  representations -
24:13, 24:24, 187:14, 189:2, 189:5, 189:12
  represented - 3:5,
  request - 5:3, 5:5,
5:7, 5:10, 6:23, 7:1,
8:7, 8:11, 9:17, 9:18,
                                       76:18, 77:7
10:15, 10:17, 10:19,
10:21, 10:24, 12:5, 12:12, 12:15, 12:21, 12:23, 12:25, 13:1, 13:9, 14:6, 17:13, 17:14
                                       97:25
17:15, 17:17, 17:18,
17:22, 18:11, 18:12,
18:15, 18:18, 19:22,
19:23, 19:25, 20:1, 20:3, 20:6, 20:14,
20:15, 20:17, 20:21
21:3, 21:4, 21:5, 21:8,
21:11, 22:3, 22:10, 22:12, 24:21, 25:6,
25:12, 24:21, 25:0,
25:9, 25:11, 38:2,
38:3, 38:5, 38:7,
38:10, 49:17, 86:13,
94:8, 94:9, 94:11,
94:14, 98:21, 111:9,
111:10, 111:12,
111:16, 122:10,
122:11, 122:13,
122:16, 122:19,
132:19, 132:20,
132:21, 132:22,
                                        190:10
132:25, 133:3, 150:6,
150:7, 150:9, 150:12, 196:7, 196:9, 196:11,
196:14, 196:25
                                        114:21
  requested - 6:9,
35:14. 63:15
  requesting - 6:21
Requests - 12:22
requests - 6:9, 6:13, 6:19, 8:19, 15:14,
49:21, 50:6, 196:6
  require - 14:9
                                       51:14, 69:18
   required - 53:10,
  requirement -
173:24, 177:3
  requirements
```

```
147:19, 154:11
  requires - 86:25,
                                       resulted - 137:15
                                       results - 97:19
  rerolled - 119:13,
                                       resume - 3:16, 3:17
120:8, 121:12, 129:4,
130:4, 130:6, 130:9,
                                       resumed - 155:7
                                       return - 10:8, 10:14,
130:4, 130:6, 130:8,
130:13, 131:17,
132:9, 135:13,
135:15, 136:2,
141:10, 141:15, 142:5
                                     17:12, 18:8, 19:21, 20:12, 21:1, 37:25, 62:11, 94:6, 111:7, 145:0
                                     115:8, 122:9, 132:19, 133:4, 150:4, 154:21,
  rescind - 4:15, 4:16,
                                     154:22, 154:24,
154:25, 196:4
4:18, 5:15, 11:5, 11:6, 11:7, 15:2
                                       returned - 4:24,
  research - 9:10,
69:13, 140:8, 140:12
                                      154:17, 155:6
                                       reversed - 160:3
  researched - 6:19
  reservation - 11:10,
                                       Review - 89:23
 15:7, 46:15, 52:11
                                       review - 51:25,
  reservations - 4:20,
                                     54:8, 68:12, 126:22
78:2, 88:20, 96:13
                                       reviewing - 51:14
reserve - 4:19, 9:12, 11:9, 15:6, 46:15,
                                       revolution - 56:16
                                       revolution-like -
52:10, 88:20, 96:12
                                      56:16
  reserved - 52:13.
                                       Rhodes - 1:22, 6:3.
                                     10:11, 25:25, 27:10, 27:11, 27:12, 50:9, 79:20, 79:21, 79:22, 79:25, 80:13, 80:18,
  residual - 74:16
  residue - 127:22
  resistance - 35:10
                                     81:14, 81:19, 82:1,
  Resolution - 5:9,
9:9, 10:23, 17:21, 18:17, 20:6, 20:20,
                                     82:12, 82:20, 83:3,
                                     83:6, 83:8, 83:11,
21:10, 38:9, 94:14,
                                      83:13, 83:17, 83:19
111:15, 122:18,
133:2, 150:11, 196:13
                                     83:21, 83:23, 83:25,
                                      84:3, 84:9, 84:14,
  resolved - 193:19
                                     84:17, 84:22, 84:25,
  resolving - 51:13
resource - 76:15,
                                      85:2, 85:5, 86:3,
                                     86:11, 86:13, 86:20,
                                     87:2, 87:24, 88:5
Richard - 116:15,
  resources - 76:16.
                                     116:16, 116:23, 116:24, 198:7
respect - 21:21,
22:18, 51:11, 53:1,
                                       Richardson - 97:4,
57:3, 63:12, 64:21
71:12, 94:18, 100:9,
                                       Rico - 56:7, 56:10,
                                     56:11, 57:10, 57:21, 57:22, 72:21, 163:14,
100:11, 111:24,
111:25, 112:18, 113:1, 114:22,
                                     168:24, 169:13,
169:23, 170:4,
170:11, 170:21,
172:25, 173:4, 177:1
 142:18, 142:23
 148:1, 148:19,
155:23, 156:2, 156:4,
155:23, 156:2, 156:4,
156:6, 161:3, 167:12,
178:15, 178:25,
179:13, 179:22,
181:14, 182:4,
182:16, 183:20,
186:1, 186:2
                                       riding - 55:15
rights - 4:19, 11:9,
                                     15:6, 25:15, 46:15, 52:11, 85:3, 88:20,
                                     96:13, 139:25,
140:13, 142:18,
  respectfully - 167:1
respective - 28:12
                                     153:11, 153:12, 155:6, 175:16
  respond - 22:4,
                                       ripe - 50:15, 194:7,
96:8, 100:18, 108:17, 109:5, 112:2, 115:5, 150:1, 188:4, 190:9,
                                      risk - 53:12, 106:17
Road - 34:21, 35:3,
36:3, 47:18, 47:22,
  responded - 37:15,
                                      48:4, 48:8
103:9, 138:4
                                       road - 3:10
                                      rob - 105:9, 106:3, 106:4, 192:18
  responding - 94:17.
  response - 26:7.
                                       robberies - 104:13.
26:11, 26:13, 47:12,
48:12, 48:14, 48:22,
                                      104.14
                                       robbery - 105:10,
                                      107:7, 146:24, 189:9,
110:13, 138:6,
                                      192.17
 143:16, 170:9
  responses - 19:8,
                                       Robert - 1:18
                                       Roberts - 123:17
21:13, 22:24, 51:12,
                                       role - 8:21, 22:2,
responsibility -
28:17, 37:11, 80:10
rest - 5:20
                                      28:15, 59:25, 172:3
                                       roles - 54:12, 56:22
                                       rolled - 119:12,
  result - 86:13,
                                      130:11, 141:15, 142:5
97:17, 100:10,
                                       rose - 133:11
```

row - 73:19 Rpr - 1:25 Rubicon - 7:16 ruin - 7:14 Rule - 26:17, 51:22, 59:1, 59:9 rule - 26:20, 51:25, 170:24, 171:1, 186:20, 186:23 ruled - 100:16 rules - 53:10 Rules - 26:19, 139.10 ruling - 25:25, 70:9, 87:25, 94:23, 183:14, 187:6 rulings - 168:8 run - 42:7 Run - 30:4, 30:5, 31:2, 32:14, 33:6, 37:18, 40:4, 45:18, Rw-1 - 137:13, 138:2, 198:11

safe - 16:22 safely - 42:21 salary - 158:12 sample - 102:1 satisfied - 25:13 save - 76:20 saw - 120:8, 130:2, 130:8, 130:12, 131:19, 136:21, 185:6, 196:19 scandal - 97:15 scene - 36:3, 36:18, 54:24, 179:23, 181:18, 183:2 schedule - 49:25, 59:21, 186:1, 186:7 scheduled - 3:8, scheduling - 15:15, 50:7, 59:2, 66:2 school - 76:17, science - 100:14 scope - 8:14, 27:15, 27:17, 168:8, 172:18, 173:16 score - 9:20 scrutinize - 146:17 scrutinized - 160:21 se - 42:15 seamless - 192:16. 192:19 **search** - 36:15, 36:17, 37:17, 91:20, 139:13, 141:25, 142:4, 142:11, 142:19 seat - 120:22, 121:16, 121:18, 121:22, 136:6, 138:16 seated - 19:6, 29:8, 62:7, 74:23, 116:20 second - 7:21, 12:12, 73:9, 91:2, 91:12, 91:14, 100:19, 131:9, 139:23, 168:15, 176:12, 184:1 **Section** - 9:8, 170:22, 173:5, 173:7 section - 90:8, 99:18, 170:22 secured - 74:1 **security** - 63:12, 65:15, 66:20, 67:5

sedan - 33:19 see - 4:9, 5:23, 5:25, 32:7, 32:12, 33:12, 34:15, 34:17, 37:6, 37:19, 38:21, 44:24, 48:20, 63:7, 71:3, 71:15, 76:25, 77:7, 79:7, 79:14, 82:15, 87:22, 93:13, 95:14, 103:1, 107:20, 110:23, 121:21, 126:25, 146:7, 148:25, 160:20, 168:9, 182:22, 184:19, 185:17, 185:25, 189:6, 189:25, 197:3 See - 80:18, 166:24 seeing - 133:24 seek - 89:4, 89:17 seeking - 50:24, 61:9, 77:6, 89:2 seem - 56:15, 70:5, 76:14, 192:25 sees - 88:1 segregated - 68:5 seized - 55:17, 127.20 **seizure** - 16:3, 142:19, 142:23 seizures - 52:23 selected - 90:8, 99:17 selection - 7:18 self - 8:9, 26:9, 26:14, 141:4, 164:17, self-defeating -164:17 self-described self-evident - 141.4 self-representation 8:9, 26:9, 26:14 sell - 112:11 selling - 112:10, 118:3 semiautomatic -138:14 sending - 145:21, 149:7, 149:23, 152:3, 152:8, 152:17, 152:20, 153:23, 159.11 sense - 3:13, 65:7, 73:18, 73:25, 162:4, 162:9, 162:10, 162:11, 163:13, 164:24, 165:18, 167:7, 177:11 sent - 55:20 145:11, 145:17 145:18, 145:19, 146:23, 147:1, 147:4, 147:6, 149:22, 153:22 sentence - 134:21, 145:15, 147:3, 154:12, 154:24, 155:8 sentences - 134:23 sentencing - 24:15, 74:5, 74:23, 74:25, 75:8, 75:10, 96:23, 196:3 sentient - 4:15, 11:5, 14:23, 15:2 separate - 71:22, 72:2, 75:13, 77:2, 167:20, 167:21,

176:5, 177:3

separately - 74:6

112:12, 112:20 separation -176:15, 176:25, 177:11 September - 3:8, Sergeant - 29:11, 29:15, 31:1, 43:16, 46:21, 116:15, 116:23, 117:2, 132:15, 133:19, 134:17, 136:11, 136:12, 137:8 sergeant - 38:17, 39:14, 42:1, 42:23, 43:18, 44:3, 45:17, 122:24, 123:1, 135:6 Serial - 136:7, 138:15 serial - 138:19, 159:24, 160:9, 160:10 series - 3:6, 3:9, 3:11, 70:8, 94:19, 127:17, 138:18 serious - 57:25, 195:4 **seriously** - 13:20, 109:3, 126:9 serve - 154:24 serves - 173:13 service - 45:3, 45:6, 48:23 Service - 157:20, 161:16 serving - 145:15, 147:2 Session - 115:25 session - 3:16, 178:2, 196:18, 196:19 set - 5:7, 10:21, 13:1, 17:19, 18:15, 20:3, 20:17, 38:7, 75:23, 94:11, 111:12, 119:8, 126:15 132:25, 135:9, 150:9, 155:25, 156:9, 168:15, 193:3, 196:11 setoff - 9:7, 21:8, 122:16 sets - 11:21, 50:10, 92:2 setting - 184:24 settle - 12:24, 94:6, 111:8, 132:20, 132:23 settlement - 4:25, 10:15, 17:13, 21:2, 38:1, 62:12, 122:10, 196.5 **settling** - 18:8, 19:22, 20:12 Settling - 9:4 seven - 171:17 sever - 69:17, 71:14, 78:22, 78:24, 98:15, 196:3 severable - 82:13 several - 51:23, 85:11, 102:10, 134:23, 156:17, 179:3, 179:21, 185:4 Several - 43:12 severance - 24:7, 24:12, 64:11, 66:4, 69:8, 70:12, 70:19, 70:23, 70:24, 71:12, 71:19, 79:12, 79:15, 79:19, 80:1, 86:14, 86:21, 88:24, 90:4, 90:13, 90:14, 90:22, 96:19, 97:2, 98:4

Document 642

100:11 severed - 76:7, 78:25, 97:17 **shaking** - 66:10 **shall** - 26:20, 26:22, 27:18, 79:6 shaping - 72:6 share - 12:1, 61:19, 63:14, 63:19, 66:17, 67:4, 67:8, 158:12 shared - 11:18, 59:5, 61:21, 64:7 sharing - 67:19, 73:22 sharpen - 155:15 **Shawn** - 14:23, 15:2 Shawn-earl - 14:23, 15:2 shed - 11:17 **Shelley** - 11:5, shifted - 150:24 ship - 162:1 shooter - 60:10, 61:4, 80:7, 80:9, 80:13, 81:15, 81:17, 81:25, 82:7, 88:6, 179:8, 180:5, 180:11, 180:20, 181:19, 183:3 **shooters** - 60:13, 81:21 **shooting** - 104:20, 179:5, 182:4 **shootings** - 104:18 Shores - 170:11 short - 100:2, 106:13 shortcut - 168:10 shorter - 77:3 shortly - 55:12, 68:3 show - 58:7, 107:18, 110:17, 133:18, 133:19, 171:6, 174:15, 179:23, 179:25 180:4, 181:14, 182:20, 184:6 show-up - 179:23, 179:25, 180:4, 181:14, 182:20, 184:6 showed - 133:21 showing - 172:2 shown - 53:14, 154:19, 172:7 shows - 131:1 **shuttling** - 143:22, 154:20 sic - 142:3 **side** - 4:9, 35:5, 44:16, 78:21, 120:12, 120:19, 120:22, 120:23, 129:20, 129:22, 129:23, 135:22 sifting - 72:25 signature - 4:18, 11:7, 15:4, 137:19 signed - 137:16, 195.6 significant - 87:3. 99:25, 113:20, 114:22 significantly - 191:3 similar - 49:19, 64:15, 170:12, 172:21, 173:1 Simpkins - 1:25, 199:10 simple - 65:25, 72:13, 78:22, 78:24, 161:25

simply - 13:12, 13:21, 30:17, 44:4 65:3, 80:14, 85:10, 98:23, 108:20, 109:14, 110:19, 114:25, 140:22, 152:1, 154:16, 173:23, 174:23, 176:7, 177:15, 185:10, 188:18, 188:20, 190:3 Simply - 31:6, 113.22 single - 40:18, 63:9, sit - 13:13, 13:21, 13:22, 75:25, 93:7, 96:10, 96:11, 124:15, 130:14 sits - 72:2 sitting - 35:23, 74:6, 128:9, 156:17 situation - 13:21, 13.21, 14:1, 55:3, 72:7, 72:9, 72:13, 72:16, 75:23, 78:19, 90:11, 109:12, 140:7, 149:3, 151:8, 151:10, 151:12, 154:10, 156:7, 156:16, 171:15 situations - 151:13, 151:15, 154:4 six - 66:6, 88:12, 181:19, 181:20, 182:13, 189:25 six-year - 88:12 sixes - 64:2 Sixth - 28:17, 99:10 slate - 86:15 Slow - 100:5, 157:15 Slowly - 135:6 small - 33:18, 163:12 Smallwood -120:12, 135:18 **smell** - 120:17, 135:25, 141:22 smelled - 35:21 121:3, 121:9, 129:7 smelling - 128:15 Smith - 179:1, 179:3, 179:21, 181:14, 181:17, 183:2 smoke - 119:14, 135:15 smoking - 119:12, 120:8, 121:12, 129:5, 129:9, 131:11, 131:17, 131:20, 131:22, 132:2, 132:8, 135.13 so-called - 163:16 social - 100:14 sock - 35:17 sold - 112:12, 112:13 solo - 188:14 solution - 90:23 someone - 32:25, 34:7, 40:25, 61:4, 69:19 sometime - 32:3, 53:24, 92:5 somewhat - 16:9, 16:18, 22:2, 50:22, 77:25, 79:15 somewhere - 156:9 song - 175:4 soon - 23:13, 23:16,

subject - 71:5, 94:17, 95:4, 147:12

submission -

subjected - 90:25

27:6, 107:11, 107:13 Sorry - 27:13
Sorry - 27:13
sorry - 14:24, 26:10, 30:20, 41:4, 41:6,
30:20, 41:4, 41:0, 40:1, 55:5, 50:13
49:1, 55:5, 59:13, 73:5, 74:18, 100:7,
105:21, 109:6.
132:17, 133:19,
149:14, 171:16,
105:21, 109:6, 132:17, 133:19, 149:14, 171:16, 178:23, 179:14, 183:1, 183:3 sort - 51:17, 51:18,
183:1, 183:3
SOR - 51:17, 51:18,
72.18 78.15 111.2
145:23 147:20
51:20, 63:8, 69:16, 72:18, 78:15, 111:2, 145:23, 147:20, 148:17, 148:22, 149:9, 150:20, 150:21, 151:6, 151:13, 158:12, 163:25, 167:16, 167:23, 173:7, 173:9 sorts - 177:7,
149:9, 150:20,
150:21, 151:6,
151:13, 158:12,
163:25, 167:16,
167:23, 173:7, 173:9
192:22
sought - 99:8
sounds - 55:22,
159:17
source - 121:11,
126:2
south - 129:24 South - 118:4,
South - 118:4,
118:23, 119:3,
119:11, 120:11, 129:21, 129:23,
129:21, 129:23, 135:8, 135:18,
136:19, 136:23
southbound - 137:2
southwest - 123:8,
123:10
southwestern -
117:20
sovereign - 152:20
sparse - 139:3
speaking - 143:20 speaks - 97:15,
97:18, 174:11
special - 63:8
special - 63:8 specific - 16:22,
27:20, 27:21, 81:25,
93:17. 127:12.
173:24, 177:2, 191:3
specifically - 69:1,
103:17, 112:2,
103:17, 112:2, 112:10, 148:12,
173:25
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17,
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19,
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20 Spence - 105:9.
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20 Spence - 105:9, 105:14, 105:24
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20 Spence - 105:9, 105:14, 105:24
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20 Spence - 105:9, 105:14, 105:24
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20 Spence - 105:9, 105:14, 105:24, 107:6, 113:7, 113:23, 113:24, 114:3, 144:5, 180:9, 189:9, 191:3, 192:18
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20 Spence - 105:9, 105:14, 105:24, 107:6, 113:7, 113:23, 113:24, 114:3, 144:5, 180:9, 189:9, 191:3, 192:18 spirit - 73:21
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20 Spence - 105:9, 105:14, 105:24, 107:6, 113:7, 113:23, 113:24, 114:3, 144:5, 180:9, 189:9, 191:3, 192:18 spirit - 73:21 squarely - 99:5.
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20 Spence - 105:9, 105:14, 105:24, 107:6, 113:7, 113:23, 113:24, 114:3, 144:5, 180:9, 189:9, 191:3, 192:18 spirit - 73:21 squarely - 99:5, 154:5, 155:25
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20 Spence - 105:9, 105:14, 105:24, 107:6, 113:7, 113:23, 113:24, 114:3, 144:5, 180:9, 189:9, 191:3, 192:18 spirit - 73:21 squarely - 99:5, 154:5, 155:25 stage - 76:3
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20 Spence - 105:9, 105:14, 105:24, 107:6, 113:7, 113:23, 113:24, 114:3, 144:5, 180:9, 189:9, 191:3, 192:18 spirit - 73:21 squarely - 99:5, 154:5, 155:25 stage - 76:3 Stamp - 133:22,
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20 Spence - 105:9, 105:14, 105:24, 107:6, 113:7, 113:23, 113:24, 114:3, 144:5, 180:9, 189:9, 191:3, 192:18 spirit - 73:21 squarely - 99:5, 154:5, 155:25 stage - 76:3 Stamp - 133:22, 134:12
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20 Spence - 105:9, 105:14, 105:24, 107:6, 113:7, 113:23, 113:24, 114:3, 144:5, 180:9, 189:9, 191:3, 192:18 spirit - 73:21 squarely - 99:5, 154:5, 155:25 stage - 76:3 Stamp - 133:22, 134:12
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20 Spence - 105:9, 105:14, 105:24, 107:6, 113:7, 113:23, 113:24, 114:3, 144:5, 180:9, 189:9, 191:3, 192:18 spirit - 73:21 squarely - 99:5, 154:5, 155:25 stage - 76:3 Stamp - 133:22, 134:12
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20 Spence - 105:9, 105:14, 105:24, 107:6, 113:7, 113:23, 113:24, 114:3, 144:5, 180:9, 189:9, 191:3, 192:18 spirit - 73:21 squarely - 99:5, 154:5, 155:25 stage - 76:3 Stamp - 133:22, 134:12 stand - 14:16, 24:9, 49:13, 63:2, 73:20, 73:23, 192:24 standard - 9:12,
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20 Spence - 105:9, 105:14, 105:24, 107:6, 113:7, 113:23, 113:24, 114:3, 144:5, 180:9, 189:9, 191:3, 192:18 spirit - 73:21 squarely - 99:5, 154:5, 155:25 stage - 76:3 Stamp - 133:22, 134:12 stand - 14:16, 24:9, 49:13, 63:2, 73:20, 73:23, 192:24 standard - 9:12, 54:10, 67:14, 139:15
173:25 speech - 196:25 speeches - 87:23 speed - 83:9 spell - 29:9, 41:7, 116:22 spence - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:20 Spence - 105:9, 105:14, 105:24, 107:6, 113:7, 113:23, 113:24, 114:3, 144:5, 180:9, 189:9, 191:3, 192:18 spirit - 73:21 squarely - 99:5, 154:5, 155:25 stage - 76:3 Stamp - 133:22, 134:12 stand - 14:16, 24:9, 49:13, 63:2, 73:20, 73:23, 192:24 standard - 9:12,

```
standing - 177:17, 190:20, 190:22
 start - 49:12, 50:8,
59:19, 69:22, 145:3,
168.7
 started - 33:15,
33:24, 136:20, 144:1
  State - 147:22
148:7, 148:8, 148:9,
148:14, 152:22

state - 29:9, 116:21,
142:9, 144:4, 145:15, 145:20, 145:21,
145:22, 148:23,
148:24, 149:23,
151:9, 151:11,
151:16, 151:25,
152:3, 152:8, 152:12,
152:17, 152:20,
152:21, 153:5,
153:19, 153:21,
153:23, 154:12,
154:14, 154:15,
154:24, 155:7,
156:24, 157:14,
157:16, 157:18,
158:2, 158:16,
158:17, 162:2,
169:14, 180:14,
180:19, 182:9,
187:19, 191:10,
191:15, 191:18,
191:19, 191:23,
195:22, 196:6
 state-owned -
157:16
 statement - 45:17,
60:5, 84:6, 84:19,
84:20, 93:2, 93:10,
93:11, 94:20, 94:22, 95:1, 95:3, 95:4, 95:7,
100:23, 103:8,
104:24, 104:25
107:23, 110:20,
112:20, 131:24
132:3, 135:2, 180:17,
181:17, 183:9,
189:20, 190:18
190:21, 190:22,
191:21, 191:22
  Statement - 119:22,
134:11, 134:18
 statements - 16:16,
64:16, 82:18, 95:2,
108:23, 112:1, 139:8,
179:4, 179:22,
186:19, 186:21
187:4, 187:5, 187:18,
192:12, 193:17,
194:2, 196:17
States - 1:1, 1:4, 1:13, 3:3, 72:10, 99:2,
116:14, 157:20,
158:5, 158:7, 158:8,
161:24, 171:14,
173:10, 174:2, 199:3,
199.6
 station - 118:9.
118:16, 118:22,
120:2, 135:10
 statistical - 89:22,
90:10, 100:14
 Staton - 127:22,
127:24
  status - 3:7, 16:4,
150:22, 189:7, 193:16
  statute - 70:14
162:9, 173:8, 173:17
  statutes - 57:16
```

statutory - 7:10

```
stayed - 106:13
step - 37:2, 120:16,
136:1, 138:12, 166:2
  steps - 171:5
  Stewart - 103:17,
103:20, 103:24,
104:5, 104:8
sticking - 120:21,
121:15, 121:21, 136:5
still - 26:7, 34:22,
72:3, 72:25, 74:7,
113:14, 114:20, 129:6, 141:11,
156:15, 158:16,
177:9, 177:10, 193:16
  stipulated - 139:21,
140:9
  stipulation -
137:25, 142:16
  stipulations -
  Stocksdale - 191:22
  Stokes - 170:12
stope - 170.12
stop - 34:13, 44:17,
47:15, 48:4, 128:19,
128:20, 128:21,
129:7, 135:21,
141:21, 141:19,
141:21, 142:11,
142:19, 162:21, 180:6
  stopped - 48:15,
 120:10, 120:11,
129:4, 131:18,
131:19, 131:20,
135:17, 138:11
stopping - 131:10, 131:16, 131:21, 132:1, 132:7, 132:11
  story - 103:3
  straightaway - 4:6
strange - 164:21,
164.22
  strategic - 8:13,
28:14
  strategy - 164:17,
166:20, 166:25,
167:1, 167:4, 167:5,
167:6, 167:13
  straw - 117:11
  street - 104:13,
107:13, 118:15,
118:17, 125:22,
126:13, 126:14
Street - 118:4,
118:24, 119:3,
119:11, 119:12,
120:12, 123:10,
127:21, 129:14,
129:21, 129:23,
135:9, 135:18,
136:19, 136:24, 138:5
  strenuously - 95:13
  stressed - 98:6
  stretches - 165:21
  strike - 89:16,
175:22, 194:21,
194:24
  string - 98:23,
174:10
strong - 25:5, 25:8, 120:17, 135:25
strongest - 12:11
strongly - 35:21,
66:12, 94:22, 147:17
  stuck - 87:18
  students - 164:8
  study - 89:22
stuff - 54:10, 65:4,
66:10, 185:20, 191:18
  Subject - 96:8
```

```
145:10, 151:1, 159:8, 159:13, 172:24
  submissions -
134:5, 134:9
submit - 107:22,
112:25, 113:12,
130:25, 134:5, 143:6,
163:4, 186:7, 187:21
submitted - 49:16,
49:18, 194:12, 194:15

submitting - 134:4
  subpoenaed -
 174:6
  subsequent - 98:23
  Subsequently -
53:25
  subsequently -
153:11
  subsisted - 57:22
  substance - 136:3
  substantial - 82:15,
substantially - 80:3, 80:20, 91:6, 187:15,
189:3
  substantive - 56:23
  substantively -
 143:19
  suffer - 16:18
  suffered - 16:2
  sufficient - 141:17
  sufficiently - 26:8
suggest - 70:6,
108:22, 155:19
  suggested - 141:7
  suggesting - 77:19,
93:10, 146:4

suggestion - 51:24,

163:20, 166:10
  Sullivan - 1:21
4:23, 5:22, 6:1, 6:2, 6:6, 6:24, 7:25, 8:2,
8:25, 9:15, 10:5,
10:10, 11:17, 11:20,
12:23, 13:3, 13:5,
13:11, 13:16, 13:22,
14:8, 25:20, 25:22,
25:23, 26:12, 26:15, 27:13, 27:14, 27:24,
28:2, 28:7, 30:20, 30:23, 36:5, 38:13, 38:14, 38:16, 41:23,
46:3, 47:14, 48:22, 50:8, 50:10, 50:20,
53:16, 53:17, 161:6,
194:20, 195:1
195:25, 198:5
  Sullivan's - 48:13
  sum - 176:17, 177:4
  summarize - 12:4.
 101:5, 176:9
  summarizes
 170:23
  summary - 144:9.
144:10
  sun - 58:4
  Super - 16:5
  Supermax - 158:2
  superseding -
53:25, 54:5, 57:3,
79:9, 163:1, 164:19,
 165:22, 166:13,
 169:4, 174:23,
175:14, 175:21,
176:13, 176:14
  supervised -
```

```
156:24, 157:17
 supplement - 3:13
 supplemental -
 support - 98:21,
 supported - 139:13
 supportive - 110:15
 suppose - 70:6.
101:20, 148:17
supposed - 100:15,
166:3
 supposedly - 57:8
 suppress - 179:16,
181:7, 183:16
 suppression
21:21, 140:5, 140:16, 142:23
 Supreme - 79:11,
90:2, 97:3, 97:13,
97:22, 98:6, 98:22,
99:5, 99:6, 99:11,
99:16, 100:1, 100:3, 100:6, 100:13,
100:16, 140:16,
173:10
 surgery - 115:20
surprised - 139:2
 surrounding -
189:8
 surveillance -
135:9, 138:9
 suspect - 24:11,
34:24, 94:24, 95:19,
158:9
 suspected - 136:3
 suspicion - 141:18
 swore - 134:18
sworn - 29:6, 99:22,
116.18
 system - 167:18
```

table - 74:7 tack - 73:2 tactical - 8:13 13:20, 28:13, 35:5 tag - 135:11 takers - 161:5 talks - 170:24, 173:12, 173:22, 174:4 tall - 179:6, 180:20, 180:23 taller - 179:7, 181.19 tame - 164:5 Tanya - 60:17, 102:19, 104:19, 110:3, 110:10, 168:19 tape - 55:11, 84:15, 85:1, 85:4, 106:18, 106:22 taped - 106:23 target - 107:5 task - 42:2, 63:25, 117:10 Task - 45:18, 47:5 tat - 78:19 **Taurus** - 118:22, 120:2, 135:10, 136:21, 138:11 teacher - 164:4 team - 44:9, 177:6, 177:9 technical - 162:12, 162:13 temp - 135:11 temporary - 145:23, 145.24

Ucc - 13:5, 21:9,

150.11

ten - 44:1, 134:3 tend - 93:5 term - 30:5, 57:13, 57:16, 152:20, 167:7 termed - 72:10 terms - 7:8, 12:11, 16:13, 16:19, 23:9, 51:17, 54:8, 55:7, 56:3, 151:6, 156:5, 162:8, 170:4, 170:5 **Terry** - 103:19 testified - 29:6, 38:24, 40:19, 47:12, 48:12, 116:18, 128:15, 179:8, 180:13, 182:8, 182:24 testify - 8:17, 10:7, 11:14, 39:19, 174:5, 180:15, 180:16, 180:18, 184:11, testifying - 40:21, 45:1, 124:18, 132:4, 139:6 testimonial - 185:10 testimony - 44:15, 53:5, 10:14, 110:12, 110:14, 112:6, 112:9, 113:2, 140:23, 141:14, 142:2, 183:19, 183:24, 187:17, 187:19 theater - 92:21, themselves - 13:25, 14:4, 87:3, 169:18 **theory** - 84:18, 88:8, 93:1, 138:25 Therefore - 24:20. 142:20, 155:9 therefore - 19:14, 23:19, 67:1, 82:22, 141:19, 141:23, 142:7, 171:25, 172:19 therefrom - 141:24 they've - 74:10 thinking - 65:20, thinks - 86:23 third - 53:25, 54:4, 57:3, 79:8, 111:2, 145:20, 148:24, 163:1, 164:19, 166:13, 169:4, 174:22, 175:14, 175:21, 176:14 **Thomas** - 2:2, 171:16, 171:20, 171:23, 172:2, 172:14 Thomas's - 172:15 thousand - 129:3 thousands - 130:7 threats - 9:25, 18:1 three - 8:16, 9:11, 12:22, 13:16, 23:2, 30:7, 65:8, 70:8, 71:9, 73:16, 77:16, 80:18, 81:1, 81:23, 88:12. 145:1, 168:23, 168:25, 181:19, 181:20, 182:13, 190:8 three-or-four-day thwart - 167:17 ticket - 107:17 tickets - 92:21 Tim - 4:22 time-out - 164:7 Timothy - 1:21, 195:24

Case 1:04-cr-00029-RDB

Tipton - 97:5, 98:2 tit - 78:19 Title - 173:5 today - 12:8, 12:11, 12:19, 14:7, 16:7, 16:12, 16:20, 19:17, 22:3, 22:18, 22:20, 22.3, 22.16, 22.20, 23:23, 24:22, 26:25, 40:17, 45:1, 87:22, 116:8, 116:9, 124:15, 128:9, 130:14, 126.9, 130.14, 176:21, 178:1, 182:1, 185:17, 187:14, 189:2, 189:12, 192:16 today's - 52:22, 165:23 together - 74:23, 77:4, 86:6, 105:2, 109:16, 112:11, 112:12, 151:4, 167:14, 185:25 token - 90:19 tomorrow - 3:16, 3:17, 3:20, 15:16, 16:8, 23:14, 115:12, 178:2 tone - 44:25 tons - 113:3 top - 82:12 tossed - 163:10 touch - 185:7, 185:12 toward - 116:21 towards - 34:21, 120:15 track - 118:18 tradition - 28:14 traffic - 44:17, 141:12, 141:19. 141.21 trafficking - 104:14 Training - 160:15 transaction -171:19, 172:13, 172:17 transcript - 110:9, 166:12, 185:10, 191:18, 199:2 transcripts - 59:10, 59:14, 165:12, 185:4 transfer - 148:20, 149:6, 152:7, 152:16, 153:3, 154:14 transferred -148:22, 148:23, 148:25, 152:2, 154:13 transfers - 144:11, 149:6, 151:7, 152:24 transformed - 107:4 transmission -34:8, 34:19 transmitted - 92:12 transport - 36:10 transported - 36:3, 36:14, 144:3 transporting -142:9 travel - 116:8 traveling - 104:15 treat - 21:13 treated - 16:5, 152:14 treating - 151:24 treats - 98:2 Treem - 2:9, 15:21, 15:22, 15:24, 16:25, 21:23, 21:25, 22:1, 22:11, 23:8, 23:19, 24:10, 24:20, 25:1,

25:7, 25:18, 52:7

52:14, 53:6, 69:10, 116:4, 116:5, 116:6, 116:11, 116:13, 194:8 Treem's - 69:24 trial - 3:9, 27:3, 28:19, 50:5, 59:2, 59:16, 59:19, 63:9, 59:10, 59:19, 63:9, 64:22, 67:1, 67:6, 69:22, 70:7, 71:4, 71:7, 71:8, 71:9, 73:14, 74:2, 75:20, 76:3, 76:24, 76:25, 77:1, 77:3, 78:11, 85:22, 90:6, 90:17, 93:25, 97:19, 99:8, 99:15, 99:25, 100:10, 114:9, 146:15 165:13, 180:19, 189:23, 190:1, 190:6, 196:3 trials - 66:2, 70:8, 77:2, 78:22, 78:25, 97:8, 97:9, 97:17 tried - 85:23, 86:17, 91:4, 98:12, 191:14, 193:2 trigger - 54:25, 56.19 trouble - 128:4 **true** - 28:1, 60:15, 60:16, 60:18, 65:5, 78:17, 80:11, 86:9, 151:15, 158:7, 186:15, 186:18, 199:7 True - 87:24 truly - 24:5 truncated - 64:22 truth - 130:20 truthful - 192:21 try - 35:6, 68:4, 90:20, 118:18, 155:15, 183:8 trying - 9:6, 73:1, 86:5, 146:14, 149:16, 177:4, 181:6 turn - 58:25, 59:3, 65:14, 65:21, 119:10, 129:14, 131:9, 166:21 turned - 44:19, 58:24, 67:1, 135:17, 167:16 turning - 65:10 turns - 167:14 twice - 89:25 two - 3:15, 3:22, 3:24, 11:21, 32:1, 34:17, 36:21, 54:21, 56:23, 71:8, 74:11, 75:11, 86:10, 88:23, 88:25, 89:8, 90:24, 92:21, 104:4, 108:10, 115:8, 140:2, 151:6, 154:19, 163:14, 165:17, 171:18, 172:12, 174:24, 184:12, 188:3, 190:8, 193:8, 193:10, 194:22 Two - 185:2 two-day - 3:15 type - 22:16, 57:24 types - 126:10 Typically - 134:3 typically - 134:8, 144:4, 145:14, 145:23, 156:5, 156:12 Tyree - 103:17, 103:20, 103:23, 104:5 U

ultimate - 76:1, 76:20, 77:6 unambiguous -149:21 unaware - 60:6 uncertain - 16:3 uncharacteristicall y - 167:3 unchartered - 164:1 unclear - 180:2 uncomfortable -78.1 uncontested -172:11 unconvincing -100:17 under - 9:8, 19:15, 25:14, 28:10, 28:17, 30:22, 31:6, 53:8, 53:10, 58:4, 58:6, 59:1, 59:9, 71:1, 72:15, 74:13, 76:10, 78:15, 82:13, 82:16, 85:21, 89:6, 93:1, 65.21, 69.6, 95.1, 113:3, 120:20, 121:16, 121:22, 136:5, 138:15, 140:1, 140:4, 140:16, 151:21, 155:6, 161:25, 162:17, 169:14, 169:16, 174:8, 174:14, 176:16, 179:8, 179:11, 180:18, 186:21, 187:1, 187:19, 189:3, 189:10, 190:4 Under - 84:19, 170.2 underneath -120:21, 120:22, 121:17 Understandable -60:14 understood - 5:14, 5:19, 110:15, 139:7 undertake - 23:17 unfairness - 98:12 unfettered - 8:4, 27:2, 27:18 Uniform - 5:8, 9:8, 10:23, 17:20, 18:17, 20:5, 20:19, 38:8, 94:13, 111:14, 122:49, 420:2, 420 122:18, 133:2, 196:12 uniform - 31:22. 151:22, 151:23 uniformed - 36:19, 36:21, 184:13 **Uniformed** - 184:14 Unit - 117:19, 118:15, 126:4, 126:12, 134:1 unit - 120:5, 123:21, 124:12, 126:13 **United** - 1:1, 1:4, 1:12, 3:2, 72:9, 99:1, 116:14, 157:20, 158:5, 158:7, 158:8, 161:24, 171:14, 173:10, 174:2, 199:3, 199.6 unknown - 4:17 unless - 21:14, 22:3, 27:17, 143:5, 194:8 unlikely - 70:10 unmarked - 31:19

31:21, 47:14 unnamed - 54:12 unreasonable -22:11 unrelated - 145:20 unreliability -181:13 unsecured - 12:17 unusual - 35:18. 140:7 **up** - 3:8, 7:22, 34:23, 35:5, 37:3, 38:21, 42:20, 44:16, 44:22, 45:13, 62:20, 62:24, 64:7, 68:1, 72:6, 73:20, 73:23, 75:23, 81:1, 83:13, 83:14, 83:20, 91:5, 93:24, 101:25, 105:2 106:21, 116:6, 119:7, 119:8, 120:10, 121:4, 121:7, 121:9, 121:21, 124:22, 126:15, 135:9. 144:15. 147:9. 148:10, 153:4, 154:14, 155:25, 162:25, 167:22, 169:10, 171:9, 171:12, 171:16, 176:17, 177:5, 179:23, 179:25, 180:4, 181:14, 182:20, 184:6, 185:25, 192:22, 192:24 update - 116:7 urges - 154:11 urging - 145:11 uses - 57:13 Usms - 160:23

value - 4:23, 4:24, 10:8, 10:14, 17:12, 18:8, 19:21, 20:12, 21:1, 37:25, 38:1, 62:9, 62:12, 94:6, 111:7, 111:8, 122:9, 122:10, 132:19, 133:4, 133:5, 150:4, 150:5, 195:23, 196:2, 196:5 values - 97:21, 98:2, 98:3 van - 32:5, 33:1, 34.16 variance - 187:15 variety - 113:20, 170:5 various - 11:24 57:9, 140:20, 144:3 144:10, 150:23, 168:3 varying - 8:2 vehicle - 31:17, vehicle - 31:17, 31:18, 31:19, 31:24, 32:1, 32:16, 32:18, 33:5, 33:16, 33:19, 33:24, 34:4, 34:8, 34:13, 34:15, 34:24, 35:2, 35:9, 35:22, 36:10, 36:15, 36:17, 37:2, 37:13, 44:18 37:2, 37:13, 44:18, 47:15, 47:21, 47:23, 47:25, 48:1, 48:3, 48:15, 48:19, 119:15, 119:24, 120:1, 120:10, 120:11, 120:13, 120:16,

Valdivia - 37:15

124:17, 125:7,

130:18, 131:7, 134:8

Wyche - 54:22

Willard's - 139:3

William - 91:16

Willie - 1:6, 4:14

137:9, 198:7

121:4, 121:8, 121:9,	Wait - 105:13			
121:14, 125:23,	waive - 5:4, 7:13,			
129:20, 129:22, 131:10, 131:21, 132:1, 132:8, 132:11, 135:11, 135:17, 135:22, 135:24,	10:18, 12:13, 17:16, 18:12, 20:1, 20:15,			
132:1, 132:8, 132:11,	21:4, 38:4, 94:9,			
135:11, 135:17,	111:10, 122:12,			
135:22, 135:24,	132:22, 139:25,			
130:1, 130:0, 130:7,	10.12, 20.1, 20.15, 21:4, 38:4, 94:9, 111:10, 122:12, 132:22, 139:25, 150:7, 153:12, 196:8 waived - 85:3, 85:5,			
136:1, 136:6, 138:7, 138:11, 138:13, 141:12, 141:22,	142:22			
141:25, 142:3, 142:4, 142:10, 142:12	waiver - 140:13,			
142:10, 142:12	142:18, 155:6,			
vehicles - 33:9,	155:17, 155:20,			
33:12 ventures - 101:24	155:23 waiving - 9:1			
verdicts - 97:16	Walk - 150:18			
versa - 188:16	walked - 121:4			
versus - 3:3, 90:3,	walking - 124:22			
97:4, 98:14, 99:2, 99:6, 99:12, 171:14,	wall - 75:10 wants - 7:23, 8:15,			
174:3	65:1, 69:8, 109:5,			
vetted - 156:11	190:8			
vice - 188:16,	warnings - 36:25,			
188:17	37:4, 37:7			
vicinity - 32:13 victims - 97:25	warrant - 31:8, 31:9, 37:17, 42:17, 42:22,			
view - 63:6. 141:5.	43:11, 91:20			
142:6, 143:18,	warranted - 58:1			
149:21, 161:18,	warrantless -			
162:8, 162:13	140:24			
viewed - 162:8 viewpoints - 99:19	warrants - 42:3 watching - 107:18			
vigor - 23:5	waters - 164:1			
vigorously - 28:12	Wayne - 11:5,			
Vine - 123:10,	106:23, 122:2			
127:21 violate - 57:22,	ways - 73:11, 80:24, 81:21			
63:18, 99:9, 146:5,	weapon - 45:3,			
152:4	45:12, 48:23, 102:18,			
violated - 162:14 violating - 69:3,	142:7			
112:5, 153:24	weapons - 36:16, 45:7, 102:20			
violation - 106:12,	wearing - 179:7,			
129:6, 142:9, 149:1,	179:12, 180:20,			
149:22, 150:25, 153:22, 154:16,	179:12, 180:20, 180:23, 181:20, 182:24, 183:3, 183:20			
154:20, 155:1, 155:9,	week - 6:8, 115:11			
159:10, 159:25	weeks - 164:10,			
violence - 31:9,	188:3, 190:5, 190:8,			
126:13	190:9, 194:23			
violent - 78:5 Virginia - 99:1,	welcome - 115:4 Welcome - 69:14			
159:9	West - 171:10,			
virtually - 130:21,	171:14, 171:23			
139:7	westbound - 119:12			
vociferously - 110:7	western - 123:12			
voice - 55:11,	whatsoever - 7:2,			
55:20, 83:1, 83:9,	9:23, 28:21, 66:1,			
84:8, 85:15, 85:19, 85:23, 92:12, 106:18,	79:8, 87:21, 124:20, 125:16			
106:22, 106:25,	wheelman - 114:5,			
185:14	182:4			
Voices - 83:23	whence - 147:1			
voices - 84:1, 84:4, 84:12, 85:4	whereby - 167:22 whimsical - 28:9			
volumes - 73:1	white - 127:21			
voluminous - 113:1	whites - 90:1			
voluntarily - 142:22	whole - 49:12,			
vs - 199:3 Vs - 1:5	65:12, 176:15 Wikipedia - 148:10			
V3 - 1.0	Willard - 116:15,			
W	116:16, 116:23,			
Weger 100:05	116:24, 117:2, 133:19, 134:17, 136:11, 136:12,			
wager - 160:25, 161:2	133.19, 134.17, 136:11, 136:12			
101.4	100.11, 100.12,			

wagon - 118:22,

120:2, 135:10

122:5, 191:6

wait - 110:23,

30:14, 33:18, 36:23, 37:20, 39:5, 42:18, 199:3 willing - 12:19, 89:9, 196:17, 196:24 window - 120:23 window - 120:23 wish - 17:1, 17:4, 17:8, 17:24, 18:4, 18:9, 18:21, 18:25, 19:11, 19:16, 19:18, 20:8, 20:9, 20:13, 20:22, 20:23, 21:3, 21:14, 21:16, 24:17, 24:22, 94:7, 11:18 24:22, 94:7, 111:8, 122:11, 133:9, 150:5, 178:3 wished - 25:3 wishes - 12:8, 13:19, 24:5 withdraw - 48:2 withdrawal -170:16, 170:24 171:4, 171:9, 171:25 Withdrawal - 172:6 withdrawing -171:12 withdraws - 172:5 Witherspoon -89:7, 89:12 withheld - 59:7 withholds - 65:13 Witness - 29:11, 30:21, 36:8, 116:23, 135:4, 135:7 witness - 21:22, witness - 21:22, 29:1, 29:5, 64:14, 68:6, 108:7, 115:9, 116:17, 163:18, 163:24, 166:8, 174:24, 174:25, 181:6, 184:8, 192:10 witness's - 142:2 witness's - 142:2, Witnesses - 198:2 witnesses - 3:22, 3:25, 7:3, 7:4, 60:22, 65:16, 67:7, 81:12, 81:14, 81:20, 83:25, 84:10, 98:1, 165:2, 165:9, 175:8, 178:16, 193:20, 194:3 woman - 124:11 wonderful - 192:13 wondering - 178:19 word - 148:17, 173.21 words - 48:18, 61:8, 71:10, 82:5, 84:11, 84:20, 146:22, 147:2, 148:21, 193:6 wore - 182:13 works - 143:21 world - 164:23 worth - 142:16 writ - 153:5, 153:6, 153:19, 154:14 write - 127:1, 127:2, write - 127.1, 127.2, 134:5, 148:10 write-up - 148:10 writing - 14:8, 86:15, 101:2, 107:22, 174:17, 187:11 writs - 153:16 written - 127:23, 144:24, 151:1, 159:15, 172:24, 186:2 wrote - 124:13,

Document 642

55:17, 56:24, 58:22, 92:1, 105:19, 105:22, 106:9, 106:24, 107:16, 123:4, 191:9, 191:16 Wyches - 83:7, 92:15 Wyches' - 83:10 **Wyda** - 137:17 **Xy1257** - 135:12 Yankees - 177:6 **year** - 59:2, 64:21, 88:12, 134:2, 169:15 years - 29:24, 30:8, 39:15, 41:21, 117:7, 118:7, 124:8, 125:18, 126:15, 163:14, 165:17, 169:25, 179:2, 181:17 York - 102:3, 104:15, 177:6 yourself - 5:25. 17:1, 17:5, 17:9, 17:24, 18:5, 18:21, 19:1, 19:11, 130:3 zealously - 26:1, 28:12